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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
Defendants.

________________

)
) Case No. CV 10-0677
)
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord and hereby move this
Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(a) for summary judgment as to the entitlement of attorney's fees
and the amount thereof ($60,000), or at least partial summary judgment on the issue of
entitlement of attorney's fees.
The basis of this motion is that Defendants have answered Plaintiffs' complaint and have
failed, pursuant to l.R.C.P. 8(d), to deny specific allegations made in Plaintiffs' complaint
thereby admitting the truth of the matter contained therein. Specifically, Defendants have failed

.
,
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to affirmatively deny paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. Thus, by
failing to deny the allegations made in these paragraphs, Defendants have admitted their truth.
By admitting the truth of the foregoing paragraphs, Defendants have no factual basis to defend
against Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho law.
This motion is supported by affidavit of counsel as well as memorandum filed
contemporaneously herewith and incorporated herein. This motion is also supported by the
pleadings filed in this case.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS WAIVED.
DATED this

r~

day of May, 2010.

Kinzo .
Counsel for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
/
day of May, 2010, I caused a true, accurate,
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via the
method indicated below:
·

1--

William J. Schroeder
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P. 0. BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Telephone: (208-664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338

[~IA HAND-DELIVERY
[ ] VIA F ACSMILE @ (208) 664-6338
[ ] VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL

Mailing Address:
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Kinzo H. Mihara
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Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940
Attorney at Law
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308
P. 0. Box 969
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969
P (208) 667-5486
F (208) 667-4695
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Counsel/or Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
The EST ATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
Defend ants.

----------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 10-0677

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record and hereby offer this
memorandum oflaw in support of their motion for summary judgment. This memorandum is
supported by the affidavit of counsel filed contemporaneously herewith, along with counsel's
previous affidavit, which are both incorporated herein by reference.

L

UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL ffiSTORY

Benjamin Charles Holland (Ben) passed away on October 25, 2009. See Complaint; see also
Aff. K. Paukert,~ 3. Shortly after Ben passed, his parents, Gregory and Kathleen Holland,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR

SUMMAK1'1J1JDGMENT - 1

Page 268 of 709

Plaintiffs herein, contacted their attorney for assistance with legal matters related to their son's
death. See Aff. K. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Aff. K.
Mihara (May)), Ex. "1." Their attorney offered to represent them pro bono publico. Id. The
Estate of Benjamin C. Holland and Ben Holland's parents, Gregory and Kathleen (Plaintiffs),
combined, held three (3) policies of insurance with Defendants. See Complaint, ,i,i,i 3, 4, and 5;
see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RF A no. 16). Claims relating

to Ben's death were made under all three policies. See Complaint; see also Aff. K. Mihara
(May), Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RF A no. 16).
Plaintiffs' attorney provided proofs of loss to Defendants as provided for in Plaintiffs'
policies of insurance on November 10, and provided information in response to inquiry on
November 17, and December 1, 2009, January 27 and 28, 2010. See Complaint, ,i,i 9 and l O; see
also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "3," "4," "5," and "19" (Defendants' response to RFA nos. 2

and 6).
Plaintiffs' attorney constantly engaged both Defendants' adjustor and coverage counsel in an
attempt to obtain a coverage decision from November, 2009 to February 2, 2010. See Aff. K.
Mihara (Feb.), ,i 6; see also Aff. K. Paukert, ,i,i 4-17. Indeed, it should be noted that in midJanuary, 2010, despite being well over thirty (30) days since formal proof of loss had been given,
Plaintiffs had not filed a complaint against Defendants as Defendants' coverage counsel had
requested, and Plaintiffs had agreed not to take any formal legal action against Defendants until
January 22, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.), Ex. "B;" see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "6"
and "7." Defendants failed to give Plaintiffs an answer regarding coverage under the applicable
policies of insurance on or before January 22, 20 IO, Plaintiffs and their attorney came to a new

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
S081WAJll:1 lJUDGMENT - 2

Page 269 of 709

understanding regarding fees, and this lawsuit was filed on January 26, 2010. See Complaint; see

also Aff. K. Paukert, ,i,i 4-14; see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "2."
On February 2, 2010, Defendants made their first tender to settle this matter. See Answer,

Exs. "A" and "B;" see also Aff. K. Paukert, 1 10; see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19"
(Defendants' response to RF A No. 9). The tender was for $200,000.00- applicable limits under
the motorcycle insurance policy identified in the compiaini. See Compiaint, ,i 5; see also
Answer, Ex. "B," see also Aff. K. Paukert 1 10 and Ex. "l ." On February 9, 2010, Plaintiffs
filed their Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. See Plaintiffs' Motion for
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. Plaintiffs' motion was supported by memorandum
·and affidavit filed contemporaneously therewith. Id. On February 9, 2010, Defendants were
served with the Complaint, Summons, Motion for Attorney's Fees, Affidavit, and Memorandum
in Support. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), 119, Ex. "13;" see also Aff. K. Paukert, 114.
Defendants' counsel, William B. Schroeder, was also provided these documents on or about
February 12, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), 122, Ex. "16." Plaintiffs' demanded $60,000.00,
in addition to the $200,000.00 tendered under the applicable policies, as compensation as a
reasonable attorney's fee due and owing pursuant to the statute allowing for the award of
attorney's fees. Id.
In late February, 2010, subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees,
Counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly negotiated and drafted the settlement release
document in this matter, attached to Defendants' answer and entitled "Release of All Claims."

See Aff. K. Mihara (May), ,i 23, Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RFA nos. 21 and 22); see
also Answer, Ex. "A." Such negotiated settlement agreement expressly reserved the issue of
attorney's fees, and the amount thereof, to be decided by this Court. See Joint Motion and
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Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney's Fees; see
also Answer, Ex. "A;" see also Aff. K. Mihara (May),~~ 22, 23, and Ex. "19" (Defendants'

response to RF A No. 22).
On February 26, 2010, pursuant to the terms of the settlement, counsel for both Plaintiffs and
Defendants jointly executed a motion to dismiss all claims, with prejudice, except for the
pending motion for attorney's fees. See Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims
Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendants' attorney authorized payment of
the full settlement amount once Plaintiffs executed the jointly drafted release. See Aff. K. Mihara
(May), Ex. "17.") All parties stipulated to the form of the order dismissing the underlying claims
in this case. See Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the Pending
Motion for Attorney Fees. Pursuant to the stipulation and joint motion this Court entered the
requested order on March 3, 2010. Id.
Defendants have just recently answered Plaintiffs' complaint. See Answer. Attorney
Katherine Paukert has just recently executed affidavits in support of Defendants' opposition to
Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. See Aff. K. Paukert; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert.
Adjustor Daneice Davis has also just submitted affidavits. See Aff. D. Davis; see also Supp. Aff.
D. Davis. Further, Defendants have recently served responses to Plaintiffs' first discovery
requests and the time for Defendants to amend their answer as a matter ofright has passed. See
Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19;" see also I.R.C.P. 8(d) and I.R.C.P. 15.
Those are the facts, and those facts are undisputed.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c);
Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991); see also Sewell v. Neilson,
Monroe, Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 194, 706 P .2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1985). Standards applicable to

summary judgment require the district court to liberally construe facts in the existing record in
favor of the party opposing the motion, and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 436. If the record contains conflicting inferences or if
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Id. The
moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to establish existence of an
element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of poof at trial.
Badell v. Beeks, l 15 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.26 126 (1988). A mere scintilla of evidence of only

slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary
judgment. Samuel V. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303,306
(2002).

ill.

ARGUMENT

Defendants have admitted all necessary facts for final adjudication of this matter by failing to
affirmatively deny such facts in their answer, by submitting the affidavits of Katherine Paukert
and Daneice Davis, and by serving their responses to Plainitffs' discovery requests.
Also, Defendants' estopple claim contained in their answer fails for lack of proof of the
necessary elements.
And finally, the factual assertions in Ms. Paukert's affidavits, along with the affidavit filed
by Daneice Davis, support the award of attorney's fees sought by Plaintiffs, and in the amount
if not in a greater amount - than that sought by Plaintiffs.
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It is for the foregoing reasons why summary judgment should be entered in favor of
Plaintiffs. Each reason is discussed in detail below.
a. Defendants have admitted all facts necessary for this Court to enter
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if a party fails to deny an allegation in a
responsive pleading, then such an aIIegation is deemed admitted. See I.R.C.P. 8(d). The rule
provides:
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than
those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive
pleading. except those necessary to sustain an action for divorce ...

Id. (emphasis added). The applicable rule provides, "[tJhere shall be a complaint and an
answer. .. " See I.R.C.P. 7(a). Thus, an answer is the responsive pleading to the complaint and
any averments in the complaint not denied by the answer are deemed admitted.
In this case, Plaintiffs made specific averments in their complaint. See Complaint, ~~ 9, I 0,
13, 16, 17, and 18. The gist of these averments were that Plaintiffs had properly noticed their
claim pursuant to the policies' terms, and Defendants had failed for a period of over thirty (30)
days to tender an amountjustly due under those policies contrary to LC.§ 41-1839, thus entitling
Plaintiffs to award of their attorney's fees under the statute. Id.
Upon review of the Answer in this case it is apparent that Defendants fail to deny paragraphs
9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 in their answer. See Answer,~ 2. Defendants state:
... no Answer is required as to Paragraphs 1 through 33, as all claims, except the
claim for LC.§ 41-1839 attorney's fees, alleged in paragraph 34 of the
Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice ...
See Answer, pp. 2. Thus, Defendants' answer fails to deny the factual allegations contained in
paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' complaint.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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The reason that Plaintiffs had set an evidentiary hearing for this matter was to introduce
evidence to support paragraphs 9, IO, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' complaint, availing
themselves to the entitlement of attorney's fees in this matter. In short, by failing to deny
paragraphs 9, IO, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendants have admitted the facts
necessary for adjudication of this matter and have negated any need for an evidentiary hearing.

It is because Defendants have admitted all necessary allegations by failing to deny the
allegations contained in Plaintiffs complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(d) that Plaintiffs are entitled
to summary judgment on the remaining issue in this case.
b. Defendants' estopple argument is without merit as Defendants fail to provide
evidence to satisfy the elements of estopple.
Defendants' third affirmative defense is an equitable claim that Plaintiffs are estopped from
claiming attorney's fees. Defendants' argument is fatally flawed as Defendants fail to marshal
any evidence in support of their argument.
Under Idaho law, in order to obtain the benefit of equitable estoppel, a party must show:
( 1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not
and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or
concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the
misrepresentation or concealment to his or her prejudice.
See Weitz v. Green, April 2, 2010, docket no. 33696 (Idaho Supreme Court).
In this case, the only evidence Defendants offer is the affidavits of Katherine Paukert and
Daneice Davis. See Aff. K. Paukert. Ms. Paukert and Ms. Davis make several conclusory
statements; however, Defendants never parse out how such statements represent either a 'false
representation' or a 'concealment of a material fact' by Plaintiffs. In addition, under the second
element, Defendants fail to show how their adjuster and/or counsel 'did not and could not have
discovered the truth.' In fact, it is undisputed that Defendants have retained not one, but two law

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
S~(JUDGMENT- 7

Page 274 of709

firms to represent them in this matter. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "16" to "18." Defendants
further fail to prove or even allege how it was the intent of counsel to have Defendants rely upon
his statement(s).

It is for the reason that Defendants fail to prove the necessary elements of equitable estopple
that Defendants third affirmative defense and/or argument is fatally flawed and must be
disregarded.
c. The factual assertions in Ms. Davis' and Ms. Paukert's affidavits support the
award of attorney's fees sought by Plaintiffs, and in the amount sought by
Plaintiffs.
Idaho law sets forth the criteria that this Court must weigh when dealing with requests for
statutory attorney's fees in cases such as this. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3); See Martin, 138 Idaho 244
(2002); see also Halliday, 89 Idaho 293 (1965); see also Walton, 120 Idaho 616 (1991).
The rule of civil procedure states:
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it
shall consider the following factors in determining the amount of such fees:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field oflaw.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's
case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
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In this case, Ms. Paukert affirms that she knew that counsel for Plaintiffs had agreed to
represent Plaintiffs pro bono publico. See Aff. K. Paukert, il 4; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert.
Ms. Paukert further acknowledges that counsel for Plaintiffs was making every possible
argument on behalf of his clients. Id., ii, 5-28. Indeed, in the face of adversarial posturing,
Plaintiffs' counsel provided Idaho case law supporting Plaintiffs' legal and equitable positions.

Id., ,i 6-28. Also, it is undisputed that Ms. Paukert acknowledges that Defendants did not provide
Plaintiffs a coverage answer on January 22,2010, the mutually-agreed upon date to do so. Id.,

,i,iii 7, 8, and 9. The most important fact that can be gleaned from Ms. Paukert's affidavit is that liability and damages were still at issue between the parties on the day the Complaint was
filed. Id.,, 9 and 10. Plaintiffs filed their complaint only after being told by Defendants'
coverage counsel that, "[i]t was my final opinion that the majority of states would not find
coverage." Id.,, 8. It was apparent that Defendants were disputing both coverage and liability.
Despite the conclusory statements contained in Ms. Paukert's affidavit regarding the fact that
Plaintiffs' counsel's theories regarding coverage in that more than one insurance policy applied
to the covered loss, it is telling that Defendants issued two checks - one check referencing a
claim number under one policy, and another check referencing a claim number under another
policy. See Af£ K. Mihara (May), Ex. "15;" see also Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RFA
nos. 18 and 19). Plaintiffs would submit that perhaps Plaintiffs' counsel's theories were not as
'off the wall' as Defendants attempt to portray them as payment was issued under two policies.
Ms. Paukert states that "MetLife is a good company." See Aff. K. Paukert, il 8. Plaintiffs
would assert just the opposite. MetLife was such a good company that Plaintiffs had not received
a coverage answer despite waiting over two months! See Aff. K. Paukert, ,i, 3-12. MetLife was
such a good company in that their adjuster was seeking additional proof of loss (motorcycle title)
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after being advised that the lawsuit had been filed. See Aff. K. Paukert, ,I 8; see also Aff. K.
Mihara (Feb.), Ex. "C." Would MetLife have this Court believe that it was seeking the additional
information to perhaps pay more than they would have contractually had to pay under the
policies?
The above facts show that MetLife would have denied coverage for Plaintiffs' claims under
the higher policy limits if they could have. They were looking for every opportunity to do so.
Their coverage counsel was posturing against Plaintiffs' attorney theories by trying to argue noncoverage under the policies. As Ms. Paukert states in her affidavit, "I explained to him that I
thought he had significant problems with his stacking and household residency requirements,"
·and "I interpreted Idaho law not to allow the stacking of insurance policies," "in my opinion,
Benjamin Holland was not a household resident," "it was my final opinion that the majority of
states would not find coverage," and "[i]t is definitely not a clear-cut case that there would be
coverage under the motorcycle policy" - but despite all of this "MetLife offered the limits."
Both Ms. Davis' and Ms. Paukert's affidavits are proof that there was significant time and
labor required of Plaintiffs' attorney. Further, their affidavits show that the questions of law were
particularly novel and difficult. Despite facing such adversity, Plaintiffs' counsel showed the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney
in the particular field oflaw. Ms. Paukert's affidavits do not appear to speak to the prevailing
charges for like work. Ms. Paukert's affidavits confirm that the fees were pro-bona, and then
contingent immediately prior to filing the lawsuit. Time limitations imposed by the
circumstances of this case were that Plaintiffs had waited for over two months for a coverage
answer before filing suit, Defendants had denied liability and/or coverage, and perhaps a
declaratory action against Plaintiffs was imminent. Two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00),
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the policy limits under one of the greater policies at issue, obtained without Plaintiffs having to
go through an arduous litigation path, was the amount involved and the results obtained. Ms.
Paukert's affidavits show that there was significant legal research conducted by both parties.
As this Court is well aware, one of the factors not enumerated in the rule, but covered by case
law, is that an attorney's attempt to settle the case without litigation should be taken into account
by the trial court when awarding statutory attorney's fees. See Walton v. Hartford Ins. Co., 120
Idaho 616 ( 1991 ). In Walton, the plaintiffs' attorney had attempted to orchestrate settlement prior
to filing a lawsuit. 1 Id. at 618.
In Walton, like in this case, counsel for the plaintiffs waited until he had obtained the best
result he believed he could for his clients until he advised the insurance company that he would
be seeking statutory attorney's fees. 2 Id. at 619. In its ruling, the Supreme Court ofldaho stated:

It should be kept in mind that in representing the Waltons, their counsel initially
tried to orchestrate a settlement without litigation or arbitration, and certainly
without delay, in which event the costs of counsel to the Waltons would have
been only 25 percent of the recovery. However, it is abundantly clear that
Hartford may very well have procrastinated as long as possible in order to avoid
paying under the underinsured provisions of its policy sold to the Waltons, who
had willingly had paid the premium with the reasonable expectation that the
Hartford umbrella covered them up to the amount of$300,000. As it was,
Hartford was quite willing to hold back from settling, and has cost the Waltons
considerably more in attorney fees. Hartford's delay caused the ultimate result,
not consistent with the statute, of substantially diminishing the Walton's recovery.
Id. at 621. Upon review of the District Court file, it appears that the Waltons' attorney was paid
his contingency fee by The Hartford.

1
"Not mentioned in the district court's otherwise well-narrated sequence of events is the reluctance of counsel for the Waltons to
embroil them in a trial. .. counsel retained by the Waltons entered into a written fee agreement, contingent upon recovery, which
provided for only 25 percent if counsel did not have to litigate, but 33 1/3 percent if such became necessary."
2

"Within 48 hours of the [arbitration] award, The Hartford's draft in the amount of $166,000.00 was tendered to Mr. and Mrs.
Walton. Shortly thereafter, The Hartford was advised that the Walton's counsel intended to petition for his one-third contingent
attorney's fees pursuantto I.C. § 41-1839."
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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In this case, it is undisputed by all parties that counsel for Plaintiffs would have performed
his services on this case for free had there been a coverage answer forthcoming on January 22,
2010. In this case, it was MetLife that caused considerably more work for Plaintiffs and has
resulted in considerably more in attorney's fees and time and energy. From the facts of this case,
like Walton, it is abundantly apparent that MetLife may very well have procrastinated as long as
possible in order to avoid paying under the underinsured provisions of its policies - policies sold
to Plaintiffs who had willingly paid their premiums with the reasonable expectation that their
insurance company would cover them up to their limits. This case was not filed before January
22, 2010. This case was only filed after MetLife's coverage counsel stated that her "final
opinion" was that "there was no coverage."
It is counsel's hope that Defendants do not have the audacity to try to persuade this Court to

believe that MetLife would have tendered the limits of any of the larger of the policies had
Plaintiffs not had an attorney to advocate on their behalf.
MetLife should pay the requested attorney's fees and MetLife has only itself to blame as it
failed to tender the amount justly due to Plaintiffs within thirty days after receiving proof of loss.
IV.

CLOSING

It is for the foregoing reasons why attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiffs in the
amount requested in their memorandum, if not in greater amount depending on this Court's
discretion, for having to bring and prosecute this matter to its current status. At the minimum,
Plaintiffs ask for this Court to decide the issue of entitlement of attorney's fees.
DATED this

f t day of May, 2010.
Kinzo H. Mihara
Counsel for Plaintiffs

,.,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lh

_. ·1-},t__
I
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
/
day of
'V\"'-'j , 2010, I caused a
true, accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants
attorney via the method indicated below:
William J. Schroeder
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
70 I Front A venue, Suite IO I
P. 0. BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, Ida.lio 83816-0328
Telephone: (208-664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338

[ /4IA HAND-DELIVERY

[ J VIA FACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338
[

] VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL

Mailing Address:
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
Defendants.

-----------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 10-0677

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
PERFORMANCE OR DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord and hereby respond to
Defendants' pending motion to compel and/or dismiss. Plaintiffs would ask the Court to deny
Defendants' motion for the following reasons:

I.

1

BACKGROUND AND UNDISPUTED FACTS

1
Also for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Plaintiffs point this Court to the factual allegations in their complaint, which facts
Defendants do not deny in their Answer. Further, Plaintiffs would point this Court to the filings
in the Court's record.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As Defendants fail to cite law or authority as the basis for their motion, and as
Defendants fail to include a standard of review section in their memorandum of authorities in
support of their motion, and hence the standard of review section of this response will not be
included.
III. ARGUMENT
a. Defendants fail to cite law or authority for the basis of their motion and as
such it must be dismissed.

One of the basic tenets of Idaho jurisprudence is that a motion for affirmative relief must
state the rule or law upon which motion is based. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l).
The applicable rule states:
An application to the Court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made
during a hearing or a trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity
the grounds therefore including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any,
under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief sought.

Id. Hence, there are three requirements of every motion. Id. (emphasis added).
In this instance, Defendants' motion cites neither statute, case law, nor an applicable civil
rule as a basis for relief. See Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement
and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. The motion states that it is based upon an
affidavit of Kathleen Paukert and Defendants' memorandum filed contemporaneously with their
motion. Neither Ms. Paukert's affidavit, nor Defendants' memorandum carry the force of law
and are, therefore, improper bases for the foundation of a motion.
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Because the application of I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) is mandatory to all motions filed with the
Court seeking affirmative relief, and because Defendants fail to cite any applicable law upon
which said motion is based, Defendants' motion is fatally flawed and must be denied.

b. Defendants are judicially estopped from arguing that Plaintiffs' execution of
the settlement document precludes their recovery of attorney's fees.
An issue before this Court is whether Defendants can jointly appear before this Court and
file a document entitled, "Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for
the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees" based upon "settlement of this matter" and then turn
around and claim that such settlement precludes the Court from awarding statutory attorney's
fees.

It is a well entrenched principle of Idaho law that a party cannot take inconsistent
positions before the court, or otherwise speak out of both sides of one's mouth. See Loomis v.

Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94, 277 P.2d 561, 565 (1954) (a litigant is estopped from adopting
inconsistent and contrary positions arising out of the same transaction or subject matter); McKay

v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). 2
In this case, "in derogation of the settlement terms," it is undisputed that Katherine
Paukert, Esq. transmitted a draft settlement release that contained an explicit indemnification
3

provisions for both herself and her law firm. See Aff. K. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Aff. K. Mihara, (May)), Exs. "15" and "19" (Defendants' response to
RFA no. 23). Unsurprisingly, Plaintiffs' counsel advised that his clients would not execute such
a settlement draft.

2

the policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice
and regard for the dignity ofjudicial proceedings. Judicial estopple is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose
with the courts. Loomis, at 93-94.
3
This fact, in and of itself, constitutes a breach of the agreement between the parties and therefore any agreement reached prior
had already been breached and was therefore by operation of law, terminated, and any further performance by Plaintiffs was
excused. ln the alternative, the facts support the finding of either modification or novation.
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It is further undisputed that counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly negotiated

and drafted the settlement document attached to Defendants' answer. See Joint Motion and
Stipulated Order; see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" (Defs' answer to RFA no. 23). In
regards to the issue of attorney's fees, Plaintiffs' attorney had sent Defendants' attorney a letter
which stated in part:
... Please let this letter memorialize that you have requested, and I have agreed,
that I will not disburse the checks in my possession (check nos. 002599482
($50,000) and 002599483 ($150,000)) at least until you and I have had a chance
to attempt to find some mutually-agreeable release language that is acceptable to
both of our clients ...
See Aff. K. Mihara, Ex. "20" (emphasis added). Now it appears that despite the release being

jointly drafted by Defendants' attorney, Defendants argue that such release language was not
mutually-agreeable nor acceptable. See Defendants' Motion to Compel or Dismiss.
Indeed, it is undisputed that it was Defendants' attorney that filed the joint motion and
stipulated order based upon the fact that "the parties have fully resolved all claims in this matter
except for the pending motion for attorney fees." See Af£ K. Mihara (May), Ex. "18;" see also
Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the Pending Motion for
Attorney Fees; see also Answer, Ex "A.". To be sure, it was Defendants' attorney who gave
Plaintiffs' attorney authority to disburse the settlement checks once the aforementioned release
was signed. 4 See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "17." Surprisingly, in light of the foregoing facts, it
is Defendants who now seek dismissal of the remaining claim in this case based upon the very
same language that was before them when the settlement release was negotiated, drafted, and
executed.
Equity refuses to bend to allow Defendants, who had full knowledge of the claims of the
case, negotiate specific terms of a settlement release, authorize full payment of the settlement
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amount once said settlement document has been executed, and then claim that the release their
attorney jointly drafted is not the release envisioned by the settlement. The time to file a
successful motion to compel settlement terms expired at the time Defendants, through their
attorney, negotiated the specific terms of release and authorized full payment upon execution of
the jointly negotiated settlement draft. 5
It is for the foregoing reason why Defendants' motion fails.

c. Plaintiffs' and Defendants' agreement of February 3, 2010 was not an
enforceable contract as material terms of the agreement had yet to be
negotiated.
Another issue becomes whether Plaintiffs' and Defendants' entered into a binding
settlement agreement on February 3, 2010.
As Defendants correctly note, Idaho law sets forth the fact that stipulations for the
settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the courts and will be enforced unless good
cause to the contrary is shown. See Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532, 53839 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Kohringv. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002);

Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 633, 888 P .2d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1995)). Whether the
parties to an agreement or stipulation become bound prior to the drafting and execution of a
contemplated formal writing is largely a question of intent. See Lawrence, at 538 (citing

Kohring, 137 Idaho at 99). The intent of the parties is to be determined by the surrounding facts
and circumstances of each particular case. Id. (citing Conley, 126 Idaho at 634). The stipulations
are best evaluated by looking to the very words of counsel and their clients. Id. Circumstances
which have been suggested as being helpful in determining the intention of the parties are:
whether the contract is one usually put in writing; whether there are few or many details; whether

4

Any further demand from Defendants for performance from Plaintiffs fails for lack, of consideration.
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the amount involved is large or small; whether it requires a formal writing for a full expression
of the covenants and promises; and whether the negotiations themselves indicate that a written
draft is contemplated at the final conclusion of the negotiations. Id. (citing Elliot v. Pope, 42
Idaho 505, 511 (1926)).
In Lawrence, cited above, it was noted that a formal writing was expected to be executed
by the parties. Id. at 539. Specific release language had not previously been discussed. Id. The
parties confirmed that written releases were regularly used in the settlement of similar cases. Id.
The district court, pursuant to its own experiences, also indicated that a written release would
normally follow the type of agreement in the case. Id.
Releases are usually contemplated in the settlement of insurance cases such as the one at
bar. In this case, it is undisputed that the parties had discussed the execution of a formal
document (a release) in their attorneys' February 3; 2010 emails. See Answer, Ex. "B." It is also
undisputed that subsequent to the February 3, 2010 emails, the parties' attorneys negotiated the
specific terms of the release in this case. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "16," "17," "19" (Defs'
responses to RFAs nos. 21 and 22), and "20." There is no dispute that the settlement release in
this case, negotiated and drafted by counsel for both parties, contains express language that
excludes Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees from its terms. See Answer, Ex. "A." There is
also no dispute of fact that Defendants' authorized full payment once Plaintiffs executed the
mutually-negotiated and drafted release attached to Defendants' Answer as Exhibit "A." See Aff.

K. Mihara (May), Ex. "17." In addition, consistent with their understanding with Defendants, it
is undisputed that Plaintiffs' executed the mutually-negotiated and drafted release. See Answer,

5

If not before when their other counsel sent a draft settlement release with terms not envisioned by the February 3, 20 IO
agreement.
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Ex. "A." In short, Plaintiffs have fully complied with their obligations under any agreement
reached on February 3, 2010.

It is for the foregoing reasons that Defendants' motion should be denied as Plaintiffs have
fully performed under the terms of the agreement that was negotiated between the parties.
d. Plaintiffs lack authority to waive entitlement to their attorney's fees.
For almost sixty (60) years Idaho law has recognized t½.at insurers who fail to pay
amounts justly due under policies of insurance for a period of thirty days must pay statutory
attorney's fees to Plaintiffs. See Chapter 289, page 621, 1951 Session Laws (approved March 22,
1951); see also Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524,529,275 P.2d 969
(1954).
The Court noted back in 1954, "the enactment of such statutes constitutes a valid exercise
of the police power... " Penrose, at 537. Indeed, the Supreme Court went on to observe that:
... the parties entered into the insurance contract charged with the knowledge of
the reserved police power of the state which may at any time be invoked in the
promotion of the general welfare by enlarging from time to time the remedies and
procedures in connection with insurance contracts; the statute... does not affect
the substantive matter of the contract; it only enlarges the remedies and
procedures available to an insured whose claim is not paid who is obligated to
litigate and does successfully litigate his claim under the insurance contract ...
Penrose, at 539 (emphasis added). Hence, it is the reserved police power of the state of Idaho

that imposes the attorney's fees liability upon Defendant.
The very issue of whether parties have the authority to release another who owes them a
statutory duty has come before the Supreme Court of Idaho in a case involving a horse rider who
was injured due to the negligence of the outfitter. See Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976
(1984). The Court recognized the general rule of law that statutory rights and duties may not be
waived or exempted by contract. Id. at 979. The Court held:
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... that where the legislature has addressed the rights and duties pertaining to ...
injuries arising out of the relationship between two groups, i.e.,
employers/employees, outfitters and guides/participants, and has granted limited
liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties, then such
duties become a "public duty" within the exception to the general rule validating
exculpatory contracts ...

Id.
There is no dispute of fact that LC. § 41-1839 is the code provision that applies to the
statutory award of attorney's fees in cases such as this. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19"
(Defendants' response to RFA no. 15). It is further undeniable that said code provision allows for
limited liability for attorney's fees if the insurer simply tenders the amount due to the insured to
the insured within thirty days. See I.C. § 41-1839(1). Further, liability for attorney's fees can be
avoided if the insurer simply deposits such amount with a court. See I.C. § 41-1839(2).
In this case, despite having received proof ofloss in early November of 2009, Defendants
never tendered anything prior to February 2, 2010. See Af£ K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19"
(Defendants' response to RFA no. 9); see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, 1 18. Indeed, in the face of
dispositive case law, Defendants do not admit that the amount settled upon was ''the amount
justly due." 6 Id. (Defendants' response to RFA no: 12).
Arguing by analogy, Plaintiffs would ask the Court to note that there is civil liability and
there is criminal liability. Indeed, when criminal liability is imposed via the police power of the
state, the victim may not "release" the perpetrator from liability, only the state may. Plaintiffs
would ask this Court to reflect, likewise, that when civil liability is imposed by the police power
of the state - only the state may "release" a defendant from liability. Idaho has not released

6

Martin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 248 (2002) ("If the amount tendered by the insurer is unconditionally
accepted by the insured, the it will represent the "amount justly due"... ); see also In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456 (2009) (Bkrtcy D.
Idaho) (interpreting Idaho law) ("the amount that is "justly due" is determined either presently, when an insured accepts the
amount offered by the insurance company, or retrospectively after a jury or an arbitrator determines the amount.")
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Defendants herein. Plaintiffs' could not have released Defendants from their liability if they had
wanted to.
Again, it is for the foregoing reason why Defendants' first affirmative defense fails and
why summary judgment should be awarded in favor of Plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is for the foregoing reasons why this Court should deny Defendants' motion to compel, or
in the alternative to dismiss.

'-1-0-

Respectfully submitted this/_±_ day of May, 2010.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
vs.
)
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
)
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and )
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
)
)
Defendants.
)
________________ )
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,

Case No. CV 10-0677
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO
LC. § 41-1839

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord, and hereby submit this
reply to Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. As Defendants do not
provide an alternative standard of review in their response, Plaintiffs will submit that the
standard of review set forth in their motion is undisputed.
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I.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

In this case it is undisputed that Plaintiffs submitted their initial claim against a MetLife
insurance policy on or about November 10, 2009. See Defs' Response, p. 2. It is undisputed that
Defendants' adjustor did not send out a confirmatory letter clarifying her understanding of
Defendants' alleged extension with Plaintiffs' attorney. See Aff. D. Davis,~ 3. p.2. It is
undisputed that Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to Defendants' adjustor clarifying his
understanding of the matter on or about January 6, 2010. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 4, see also Aff. K.
Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Aff. K. Mihara, (May)), Ex. 21.

It .is further undisputed that Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to both Defendants' attorney, and
Defendants' adjustor, stating that Plaintiffs' counsel would not take any action against
Defendants until after January 22, 2010 and also transmitting a seventeen page coverage
memorandum. 1 See Defs' Response, p. 16, FN 6; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 20, p. 2; see
also Aff. K. Mihara (May), ,r 10, Exs. "6" and "7." The January 14, 2010 letter reads, in

pertinent part:
... Should MetLife contest a portion of coverage, please forward the amounts
uncontested to my care at the address above with the checks made payable to: The
Estate of Benjamin Holland. Please let this letter also memorialize our agreement
that I will not take any further action in this case against MetLife until after
Friday, January 22, 2010 ...
See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "6" and "7" (emphasis added). It is further undisputed that the

subject line of the email which transmitted said letter to Katherine Paukert read, "Holland v.

1

Despite Defendants' claim that" ... these letters, inexplicably, were not communicated or addressed to Ms. Paukert ... " (See
Defs' Response, FN 6, p. 16), Ms. Paukert references receipt of that very same letter in her supplemental affidavit. (See Supp.
Aff. K. Paukert, 120). In addition, cursory review of the subject letter's address block shows that Ms. Piiukert was emailed that
letter on or about January 14, 2010 and the affidavit of counsel shows documentation of receipt by both ·K. Paukert and D. Davis.
(See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "6" and "7").
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MetLife (Unfiled): Demand and Statement of Legal Position." See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex.

"7'' (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Ms. Davis had requested and received a motorcycle title from
Plaintiffs' attorney on January 27,2010. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8; see also Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 8; see

also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "9" and "IO." It is further undisputed that Ms. Davis requested
another copy of said title as she claimed that the original copy was illegible and sent
confirmatory memoranda to that effect. Id. Another undisputed fact is that Defendants' agent,
Joe Foredyce, had noticed Daneice Davis regarding the lawsuit on January 29, 2010 and Daneice
Davis had noticed Katherine Paukert that same day. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8. p. 3; see also Supp.

Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 25, p. 4.
In fact, it is undisputed that counsel for plaintiffs, despite being on a pro-bona publico
arrangement with his clients, fought vigorously to obtain a favorable recovery for his clients
prior to filing suit in this matter. See Defs' response, see also Aff. K. Paukert; see also Supp. Aff.

K. Paukert, see also Aff. D. Davis; see also Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.); see also Aff. K. Mihara
(May); see also Complaint.
Those are the undisputed facts and those facts are supported by the evidence forwarded
by both parties.

IL

ARGUMENT

It is Plaintiffs' understanding that Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be

.

foreclosed from obtaining an award of their attorney's fees because (1) Plaintiffs' and
Defendants' settlement agreement allegedly provided against an award of attorney's fees, (2)
Plaintiffs were not the prevailing party, (3) Defendants came to .a timely decision under the
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statute, (4) Plaintiffs are estopped from arguing for attorney's fees, (4) that Defendants' are
entitled to a trial on the subject of attorney's fees, and finally, (5) if attorney's fees are awarded,
such amount requested is unreasonable. Defendants' arguments are all without merit as discussed
in detail below.
A. Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' and Defendants' settlement agreement
provides a basis for the preclusion of attorney's fees is barred by the doctrine of
Judicial Estopple.
For the reasons and law set forth in Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to compel
or motion to dismiss, such reasons and law are hereby incorporated herein for brevity,
Defendants' first argument (set forth in section II.A. of Defs' Response) is without merit and
must be denied.
B. Defendants attempt to tangle facts and dicta from several cases in an attempt to
argue a conflict in Idaho law as a subterfuge and smokescreen to oppose
Plaintiffs' motion for the award of attorney's fees.
Defendants' would have this Court believe that 'the amount justly due' must be either be
decided by the Court, or awarded pursuant to arbitration. See Defs' Response, § II.B., p. 11. 2
Defendants' very argument has been sternly rejected by the Federal bankruptcy court in Idaho
(applying Idaho law). See In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456 (2009). In holding that settlement within the
context oflitigation of a contested claim results in a finding of the 'amount justly due," Federal
Bankruptcy Judge Jim Pappas wrote:

Defendants further contends that, absent an agreement, a jury or arbitrator
necessarily must determine what amount is 'justly due." ... Therefore,
Defendant contends, a jury or arbitrator's determination was necessary to arrive at
the amount justly due.

2

Defendants cite Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 70 (1999); Manduca Datsun Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins., 106 Idaho 163 (Ct. App. 1984 ); and Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 89 Idaho 293 ( 1965).
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Defendant's position is surely untenable. For the purposes of the statute, the
amount that is 'justly due' is determined either presently, when an insured
accepts the amount offered by the insurance company, or retrospectively, after
a jury or arbitrator determines the amount. See, Martin, 61 P. 3d at 605; Walton v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818 P.2d 320(1991); Brinkman, 766 P.2d at
1231. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the question or "what amount is
'just' only arises when the Plaintiff and the insurance company cannot agree."
Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231. On the other hand, if "the insurance company
tenders an amount that is agreeable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will accept and
that will be the end of it." Id. Put another way,
If the amount tendered by the insurer is unconditionally accepted
by the insured, the it will represent the "amount justly due" and the
case ends ... But if the insurance company makes no tender within
thirty days, or makes a tender that is substantially less than the
aribtrators' eventual award, the insurance company is liable for a
reasonable amount of the insured's attorney's fees, as
compensation to make the insured whole.

Martin, 61 P. 3d at 605.
See In re Jones, 401 B.R. at 466-467. (emphasis in original) (emphasis added). Hence it is
interesting that at least one judge sitting on the federal bench (in Idaho) has cited the very cases
cited by Defendants to hold squarely the opposite conclusion that Defendants have come to and
would urge this Court to adopt.
Despite the case law cited by Judge Pappas, and while Defendants admit that
$200,000.00 was the amount tendered by Defendants, and accepted by Plaintiffs - and that
Defendants were ready to tender $50,000.00 to settle Plaintiffs claims prior to Plaintiffs' lawsuit
- Defendants have the audacity to claim that Plaintiffs were not the prevailing party in this case. 3
Indeed, Defendants further concede: "Were the Defendants here seeking to settle with the
Plaintiffs in response to the lawsuit, there might be an argument attorney's fees are applicable"

3
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs are not the prevailing parties in this case despite citing the very language of Slaathaug v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 132 ldaho 705, 711 (1999) ("The court explained that in order to "prevail," the insured need not obtain a verdict
for the full amount requested. The insured need only be awarded an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer.")
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See Defs' response,§ II.B., p. 13. Plaintiffs' would offer that Plaintiffs' attorney sent an email to
Defendants' attorney K. Paukert and left a message with her on January 26, 2010 as well as
sending a formal letter to Defendant's adjustor on January 27, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May),
Exs. "7," "1 0," and "21." Despite Plaintiffs' contention, Plaintiffs would point this Court to the
undisputed fact that the settlement release in this matter that specifically references this lawsuit.

See Answer, Ex. "A." Plaintiffs would also point this Court to the undisputed fact that the offer
was made on February 2, 2010, and the acceptance came on February 3, 2010. See Answer. It is
further admitted by Defendants' that Defendants' agent had noticed Daneice Davis regarding the
lawsuit on January 29, 2010 and Daneice Davis had noticed Katherine Paukert that same day.

See Aff. D. Davis, 18. p. 3; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, 125, p. 4. Ms. Paukert stated that she
took action upon learning of the lawsuit. ("I had an assistant check with the Court and was
advised that there was not a record of such a filing"). Id.
It is not Plaintiffs' responsibility and/or duty to meet and confer with Defendants prior to

taking action in this case. Indeed, Plaintiffs' are unaware of the statutory language or developed
case law that disallows recovery of attorney's fees dependent on Defendants' motivation to
settle. But, in any case, referencing Defendants' own words above, perhaps if Defendants were
seeking to settle with the Plaintiffs in response to the lawsuit, there might be an argument
attorney's fees are applicable.
Also, in any event, if, arguendo, Defendants did not know about the lawsuit on or before
February 2, 2010, it is plain as day that they should have known due to the admitted fact that
they were told of the lawsuit by their agent on January 29, 2010.

PLAJNTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE to PLAJNTJFFS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO

1.cil\1.f.,7..~~06

Page 295 of 709

Plaintiffs would also point out the fact that the argument raised in this section was not
raised by Defendants' answer, and therefore, should not be argued before this Court in their
response.
Plaintiffs would suggest that consistent with In re Jones, cited above, the federal bench's
view of the matter is the correct view of the law. Plaintiffs would also demand that Defendants
keep their arguments to those contained within their answer. It is for the foregoing reasons why
Defendants' second theory fails.

C. Defendants' argument that they were timely under the statute fails because
Defendants had well over thirty days to process these claims when their adjustor
was not on vacation.
Idaho law sets forth when the clock begins to run on the thirty (30) day requirement of
the statute. The Idaho bankruptcy court has noted that:
[i]fthe information provided [by the insured to the insurer] is insufficient to give
the insurer an opportunity to investigate its liability, the insurer may deny
coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate and/or determine its rights and
liabilities.
See In re Jones, 401 B.R. at 465 (citing Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231) (emphasis in orginal).
In this case, there is no dispute of material fact that Plaintiffs, through their counsel,
submitted their initial proof of loss and noticed claims to Defendants on or about November 10,
2010. See Defs' Response, § A. I, p. 2 ("Plaintiffs submitted their initial claim against a MetLife
insurance policy on or around November 10, 2009"); see also Aff. D. Davis, ,r 3, p.2 ("Notice of
this claim was submitted on or around November 10, 2009"). Plaintiffs sent Defendants a letter
along with the police report documenting the fatal accident and noting the responsible party's
insurance information. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "3." It is also undisputed that in reaction to
that initial claim, Defendants began to investigate and requested additional information. Id.
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Defendants also fail to mention to this Court that Plaintiffs' attorney sent every piece of
information asked for by Defendants on November 17, 2009. 4 See Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.), Ex.
"A;" see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "4." It is undisputed that the next time Plaintiffs were
asked for proof of loss is after they filed their lawsuit. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8; see also Aff. K.
Mihara (May), Exs. "6" and "7."
In addition, it is undisputed that despite the fact that Plaintiffs had just made a claim for
hundreds of thousands of dollars in coverage under their policies issued by Defendants, and the
fact that an attorney was involved, Defendants' adjustor, despite her usual practice, did not send
out confirming memorandum of her understanding of the matter. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 3, p. 2. Ms.
Davis states, "I usually send out a confirmation letter for such extensions, but with the press of
getting ready for a lengthy vacation, I did not." Id. Now, Defendants wish to hang their defense
on their understanding of the facts with a letter that was never sent to confirm the terms and
understanding of an extension. It is also interesting to note the time between when the claim was
initially made (Nov. 10, 2010) and when Defendants' allegedly made an offer to settle (Dec. 7,
2010)- just within thirty (30) days. 5
Plaintiffs dispute that Ms. Davis' understanding set forth in her affidavit were the terms
of the offer not to take any formal action against Defendants. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex.
"21." It is Plaintiffs' understanding that Ms. Davis would be away due to an exigent family
matter. Id. In fact, it was Plaintiffs' understanding that despite Ms. Davis' vacation, other
MetLife personnel would, indeed, be working on the claim and it was just the coverage answer
4
The initial proof of loss contained reference to the police report outlining the details of the accident as well as a copy of the
death certificate verifying that Mr. Holland was deceased. The November 17, 2009 included but not limited to proof of loss
included a death certificate, tax returns, funeral bills, wage statements by Mr. Holland's employer, a resume, as well as a letter
from the negligent party's insurance carrier.
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that would be forthcoming after Ms. Davis would be returning from vacation. Id. Plaintiffs'
understanding of the matter can be verified through confirming memoranda dated January 6,
2010 and January 14, 2010, respectively. Id.
In any event, such purported extension is irrelevant as it is undisputed that Defendants
had the time from November 10, 2010 to December 7, 2010; and then from January 7, 2010 to
January 26, 2010 to work on and process Plaintiffs' claims; claims that all arise from the same
set of facts and proof - those timeframes are, again, well over thirty days. 6
Further, it is undisputed that despite Defendants' claims that they were unaware of the
lawsuit filed against them on February 2, 2010 when they made the offer to settle to Plaintiffs,
both Ms. Davi~ and Ms. Paukert admit that they were advised by Defendants' agent, Joe
Foredyce, on January 29, 2010, that a lawsuit had been filed and notice was published in the
Coeur d'Alene Press. See Aff. D. Davis, ,rs, p.3; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 25, p. 4.
Despite the foregoing undisputed fact, Defendants hang their hats on the defense that an offer
was made without Defendants' knowledge that a lawsuit had been filed against Defendants. See
Aff D. Davis ,r 8, p. 3, c.f. Aff. D. Davis ,r 10, p. 4; see also Supp. Aff K. Paukert, ,r 25, p. 4,

cf, Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 26, p. 4. Defendants' contention that they did not know about the
lawsuit prior to settlement is contradicted by their own evidence.
D. Defendants' estopple claims fail for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs' response
to Defendants' motion to compel and/or dismiss.
For the reasons and law set forth in Defendants' motion to compel and/or dismiss, such

5

Plaintiffs dispute that a fonnal offer to settle was ever made prior to the Feb. 2, 2010 offer.
It should be noted that l.C. § 41-1839 does not require a 'proofof claim' - the statute in question only requires 'proof ofloss.'
Plaintiffs would argue that their original proof of loss submitted to Defenants constituted sufficient notice to begin the time
running on the other claims as well. The statute does not contain language that is policy specific.
6
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reasons and law are hereby incorporated herein for brevity, Defendants' fourth argument (set
forth in section 11.D. of Defs' Response) is without merit and must be denied.
E. Defendants' argument that any dispute as to a material fact results in a trial is
misplaced due to the fact that the vast majority of all facts in this case, material
and non-material, are undisputed leaving only a question of law to be
determined by the Court.
Defendants suggest that a full-blown trial is necessary to adjudicate the merits of
the final claim between the parties. See Answer; see also Defs' Response, § 2.E., p. 20. Plaintiffs
would suggest the opposite.

It is a well established rule of Idaho law that disputes over material fact result in trials.
See Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589 (2006). However, "if the
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question oflaw... " See

Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School District No. 93, 144 Idaho 637 (2007).
In this case, Defendants' response fails to parse out what 'genuine issues of material fact'
exist. See Defs' Response, § 2.E., p. 20. In fact, Defendants concede that this Court may find that
there are no genuine issues of material fact ("If, after reviewing the affidavits and other evidence,
the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist ... "). Id. (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs and this Court should not be forced to guess at which facts Defendants take
issue with or find are material.

It is for the foregoing reason why Defendants' request for a trial is not meritorious and
why there is no genuine issues of material fact.
F. Defendants fail to parse out how handling a civil case pro bono, or that the
attorney fee agreement was redacted (for privilege) should be a reasons to
depart downward from a requested attorney's fee.
In reading Defendants' response, Plaintiffs are at a loss as to why their attorney's
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previous willingness to take a case pro bono publico should be a reason to depart downward
from the amount claimed as an attoney's fee. In fact, Defendants never parse out how going from
a pro bono publico arrangement in a matter where liability and damages should be relatively
simple (wrongful death case with no comparative negligence to be attributed to the deceased), to
a contingency fee agreement where liability and damages are at issue, should be a reason to
depart downward under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
Defendants also state that counsel for Plainitffs, "rejected payment for the initial claim ..
." however, Defendants fail to note or to advise this Court that Idaho law is explicit in the
requirement that such an offer be in writing. See I.C. § 9-1501. The statute reads:
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money, or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property, is; if not accepted, equivalent to the
actual production and tender or the money, instrument or property.

Id. Thus, an offer not in writing is not equivalent to the actual production or tender. Id.
In this case, Defendants admit that they simply never conveyed a written tender of the
amountjustly due prior to February 2, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" (Defs' response
to RFA no. 9). Indeed, Defendants' would have this Court believe that counsel for Plaintiffs
rejected payment, however, admit that no such offer was ever forthcoming. Id. In their response,
Defendants state:
Ms. Paukert had no discussions about sending him the policy limits for the Initial
Claim, because Mr. Mihara was waiting for MetLife's decision on coverage under
the policies with the higher limits.
See Defs' Response, p. 5. Ms. Paukert reinforces that statement in her supplemental affidavit:
Mr. Mihara was clear he did not want the policy limits under Benjamin Holland's
policy. He wanted coverage under one or both of the parents' policies because of
the higher limits. Therefore, we had no discussions about sending him Benjamin
Holland's policy limits.
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See Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 18. Plaintiffs' counsel got exactly what he demanded for his clients.
See Aff. K. Paukert; see also Answer, Exs. "A" and "B." Again, Defendants' purported

evidence is contradictory to their stated legal position and arguments.
Defenda.rits argue that if an award of attorney's fees is granted by this Court, such fees
should be limited to the time spent preparing the complaint. Such argument fails to take into
account that despite being on a pro-bono arrangement, counsel for Plaintiffs bent over backwards
to come to an equitable settlement prior to filing a lawsuit. See Aff. K. Paukert, ,r,r 3-17; see also
Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r, 18-28; see also Aff. D. Davis, ,r,r 3-11; see also Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.);
see also Aff. K. Mihara (May).

Defendants' evidence shows that Plaintiffs' attorney would not take 'no' for an answer
and relentlessly lobbied both the adjuster and coverage counsel for - and obtained - a coverage
decision which tendered higher limits for his clients. See Aff. K. Paukert; see also Aff. D. Davis,
see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert; see also Complaint. At the time the fee agreement was entered

into, and at the time of filing of the Complaint, it is undisputed that Defendants had not yet
tendered a dime to satisfy Plaintiffs' claims and that liability and damages were all still at issue.
Id. There is no dispute as to the fact that the Complaint was filed on January 26, 2010. See

Complaint.
Plaintiffs will counter Defendants' contention that the amount sought is unreasonable by
quoting the Supreme Court of Idaho:
A contingent fee agreement that was reasonable when entered into does not
become unreasonable simply because in the end the attorney recovers more than
he or she would have under an hourly fee contract.
See Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614, 619 (2007).
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It is for the foregoing reasons that Defendants' argument that the amount sought is
unreasonable fails.
G. Defendants have waived any and all objection to Plaintiffs' entitlement to
attorney's fees along with the amount claimed by failing to timely object.

It is well established that a failure to time]y object to a claimed entitlement to attorney's
fees waives any objection to the requested entitlement as well as the amount sought. See Conner

v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761 (1982); see also Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc. v. Howell, 105 Idaho
699 (Ct. App. 1983); see also Farber v. Howell, 111 Idaho 132 (Ct. App. 1986).
The applicable Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure states:
Any objection to the allowance of attorney's fees, or to the amount thereof, shall
be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided by Rule
54(d)(6). The court may conduct an evidentiary hearing if it deems it necessary,
regarding the award of attorney's fees.

See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) (emphasis added).
As noted above, the rules require any objection to a claimed cost within fourteen (14)
days of service of the memorandum of cost. See I:R.C.P. 54(d)( 6). Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Idaho has held that an attorney's affidavit is sufficient memorandum to comport with Rule 54.
See Great Plains Equip., Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754 (1999). Also, the
Supreme Court has held that a motion filed prematurely shall be deemed filed timely. See

Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818 (1984). Indeed, it is the policy of the rule to
require timely objection to both the entitlement of the attorney's fee and the amount thereof so
that trial courts can expeditiously rule on such objections and bring cases to conclusion. See

Operating Eng'rs Local Union 370 v. Goodwin Const. Co., 104 Idaho 83 (Ct. App. 1982).
However, if a party fails to timely object to the request for an award of attorney's fees, and has a
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good reason for doing so, that party may petition a court to enlarge such time to answer. See Ada

Co. Hwy. Dist. ex rel. Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873 (1983); see also Camp v. Jiminez,
107 Idaho 878 (Ct. App. 1984).
In this case, the motion for attorney's fees was filed on February 9, 2010. See Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839; see also Aff. K. Paukert,~ 14. The
motion was served upon Defendants the same day via certified mail. See Aff. K. Mihara (May),~
19, Ex. "13;" see also Aff. K. Paukert, 114. Fourteen days from the date of service was February
23, 2010. Defendants' initial appearance was signed on February 23, 2010 and filed with the
Court on or about March 1, 2010. See Notice of Appearance. Fourteen (14) days from February
23, 2010 is March 9, 2010 and fourteen days from March 1, 2010 is March 15, 2010.
Defendants' filed the joint motion and stipulated order to dismiss on or about March 2, 2010, and
this Court entered the requested order on March 3, 2010. See Joint Motion. Fourteen days from
said dates are March 17 and 18, 2010, respectively. Defendants filed their answer on April 12,
2010. See Answer. Fourteen days from April 12, 2010 is April 27, 2010. Defendants' objections
to Plaintiffs' motion can be found in their response to Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees which
was filed on May 9, 2010. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839.
At no time prior to the filing of this motion for summary judgment have Defendants
formally petitioned this Court seeking to enlarge the time to respond.
Further, in her affidavit, Ms. Paukert states,
Moreover, 1 believed that no response to his motion was required until he noted it
for hearing ... Mr. Mihara, at no time, advised me that he considered his Motion
for Attorney's Fees to be a cost memorandum to which 1 had 14 days to respond ..
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See Aff. K. Paukert, il~ 14 and 15 (emphasis added). The rhetorical question would be: why
would Ms. Paukert submit such a statement in defense of Plaintiffs' pending motion for
attorney's fees if she did not realize that there was, indeed, a fourteen (14) day requirement to
respond to such filings?
Plaintiffs will concede that the motion for attorney's fees was served upon Defendants
along with the complaint, summons, and other material. Plaintiffs would ask the Court to note,
however, that Plaintiffs did not move to default Defendants on this issue and attempted to find
resolution with Defendants prior to seeking Court involvement. Again, Plaintiffs would point out
that Defendants have made their untimely arguments without first seeking leave of the Court
despite Idaho law providing for a mechanism to do so. Defendants not only failed to answer
within fourteen (14) days from service of the motion, Defendants failed to answer within
fourteen days from the date of their initial appearance, the date of their initial motion, and the
date of their answer. Simply put, Defendants' objections contained in their response to Plaintiffs'
motion are untimely.
In essence, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment because Defendants have waived
all objection to Plaintiffs' entitlement as well as to the amount claimed by failing to timely object
to the same and/or by failing to seek leave of the Court to respond to Plaintiffs' motion outside of
the time allowed.
III.

CONCLUSION

All other applicable legal arguments contained within Plaintiffs' motion for summary
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judgment and response to Defendants' motion to compel or to dismiss are incorporated herein as

if expressly listed. It is for the foregoing reasons why Plaintiffs are entitled to their attorney's
fees in the amount sought.
Respectfully submitted this[7£y of May, 2010.

Kinzo H. Mihara
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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William J. Schroeder, JSB No. 6674
Patrick E. Miller, ISB Nu. 1771
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328

Telephone: (208) 664-81 t 5
Fncsimile: (208) 664-6338

Mailing Address
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201~3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
~

The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 10-0677

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

)

METRO POLITAN PROPER TY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and )
)
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
)
Defendants.

)
)

---------------)
COME NOW, t~e Defendants in the above-entitled cause of action, by and through their

undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit the following memorandum in opposition
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment should be dtmitd.
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A detailed explanation of the tiu.,1s of the matter was previously set fbrth in Defemlunts1
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Pcrfonnancc Under
the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs• Motion for Attorney's Fees filed April 28, 2010. For the
sake of brevity, only the most relevant facts necessary to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment wi II be reiterated below.

On O1.1ober 25, 2009, Benjamin Holland passed uwuy us a result of a motor vehicle
accident. (See, Civil Complaint ("Complaint"), filed January 26, 2010) Subsequently, Plaintitls,
through attorney Kinzo H. Mihara, submitted claims against thre~ MetLife policies. (See,

Affidavit

or Dancicc Davis (submitted in opposition to PlainLiffs' Motion

for Attorney's Fees)

("AU: of Davis 11 ), filed May 7, 2010, 1 3) On January 26, 201 O; without Defendants' counsel's

knowledge, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendants. (See, Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert
(submitted in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees) ( Aff. of Paukert
11

11
),

filed April

13;2010, ~112)

On F~hnJaTy 3, 2010, Lht.l parties Teached settltm1tml in lhh; mallt,r antl Lhc PlainL1m,;
agreed tD sign a full release of their claims against MetLife. (Ibid., at ,m 10-12) On February 3,

2010, following Mr. Mihara's confitmation that his clients had accepted MctLife's settlement

offer, Defendant,;' Attorney Kathleen H. Paukert contacted Mr. Mihara to confirm that his clients
would be providing MetLife with the full release. (lbid., at ~112) Mr. Mihara said that his cJients

would, hut for the first time, informed Ms. Paukert tb.1:1.t he was now making a claim for attorney's
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fees. (Ibid.) Ms. Paukert reminded Mr. Mihara that his clients agreed to provide a full release of
their c1aims. (Ibid.) He responded that they would, but that he was personaUy going to sue
MetLife for attorney's fees. (Ibid.) Mr. Mihara further infonned Ms. Paukert, for the first time,
that Plaintiffs had filed a CiV11 Compiaini on January 26, 2010, prior to settlement. (lliid.)
On February 8, 2010, Mr. Mihara faxed Ms. Paukert a copy of the Civil Complaint.
(Thid., at~ 13) Despite the settlement reached, on February 9, 2010, Mr. Mihara mailed Ms.
Paukert a letter that inc1uded a Motion for Attorney's Fees and other supporting documents.
(Ibid., at~ 14)

FolJowing Plaintiffs' etlort to renege on the settlement as wclJ as their agreement to sign a
fu1l release of their claims against the Defendants, the parties filed a "Joint Motion and
Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims F.~cept for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees" on
March 3, 2010. (See. Joi11L Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the
Pending Motion for Attorney F~s ("Stipulated Order to Dismiss"), filed March 3, 2010) It is

important to note the precise language used in the Stipulated Order to Dismiss:
COME NOW the parties_, by and through their counsel of ree<.nd and hereby move
this Coun to dismiss, with prejudice, an claims In the above-captioned matter,
except for Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees Pun11ant to 1.C. § 41-1839
flied on February 9, 2010. The parties further stipuh1te to the Order below. This
motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41 (a)(l )(ii). The basis of this motion is that
the parties have fully resoived all claims in this rnattCi except for the pending
motion for attorney fees referenced above.

THE COURT, pursuant to the joint motion of the parties above, and upon good
cause app.,ari11g, does ORDER that all claims in the above-captioned matter,
except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney }"ees filed on February 9, 2010, arc
dismissed with prejudice and without cost to ~ither pwty.
(See, Stipulated Order to Dismiss) (emphasis added)
38157-2010
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By its terms, the Stipulaled Order to Dismiss dismissed all claims except Plaintiffs'
pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. In other words, the Civil Complaint was dismissed, l~aving
only Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fees remaining. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, allhuugh no
answer wac, required (llecausc ail ciaims had been di~missed

CXCC1)t

Plaintiff);' pending Mot~on

for Attomcy':s Fees) to make tl1e record clear, Defendants answered Section 'IV, paragraph 34, of

Plaintiffs' Complaint by denying that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to 1.C.
§ 41-1839 and asserting affumative defenses regarding the same. (See, Defendants' Answer and
Affirmative Defenses ("Answer"), filed April 12, 2010)
Stated another wuy, although believing that no Answer was required as only Plainti fts'
pending Molion fur Attorney's fees remained, given the past disappoinling bt,havior exhibited by

Plaintiffs' attorney, Defenda11ts filed an Answer with the Release of All CJaims attached thereto
in order to secure against Plaintiffs' attempting to seek a default against Defendants; and to
crystallize the sole remaining issue for adjudication. (]bid.) This intention is further expressed in
the Preamble to Defendants' Answer which states, in relevant part,: "[n]o Answer is required as
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to paragraphs 1 through 33 1 as all claims, exct,pt the claim for 1.C. § 41-1839 attorney's fees,
alleged in paragraph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice." (lbid.)

1

ll, J\,RGUMENT

A.

Summary Judi?fiient Standard
Summary judgm'-'-nt may be granted "if pleadings, tl~usiLions, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavitc;, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian Joint School
Dh1t. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583 (1996), citing, I.R.C.P 56(c). "The burden of
estabJishing the absence of a genuine issut, of material fact rest~ at all times with the party
moving for summary judgment." Ibid., at 719, 918 P.2d 583, citing, Tingley v. Harrison. 125
Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960 (1994). To meet this burden, "the moving party must challeng~ in its

motion and establish through tvicJence the absence ot' any genuine issue of material fact
element of the moving party's case.

1
'

llTI

an

Ibid., citing. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc,. 126

Idaho 527,530,887 P.2d 1034 (1994). 'the Court should 1iberally construe the record in favor of
the party opposing the motion and "druw oil reasonable inferences and conclusions in that partts
1 Al the outset of thi~ case, Plaintiffs' coum1cl rerre11ented thar Plaintif.&' Motion fur Attorney's Feeil would be
scheduled fur Ii date convenient tn. both counsel. (See, Affidavit of William J. &hrocder in Oppoi:ition to Plaintiffil'
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Aff. of Schroeder in Opposition to PJainciffs' SJ''), filed Muy 25, 2010, 13) On
March 261 2010, l'lai,niffEI' noled lhcir Motion for Attomey'11 Fc:cs for an cvidentiary hearing !k.hcdu1~ for May 12,
2010. (Sec, Note for Hearing, filed Murch 26, 2010) Under Idaho Civil Rulo 7(b)(3), mc)l l1earin11, date tri"-gcrcd tbc:
deadline: for reap01U1ive pleadings ··- whb any 1c11pUmivc brief by Defendants due seven (7) dtty1' prior to the h.eariog.
'-R.C.P § 7{b)(3}. The partic::l!I chcn proceeded with discovery. (See, e.g., Defendants' Notice of Servlcc of Discovery
rcquc.~t", filed April 6, 2010, see, tJisu, Plaintiffs' Notic:e of Service uf Plaintiffs' first Kequest for D1l!Covery to
Defeodaots, fl.led April 8, 2010) Despite prior representations, on April 6, 2010, Plainti&' counsel advised Mr.
Schroeder that he was 1ak.ing !he position that, under Idaho CjV17 Rule 54, a response 10 hi:-1 Morion for Attorney's
.fc~ was past due. (See. Aff. of Schroeder in Opposidon to Plainti.ffil' SJ, 13) Oo April 29, 2010, Plaintitni' filed
their Amended Notice of Hearing, resetting the evidc:nliary bearing on PlainliffB' Motion for Attorney's Fees for June
2, 2010. (See, Amended Notice of .He:aring, filed April 2~, 2010) Notably, Plaintiffs ag11in ICMcned the right co
in11oduce evidenuc: 1mdlor call witnesses at I.he: ev:idc:ntiary hellring. (Ibid.)
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favor. 1' Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority. 126 Iduho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29 (1994), citing.
r'ann Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevensop. 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994). ''lf the
record contains any conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might reach different
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied." Hams

v.

Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123

lduho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992).
1n the present case, the parties' Stipulated Order to Di~miss dismissed "all claims" with

prejudice leaving only Plaintifts1 pending Motion for Attorneys Fees remaining; consequently,
only paragraph 34 of Plaintitls' Complaint, if any, needed Lo be addressed by Defendants.
Moreover, Defendants have asserted a viab]e defense that the Doctrine of Estoppel precludes
Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fot:s under J.C. § 41·1839. Finally, even if, arguendo, the Court
finds a legal basis for an award of attorney's fees, the fees sought by the Plaintiffs ure excessive
anJ unreasonable. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should, therefore, be denied.
B.

The Parties' Stipulated Order to Dismiss Precludes Plaintiffs' Argumtnt that
Defendants Have Admitted All Facts Necessan For Summary Judgment By

Failing to Address Particular Paragraphs in Plaintiffs' Complaint
ln the present motion, instead uf' adtlrc:,ssing the merits of the case, Plaintifts take the
disappointing y,osition thnt they may (1) enter into a Stipulated Order dismissing "all c1a.irns"
with prejudice and leaving onli their pending Motion for Attorney's Fees; (2) accept scttlemenL;

(3) observe Defendants' Answer addressing the sole remaining claim for attorney's fees; (4) say

nothing; and (5) then argue that "by failing to deny paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of
Plaintiffs' complaint, 'Defendants have admitted the facts necessary for adjudication of this matter

and have negated any need for an evidentiary hearing.'' (See, Memorandum in Support of
P1aintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("P)aintiffi;' Summary Judgment Memo. 11 ), filed May

38157-2010
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17, 2010, pp. 6-7) Such argument is indicative of Plaintiffs' counsel's continued disappointing
behavior in this matter.
At the outset, givcm the Order entered by the Court, the only responsive pleading required

was to Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fee.,;;. However, out of an abundance of caution,
an Answer was submitted as to the sole remaining claim. In that regard, Defendants• Answer
specifically sets forth the reason such paragraphs were not addressed - namely, "[ nJo Answer is
required as to paragraphs 1 through 33.

as all claims, except the claim for 1.C.

§ 41-1839

uttumeys fees, alleged in pardgr'dph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice.''
(See, Answer} Also, notably, Defendants have put the issue of whether Plaintiffs are entitled to

attomey's foes pursuant to LC. § 41-1839 in controversy befort: this Court, including the factual
assert.ions identified by the PJaintiffs in their summary judgment as unanswered. (See. e.g.,
Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Molion to CompeJ
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, filed April
2R, 2010, see, also, e.g., Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions to Defendants [And Rt,b-ponses
Thereto], RFA Nos. 1, 2, 5, 12, 13, tS, 20, 26 and 27, u.tt'd to Aff. of s~hrocder in Opposition to
SJ, , 4, Exhibit A; Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Document~ to

Defendants [And Responses Thereto], Interrog. Nos. 1, 6 and 7, att'd to Aff of Schroeder in
Opposition to SJ.,

,1

5, Exhibit B; see. also, e.g., Aff. of Davis~ Aff. of Paukert; SupplcmentaJ

Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintit1s' Motion for Attorney's
Ft:1-'s) ("Supp. Aff. of Paukert"}, filed May 7, 2010)
Furthermore, critically, the pllfties' Slipulated Order to Dismiss, which was entered by the
Court. dismissed ''all claims'' with prejudic~, lt.n:1ving only Plaintiffs' pe11ding Motion for
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Attorney's Fees. (See, Stipulated Ordt.T to Dismiss)

At

El

minimum, given the unique

circwnstanccs of this case, in which only Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees remains,
direction from the Court is necessary if Defendanl:s are required to answer previousily dismissed
claims. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that such factual paragraphs in Plaintifts'
Compla1nt need to he addressed by Defendants, Defendants request leave of Court to file an
Amended Answer oddressing the some.

Such leave is appropri11te, given the unique

circumstances of this case and the Stipulated Order to Dismiss entered by the Court.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request for summary judgment should be denied.

c.

Plaintiffs Are £stopped From Claiming Attorney's F~

For the sake of brevity, Defendants incorporute by reference Delimtlants' argument that
"Plaintiffs' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Barred by the Doctrine of Estoppel" contained in
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 1.C. § 41-1839, filed
May 10, 2010.

However, in doing so, Defendants wi11 address Plnintifts' argument, as

application of the Doctrine of Estoppcl is entirely 11ppropriate in this cnse. 2
Plaintiffs are incorrect in claiming that Defendants have failed to set forth evidence, i11
support of their Estoppel Argument, demonstrating a "false representation u or a "concealment nf
material fact." (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo., p. 7) · The following dim1onstratc
"false reproscntations'' or 11 conce11lment of material facts" on the part of the Plaintifts:
•

In a December 7, 2009, telephone conversation, Ms. Du.vis advised Mr. Mihara
that she would be leaving on a three week vacation ond would not return to her

l Defendants acknowledge lha1 the Docrrine of Eitc1ppcl contains I.he foUowing elemcnbl: (1) 11 false representalion
or concealmcnl of a material fact made wi1b actual or conslructive knowledge of the uuth: (2) lhc plil'ty assening
e11toppcl did not know 1md could not have discovered lhe 1n1th; (3) an ·intenl thitl lhe misrepresentation or
concealment be reJied UJ)On; and (4) the party llSsening estoppe] relied on I.be misrepresentation or concealment to

bis or her prejudice. Twin F1tl.1i Clinfo & Hosp. Hldg. Corp. v. HamiU, 103 Idaho l9, 21-22, 644 .l'.2d 341 (1982).

38157-2010

DEFENDANTS' Ml!:MORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO

Page 313 of 709

---------· 1

office until January 6, 2010. She informed Mr. Mihara that as a result she would
be unable to review the claims made against the two additional MetLife poJicics
in which Mr. Holland's parents were the named insureds, until she returned. Ms.
Davis asked if that would be acceptable. Mr. Mihara responded it would. (See,
Aff. of l>avis, inl 3, 11)
•

Mr. Mihara stated to Ms. Paukert that he was handling the Estate of Benjamin
Holland pro hono ::,ovornl timQ.s. (See, Aff. of Paukert, ii,] 4, 17)

•

Mr. Mihara had sever11l discussions with Ms. Paukert in which he indicated that
he knew MetLife had ngrccd to pay the policy limits on the lnitilll Claim, but
made it elem that Plaintiffs did not want the policy limits under that Initial Claim.
(See, Supp. Aff. of Paukert, ~I 18)

•

Mr. Mihara concealed from Ms. Paukert that Plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit against

Defendants on JW1U!lI'Y 26. 2010. (See. Supp. Aff. of Paukert,~ 22-23)

• Plaintiffs. through Attorney Mr. Mihara. accepted Defendants' settlement offer
agreeing to a full release of their claims. before reneging on such settlement.
(See, Afl of Paukert, W 11-12, Exhibit 1)
·
The foregoiTig, constitute "false representations'' or ''concealment of material facts'' relied
upon by Defendants: (a) in tuking odditionnl time to find coverage for Plaintiffs; (b) in holding
off on paying the policy limils for the Initial claim; and (c) in reaching a compromise settlement

with .Plaintiffs, 1n Jight of the preceding, among other actions by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' current
position that they arc entitled to attorney's fees based on the thirty-day attomc::y's fees provision
under 1.C. § 41-1839, is inconsistent with their prior a.t-18 1111d representations. Plaintiffs intended

that Defendants rely upon these acts as demont.'trated through the actions of 'Plaintiffs' counsel

rendering Defendants unuble to discover the same.
On good faith reliance on these prior acts and representations, including statements Mr.
Mihara made to Ms. Davis and Ms. Paukert, Defendants invested significllilt amounts of time
and effort in order to find coverage wider alternative theories for the Additional Claims, and may

suffer injury if Plaintiffs are permitted to proceed in their newly-adopted position. Accordingly,
Dli:FENPANTS' MEMORJ\NDlJM IN OPP08rTION TO
PLAINTIP'~'S' MO'HON t'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT• 9
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the Doctrine of Estoppel is applicable to the case at bar, and Plaintitls1 request for summary
judgment should be denied.

D.

The Attorney's l?ees Sought by the Plaintiffs Are Excessive and Unreasonable

For the sake of brevity, D0fcndants incorporate by reference Defendants' argument that
"if, arguendo, attorney's foes are awarded under LC. § 41-1839, the amount requested by
Pl:rintiffs is: unreasonable"

~

contained in Defendants' Rcsporu:e to Plaintiffs' Motion foT

Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839, filed May 10, 2010.

However, ar1ruendu,

Defendants will address Plaintiffs' argument, as the amount of attorney's foes requested by
Plaintiffs is excessive and unreasonable. 3
As Plwntiffs note, coverage and liabiJity und~ lht: Additional Claims wt,re at issue when
the Plaintiff.1:1, with knowledge that Defendants were exploring possible legal th~ories to provide

coverage, filed their Complaint on January 20, 2010

(See, Plaintitls' Summary Judgment

Memo., p. 9) Howcvcrr, the:; stat~m~nt by Plaintiffs that they filed the Complaint ns a r~sult of
Ms. Pilukert making the statement to

Mr. Mihara. that "[i]t was my final opinion that the majority

of st.ates would not find coverage" is simply djsingenuous. (Ibid., at pp. 9, 12) Mr. Mihara was

well aware that those statements pertained to only one proffered theory and that Defendants were

actively exploring alternative theories, evidenced by the fa<.:t Mr. Mihara contacted Defendants
counsel thereafter several times regarding the same. (Ibid.)

Ml>reover, such knowledge is

3 DcfondanL~ acknowledge I.hat courts look to the following faclOrs when assessing reasonable 11uomcy's lcc:M; (a) the
time and labor reqwred; (b) lhe novc:lty and ditliculty of the question; (c) the skill, ability and experience of the
anorney; (d) the prevailing charges for Hke work; (e) whether \he fee b1 fixed or contingent; (t) time limitations; (g)
11w MmOUnl invulvcd and reiluh ubtained; (h) undesirability of the case; (i) a:unure of the rclatiuJU1hip with tho client;
(j) awards in similar ca11es; (k) cc:,st of legal research; and (l) any olhcr factor the coun deems approi,rfate in a
partkular case. Jdaho R. Cjv. P. 54(c)f3).

DEFENl>Alll'l'S' Ml!.MOKANDUM IN Ut'P0~1TION TO
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demonstrated through Mr. Miharcs 1s failure to inform Ma. Paukert that u Complaint had been filed

until after a settlement was reached
furthermore:, Plaintills' staltrmcnts "that MetLife would have denied covt.Tagc for
.Plaintiffs' claims under the higher policy limits if they cou)d have" and 11 [t]hcy were looking for
every opportunity to do so" is without merit, us the record

t.ih(.lWS

such coverage was reached

with the encouragement of MetLife, and through the efforts of Ms. Paukert. (Ibid., at 10) In

addressing the rew.onabJeness of Plaintiffs' potential attorney's fees, the fo11owing points are

critical:
•

The s~tt)ement reached had nothing tu do with this htwsuit, because Mr. Mihara
concealed the lawsuit fmm Ms. Paukert until after settlement. (See, Ail of

Paukert, ,I 12)

•

Settlement was a result of Ms. Paukert•s efforts, with the encouragement (Jf
MetLife, in locating alternative theories or coverage for the Additional Claims,
other than those proffered by Mr. Mihara. (See, Aff. of Paukert, ,n[ 7, 8 and J6)

•

Mr. Mihara acknowledges that he was handling the case pro bono just prior Lo
fiJing Plaintiffs' complaint - which was itself filed without the knowledge or
Defendants. (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo., p. 9)
Also, ti::Hing is Plaintiffs' statement during their analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court case

WAiton v. HartfoTd lns. Co., 120 Jdaho 616 1 818 P.2d 320 (1991)- "like in this cue, counsel for

plaintiffi; waited until he had obtw.ined the best result he believed he could for his clients until he
advised the insurance company that he would be seeking statutory attorney's fees." First, that

does not appear to be what occurred in Wa1tnn.

Seccmd. the statement amountll to am

acknowledgement by Mr. Mihara that be deliberately waited until after a compromised
settlement was reached on the coverage dispute before informing Det'endants he was making a

claim for attorney's fees. (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo .• p. 11)

D&FKNDAJlfl"S' Mli:MORAIIIDlJM IN 0PP0$1TIOJII TO
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1n summary, Mr. MihllTu represented he was openttingpro bono, rejected payment for the
Initial Chum, withheld infonnation from .l)efendants' attorney that ht: hod filed a lawsuit, reached
a compromise settlement of disputed claims, and then claimed, after the fact, that he had entered
into a contingency fee agreement with the Plaintiffs and is now entitled to attorney's fees.
Defendants submit that, given the fort:guing fact pattern, it is within the discretion of the Court to

limit attorney's fees Lo those associated with drafting the Complaint, or, at a minimum, attorney's

fees incurred after January 22, 2010, as Mr. Mihara states he wouJd have operaLedpro bono up to
that date. (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo., p. 12)

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants request that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment be denied.

DATED this

xdJJy

of May, 2010.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

Wi11iam J c oeder, !SB No. 6674
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771

Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this:> ,5 .. ""' day of May, 2010, 1 caused to be ::;erved a
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN' OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Lo the following:

Kinzo H. Mihara
A ttomey

at Law

424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308
Coeur d'Alene_, Idaho 83816-0969

D6UVERED
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL

TELECOPY (FACSIMILE)
E-MAIL
Debbie Miller

DEFENl>ANTB' MEMORANDUM IN O.-POSITIOl'I TO .
PLAJNTJFf'S' MOTION FOR SUMMAR\' JUDGMENT - 13
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William J. Schroeder, ISB No. 6674
Pulrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771
PATNE HAMBLENLLP
701 Front Avenue, Suile 101
P.O.BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Telepho11e: (208) 664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664~6338

Mailing Address:
717 We'lt Sprague Avenue, Saile 1200

Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE F1RST JlJDICU.L DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, fN ..\N1) FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
The ESTATE of BENJ/1 MlN HOLLA.ND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAi"lD, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,

)

) Case Na. CV 10~677
)

) AF~IDAVIT OF WILLIAM J.
) SCHROEDER IN OPPOSITION TO
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR

Plaintiffs,
vs.

) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,

)
)
)
)
)

Defend~nts.
)

STATE OF WASHINGTON )
COUNTY OF SPOKANE

)

WILLIAM J. SCH.ROEDER, being fir'St du!y sworn on oath, deposes and states that
1.

I am over the ag~ of eighteen and cc,mpctent to testify.

AFFfflA'1.'i:~WJl,LIAM J. SCHROl;;mm Ii"
OPPOSITION TO l'LAIJ\'TlFFS' ooo·no~ FOli

319of709

'.

,er1 L

cy,

t"~J.IVt:.

nl'\IYICL.t:.IV,

:>U~tl.ltlUUU

I;

may·~~

•v

-.,v, -,

2.

I am licensed to prai;Lice law in both ldnhn and Washington.

3.

At the outset of this case, Plaintiffs' Counsel. Kinzo H. Mihara, represented to me

that Pluintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees would be schedulccl for a dale convenient to both or
us.

Along the$e lines, originally, Plaimift's' Counsel, on March 26, 2010, noted Plaintiffo'

Motion for Attorney's Fees for an cvidentiary hearing scheduled for May 12, 2010. Both p~rties
thc:n proceeded wilh discovery. De1tpitc these prior represontation.s, on April 6, 2010, Mr.
Mihara advised me tbat he was taking the position that, unde1· ldaho Civil Ruic 54. a response to
his Motion for Attomey's Fees was past due.
4.

A true and correct copy of Defenilimts' responses to P!aintiffs· rirst Request for

Admiss10:1s t~ Defendants, served on Plaintiffs April 29, 2010, is attached as Exhibit A.

5.

A true and correct copy of Defendants' rcsponses/am;wer~ to Plaintiffs' First

lntcrrogatolies and. Requests for Production of Docwnents to Defendants, served on .PluinUffs

May 3, 2010,

i~ aLLacl:ted

as Exhibit B.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

~5 -t-1--. • day

of

May.

2010.

by

W1LLTAM J. SCHROEDER.
~ ) : , h , t 't:S:J'n,\\,_,Q -A),.J~A-~
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of
Washington, residing at Spoka.11c.
My commission expires: \ j-l C1 .. ;)O\ 1

AFFIDAVIT Of WIU.IAM J. SCIIROEDER JN
Ot'POSITION TO PLA.lNT.U-1''$' M0'1'10N f'<)ll

SUMMARY JUUGMF.NT 1
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CERIIFICATE 0:F SERVICE
l HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ::;)...$
day of May, 2010, I caused to be served a
tme and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM .J, SCHROEDER IN

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the
following:
Kjnzo H. Mihara
Auumey at Law
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969
l) Ell V.t::lililJ
U.S.MAIL

OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FACSlMiLE)
E-MAIL
r- ...,

t

-~~~ ~J,,L....
Debbie Miller

1;\lpoO(l~8\IJUI Y~UI il3\l'l.cA1JIJJU8 i 11U2.00<.'

/

AFtftMit~iWJWIU,IAM J. SCHROEDER IN
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William J. Schroed~r. ISB No. 5674
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. l 771
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P. 0. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Telephone: (208-664-8 l 15
Facs~mile: (208) 664-633&
MaiHng Addres~:

717 West Sprague, Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane. Washington 99201-3505
Tebphone: (509) 455~6000
facsimile: {509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant!-

1N THE DJSTRlCT COURT Or THE PIRST JUDICIAL DISTRTCT OF
THE STP.TE OF LDt\;-IO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENA.l
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
K.i\ THLEEN HOLLAND,

)

) C11se No. CV 10-677
)

) PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR
j ADMISSIONS TO Dt-:FENDANTS {AND

Plaintiffs,

) RESPONSES THERETO]

vs.

)

)
)
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMP ANY, and ')
)
MfiTL/FE AUTO & HONIE,

Defendants.

--TO:

)
)
)

DEFENDANTS and their attorney of record, William J. Schroeder, Esq., Paine HarnbJen,
LLP
Please answer these discovery request5 in the time-frames allowed under ldaho Jaw.

Pl.AlNTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR AJ)ilATSSlONS
TcifJg~BANTS [ANO RES!>ONSES THJ:.RETO] · I
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I. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
G'1;NERAL INSTI<UCTIONS
1.
Scope of Discovery. These document requests are directed to the ahove-namcd
Defendant(s) and cover all infonnatiCJn iu its possession, custody and control, including
information in the possession of officers, employees, agents, servant~, representa1.ives, attorneys,
or other persons dircctJy or indirectly employed or ret.ained hy them. or anyone e)se acting on

the.ir behalf or otherwise subject to their control, and any m.erged, consolidated, or acquired
predecessor or successor, parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate.
2.
Time Period. Unless otherwise indit.:aled, these documenL requests apply to the t1rne
period from October 1, 2009 to the present.
3.
Supplemental Responses. These document requests are continuing; supplemental
documenrs must be prnvided pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Proecure - bcrwcen the date
these requests are arn;wcrcd and the hearing on this m,lller.
4.
Deletions from Documents. Where anything ha.<:: been deleted from a document produc.:ed
in response to a document request:
a.

b.
c·

specify the nature of thematcrialdele.ted;
specify the reason for the delelion; and

identify the person responsible for the delelion.

5.
Organization of Documents in Response. Dpcuments submitted pursuanL to a document
request should be grouped and labeled according to the individual paragraph(s) of the document
request Wit.hin each granp, the documenLS should be ruwnged, to the extenL possible, in
chronological order. If any document is re..'iponsive to more than one docLJment reque.st, you may
provide ~ singJc copy indicating the paragraphs to which it is re!-;ponsi ve.
6.
Document No Longer in Possession. If any document requested is no longer in lhe
pnsse~sion, custody, t,r control of the Defcndant(s), stale:
a.

b.
c.

d.

e.

what was done with the document~
when such document was made;
the indcntify and address of the current custodian of I.he document;
Lhe-pcrson who made the decision to transfer or tli~posc of the document; and
Lhe reasons for the transfer Qr dispositjon.

7.
Privilege as Applied to Document Production. If objection is made Lo producing any
document, or any portion thereof, or to disclosing ao)' information conlained therein, on the ba.,;j~

c,f any c1aim of privilege, Defendant(s) are requested to specify in writing the m1ture of such
information and do;;urncnts, and the nature of the claim of privilege, so that tbe Court may rule
on the propriety of rhc objection, In the case of documents, the .Def1:mda11t should state:
38157-2010
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a.
h.

Lhc title of the document;
the nature of the document (e.g., interoffice memorandum, correspondence, n::port, ~Lt:.);
c.
Lhe author or sender;
d,
the addressee;
I:!.
Lhc daLc of the document;
f.
the name of each person to whom tbe original or a copy wa-s shown or circulaLed;
g.
Lbe names appearing on any circulation Hst relating t.o Lhe document;
h.
the basis on which privilege is claimed; and
i.
::i summary statement of the subject matter of the document in sufficient detail to permit
t.he Court. Lo rule on the propriety of the objection.
Upon the agreement of counsel, certain documents may be excluded from these rcqufre111ents.

8.
Singular/Plural. Words used in the plural shall also be Lakcn to mean and include the
singular. Words used in the singular shall also be taken LO mean and include the plural.
9.
"And" am! "Or." The word,;, "and" and "of shall be constru~d conjunctively or
disjunctively as ncccs!;ary to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive,

DEVTNITTONS
Unless or.hen.vise, indicated, the folJowing definitions shall apply to these discov~r)'
Dj strict

rcy_ucsl~:

l.

"Com1 ·· sliall mean the District Court of the FirsL Judicial

of Idaho.

2.

"Compensation'' shall mean anything of pecuniary value, to include but not limited to:

cash, other forms of money, stock, stock options, silver, gt>ltl, and perquisites.
3.

"Defendant'' shalJ mean the Defendants n1imed in the above encaptioncd matter.

4.
"Dc)c.:umcnl" nu~.ms all writings of any kind, including, without limiLaLion, the originals
~md all non-identical copies, whether different from the originals by reason of any notation made
on such c.:opies or otherwise including, without limitation, correspondence, memoranda, notes,
diaries, stati!;tics, leuers, telegrams, minutes, contracts, bills of lading, reports, studies, checks,
sLatemenls, receipts, l'cturns, summaries, pamphlets, books, interoffice and intra-office
communications, notations of any conversa1;ions (inc]uding, w1thout limitation; telephone call 1!0
meetings, and other commnniclltfons), bulletins, printed matter, computer printouts, Le1etypes,
telefax, invoices, worksheets, graphic or oral records or representations of any kind (includ.ing,
without limit~tion, photogra!)hS, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotapes, recordings,
and motion pictur'!s), electrani~. mechanic;il, or electric records or representations of any kind
(including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, discs, recordings and computer memories), and
all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes and amentlmenls ur any of the foregoing.
5.
"Rel ace to," "relating to," or ''relates to" means constituting, defining, concerning,
embodying, reflecting, identifying, stating, referring to, dealing with, or io any way perta~ning to.
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6.
"Subject matter of this action" shall mean the abo•;c cncsptic.med maLLer, the !.lnderlying
even LS of this matter from October 1, 2009 LO Lhe present.
7.
''You" and "your," unless otherwi~e indicated, means the Defendant corporate and every
past or present employee, agent, attorney, or olher servant cf Defendanr.
You are r.ec1uesLed Lo file withio thirty (30) days u written rt:!;:,pnnsc to request rn1 lhe (attachoo
Docufnenl s. ~hedule) and to produce. those docu.menL~ for inspection and copying on Plaintiffs'
attorney a.t office address specified above.

(a)

Yollf writLen response shall state with respect to eac.:h iLem or category, tb,)t int:;pecLionrdatcd nctivities will he permiued a." requested, unless requesL is rcfu2.cd, in which evenl the
re;1sons for refw;·al :,hall be slated. If the refusal relates co part of an item. or category, thaL part
sh,d.l be i;pecified.
(b)
ln ::iccorchince, I.he documents shall be produced a::; they ar-2 co'1ercd in the .usual course of
busu~css or you sh::i.n orgunite and label chem to correspond with tbe catt.!g,orics jn the r;:.:quei;t.

(~'.)

'llicse. riqu.~~ts shall encompass all items within youc p0%1~ssion, cu:,mdy 0r <;ontroL

td)
These J.'equcsts a:·e continuing in d1aracter so as to re.quir.~ yuu
-;upp!c::-ntnt ~onr r,?...-;pom.,t if you oblain further .,nateri.el :nf,;rrnation.

lo

p~omr;ly ;1111end or

!.~ in rei,~11)nding t.o these re4uesLs you encounter any amb1.?J1ty :n c0, 1 Ltt:m1g :ri/ n::qu-;::,:i.,
~ns'::::-uct~on 1r. definition, sel forth the matter deemed amhiguo::.; ir: !he Cf'lnst::i.,cr.lon u~ed . .in
(;;:)

rcsp.ondi1.1g.

IL REQUESTS FOR ADML'-;.SlON
_____ ,_.,........
Renuest
for Admission No. 1: Please adm.it th.at OD or abu 1Jl i•fovr;:.mbei' )2, 2()()9,
Def~rH.ianti: $ent a letter to Pbintiffs' attorney seeking certain information related to the .:.:luims
TT'.dd~ hy Plaintiffs under the.ir policies of insurance:
· ·
·

• a dm1lle
, d that a ' etter was ~mt. 1'"
'
' spe}·1;1G
L
;•
•'
'4'
·- hr. 001C:nr.1em
1or hse1.1
I t ,s
unJ Dt\femlants deny any statenw:nt ,;1 Requ~st for Admit.!aiion ·No, J
th,F&t i$ inconsistent with the letter•

.Reque..~t-~QI._{\.d1:w..ssion No. 2: Plea-;e admit that c::i m ;:-'liout Novcmbt;;L 17, 2009,
Plaintiffs' attorney sent Defendants a letter with cr:d,y;uc:~,3 ir. r~:;pons,: to th~: tc.,t,'!r id\;ntifi!?-tl fa
Reques:: for .Admission No. 1.
H ls admitted that a letter- was sent. Thi;. dr,er.nneut sp"!aks f.;:n- HseH
fmd Defend~.nts deny &ny statement i,i .Reip..1\!St for Adrniss·k,n .No. 2
that !s ;ncort~i.'itent with the leUtr.
38157-2010
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RC;Qucst for Ad1Jlissiori No. 3: Please admit that atlached hcrclo as exhibit "A" is a true,

accurate, and admi1'sihle copy of Lhe November 12, 2009 letter identified in Request for
Admission No. l.
Respo11se:

Attachment· A· was not provided with the Requests for Admission.
This fact was brought to Plaintiffs' counsel's attention and a request
for AUachment A ·was made. Plaintiffs' counsel advised that the
Attachment. would be provided bi.J.t.l to dutc, Attachment A has not
been provided. As a re.~t.dt, the Defendant<; lack information and,
therefore, l~equesl for Admission Nu. 3 is denied. If Attachment A is
provided, this response
be supplemented.

will

Reguest for Admission No. 4: Please admit that <lttached hereto as exhibit "B" is a Lrue,
accurate, and ,tdrnissible copy of the November 17, 2009 letter idenlified in Request for
Admission No. 2,

Response:

Attachment B w.is not provided with the Requests for Admission.
This fact was brought to Plaintiffs' counse~·s attention and a reque..,.,t
for Attachment B was made. P!ai11tiff.-,' counsel advised that the
Attachment. would b~ provid,:!d but, lo dah:, Attachmenl B has not
beer, provided. As a result, the Dercnd8nts lack information and>
therefore, Requesl fo:- Admission No. 4 i$ µ.enied, If Attachment ll is
provided, this response
be supphm1cnted.

wm

Rcgucst for Admission No. 5: Please admit lbat th,;rc were at least two, and possibly
thre. policies of insurance, issued by Defendants, that provjded for coverage r~1r Plainli ffs'

claimed losses in the above en-captioned matter.
Re!;ponsc:

Objec~: The r~qu~s! is an incompleie hypotbetical. With.out
waiving the objecth'm, Request for Admission No. 5 is fflmiey.

Reouest for Admrni;ion No. 6: Please admit that on nr about December 1, 2009, Plaiociffs'
attorney sent Defen~.bnLs a t.'.opy of a ietter addre~:,ed lo Plaintj ff~· altomt:y purporting to be a
te11der of policy limits by Derrick Drydei:-i 's ins-:1rer, All$tate Insurance Company.
Ucsponse:

It fo ~dmitted tbnt a lette;r wc..s sc:s1t. ·:rne document speaks for it'ielf
and Defend:.mts d,c::ny :my st'.liemerat in Request for Admission No. 6.
that is incnnsistcnt wHh the Zett':er.
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Request for-Adg:_'.lissiQJl No. 7: Please admit that attat:hed hereto a~ exhibit "C" ls a true,

accurate, and admissible copy of the December 1, 2009 letter identified in Request for
Admission No. 6.
Response:

Attachment C was not provided with the Requesti, for Admission.
This fact was brought to Plaintiffs' counsel's attention and a request
for Attachment C was made. Plaintiffs' counsel advised that the
· Attachment would he provided bu¼ to date, Attachment C has not
bee11 provided. As a result, the Defendant'; lack information and,
therefore, Request for Admission No. 7 is ~ . If Attachment C is
provided, this response will be supplemented.

,Regul!~t for Admission No. 8: P)ea,c admit Lhat it i.s usual and customary for Plalnt:i-ffs'
attorneys in Kootenai Coum.y, ldaho ro charge an approximate contingency foe of one third ( 1/3)
for any recovery fo a personal ir1jury action.
Respm1r.e:

()_t;jectton: This is nol a proper rec1 ucsl fur admission under I.R.C.P..
Rule 36. Without waiving the objection, Request for Admiss;.cm Nu. 8
iz 5151~· A conlin~ency fee agr-ee111ent is 11 ·~•.mtrnd bdwcen .:.:uunsd
and client. Such a contra~t can vary depending ot1 the circumstur.c:eH
of ~ach cas(:,

Requ.e~t for Admission No. 9; Please admit that Defendants did not tender,
lender, $200,000 to Plaintiffs al ,my time prior to February 2. 2010.

Respon,e:

tir

offered to

Admit.

Bequest for Admission No_ 10: Please admit Lha.l Plain1.iffs will he ahl..-! Lo call Lo the stand
a qual.ificd cxpi:rt in the maucr of auorncy's fees at Lhc hearing of this m,ii.lcr.
Defendants arc without sufficient information or kn.:owle~g~ and,
therefore, ~~ the same.

S,eW}~.~! fo:r_Admissj_on No. i 1: Please admit that Plaintiffs will be able to elicit testjmony .
frrirn ;:, qmdifled e:xpelt witne:;s to the effect of the arn0tmt of attomcy's fees rcq\foste.d in this
r.:iattcr h .reui;onable given the facts and circumstances of this case.
·
·
Defendants art without sufficient !nformatiorJ
the,·eforc, tl.~l: the sanw.
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Request for Admission No. 12; Please admit t.hat the "amount justly due," a, defined by
Idaho law, under the instrrance policies covering Plaintiffs' losses, was $200,000.
Response:

Denied.

Reuuesr for Admission No. 13: Please admit that i:he auorney's fees sought in Plaintiffs'
pending motjon for auomey's tees purst1ant to J.C.§ 41-1839 is reasonable.

Response:

Denied.

Reguest for Admi1:;sion Nu. 14: P!ease admit that Defendants' coverage counsel,
Kalherine Paukert, Esq., made a sLalement to the effect of: Plaintiffs' counsel was an excellent
advocate for his clicnt.s.

Response:

Obiection: This is not R proper request for lldmissfon under I.R.C.P.,
Rule J6. Witnont waiving the objection, RetJuesl for Admission No.
14 is denied. Th~ conun~nt Ms. Kathleen Paukert made is as set forth
in her April 13, 2010 Affidavit.

ReguesL for Admissio£~_Q.._J.2: Please admit that i~ is Lhe public policy or the state of
allow for attorney's fees in instances where i11su1'Crn rail LO tendi;:..r amounts justly due Lo
their insureds within thi.rty (30) day!i after the in~urcd provide proof cf los~ and insureds incur
auomey'.s fce.s.
Idaho to

Response:

Objection: Tbis is not a proper request for admission under I.R.C.P.,
Rule 36. Without waiviJ1f, the objection, DefondanlS admil that, tC. §
41-1839 is Lhc slatute regardj.ng attorney l'ees and denies Request for
Admission No. lS to the extent it as inconsistent with I.C. § 41-1839.

Request for Admissim1 No. 16: Please admit thEit combined, Plaintiffs ltcltl Lhree
h"1surance policies with Defondan•.s.

Re.c;ponse:

three polid~s. 1t is denied
tbat the Plain tiffs ea.rb -hl'-ld .thr~e policies ...

]t is admitted Hiai. cJ>•nhinetl there wcro

B,ggucst for Ad~:nissi1,~2.,_1'.'-;':),!_j]: F!-::asc adm.:t that Plaintlffs made three claims under the
poli:::leC of insurance jssue,-t by D,!.f,;.m.l:i:nl:~.
Response;

Admit
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Reguest for Admis~jon No. 18: Please admit that Defendanis assigned three claim
numbers to Plaintiffs' claims, one for each policy of insurance.
Response:

Admit.

Rcguest for Admission No. I 9: Please admi L that Defendants tendered two checks to
Piaim.iffs for settlement of an of Plaintiffs' claims, one check in Lhe amount of $i50,000,00 arid
lhe, other in the amount of $50,000.00.

Response:

Admit.

Requesl. for Admission No. ~: Please admit that Defendants seule<l the underlying
claim:,:; in Lhis matter while allowing the claim for attorney's foes to proc.:eed.

Response:

Denied. The parties reached a settlement of all claims on Februury 3,
20l0. After the ~ettlement was reached, in breach of the settlement,
Pla.intiffs suhmittcd a claim for attorney's rt:t!'s. Defendants have a
pending motion to enfon.-e the terms of the settlement.

Request for Admission No. 21: Please admit that counsel for Defendants, iu coujum:Licm
wiLh counsel for Plaintiffs drafted the seltlemeot release in this matter.
Response.:

It is admitted that counsel for Defendants, in conjunction wilh counsel
for Plaintiff.~, drafted the Release in this matter.

RequesL for Adrn.ission No. 22: Please admit that the settlement release in this matter was
drafLcd subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs' moti:on for attorney's fees.

Response:

It is admitted that the Release was drafted subsequent lo the tilin~ of
.Pbintiffs' motion for attorney's fees:

Rcoucst for Admi:;~jon No. 23: Please admit that Defendants' first settlement release draft
tendered to Plaintiffs included a provision, for indemnity for both Paukert & Troppmam, PLLC
and for Katherine Paukert, Esq.

Response:

It is admitted that the first release draft contained a provl~ion for
i:1demnity. The dveu.ment speaks for itself and Detendands deny any,
statement in Request foi' Admission Ne. 23 that is inconsistent with
the first release draft.
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Reg_ucst for Agrnission No. 24: Plea,._e admil the settlement reJcase draft identified in
Request for Admission No. 23 was sent to Plaintiff:,;' counsel c.:ontemporan!!ously with the
settJemcnt drafts identified above in Request for Admission No. 19:
Response:

It is admitted that the release draft was seut to PlaintitTs' counsel
contemporaneously with the settlement checks identified above in
Request for Admission No. 19.

Request for Adm.issiop No. 25: Please admit that Plaintiffs have never personally meL,

nor have ever entered into any business arrangemenl wiLh either Katherine Paukert., Esq. and/or
Paukert & Troppmarm, PLLC.
Response:

Admit.

Request for Admission No 26: Please admiL that Defendants' counsel, Kalheri n~ Paukert,
Esq. attempLed 10 revoke tender of the amount justly due in this matter upon learning of
Plaintiffs' aLtorney's fees.

Response:

Denied. As explained in Ms. Kathleen .Paukert's April 13, 2010
Affidavit, aflcr a settlement of all cl:iims was reached, Plaintiffs, in
derogation of the scttlcmcnl, submitted u claim f,u- attorney's fees.
Defendants have a pending motion to e.nrorce the terms of the
settltment.

Reguest for Admission No. 27: Please admit chat Detendams· counsel, Katherine Pauk.ert,
fa;q. attempted to condition settlement of this matter to include attorney's fees i.;ubsequenl to
Plaintiffs' acceptance of Defendant~· offer to i:;ettle.

Response:

Denied. As exphth1ed in Ms. Kathleen Paukert's April 13, 2010
Affidavit, after a settlement of all claims was reached, PlaintilTs, in
derogation of tbe settlement, submitted a claim for attorney's fees.
Defendants have a pending motion to enforce the terms of the
settlemenL
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DA TF.D this

i11

accordance with Idaho Rules
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or Civil Procedure Rule 26(1).

31_ day of April, 20 I0.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

By:~-=_,,,,__.._~~----~---=--::..-'v'e_u_l/_·-=--=-~·
William J.• roeder, !SB No. 6674
PatL'ick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771
Attorney fur Defendants
1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;;) g-+ ..._ day of April, 2010. I caused to be served a
true und correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFJl'S' FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
TO DEFENDANTS [AND RESPONSES THERETOJ, by the method indicated below and
addressed to the following:
Kin:,.o H. Mihara
at Law
424 Sherman Avenue, Suit.e 308
Coeur d'Alene, ldaho 838.16-0969
Attorney

v

DELIVERED
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (F ACSIMlLE)
E-MAlL

!:\~~00001\U~l~ll\",NI I) ;II l1$l":UlOROli7 5UJOC

381-57-2010
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William J. Sc.:broeder, ISB No. 6674
PAJNE HAMBLEN 1-,,LP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P. 0. Box F.

Coeur d'Alene, Ids..u'ic 83816-0328
Telephone: (208-664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
Mailing Address:

717 West Sprague Avenue, Snite 1200
Spokane, Washington ·99201 •3505
,

Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Fa~:sim.iJc: (509) 838-0007

Attorney for Dcfendaocs
L.r-...J Tf.fb DISTm:cr COUR:r OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TH!:: STATE OF lDAHO, lN AND POR THE CO'LTNTY OF KOOTENAI

The ESTl,.TE ofDENJAMJ.N HOLLAN[).
DECEASED, GR;~GORY ItOl.I.. AND, and
KATHLEEl\. HOLLAND,

} Case No. CV J.0-677
)

) PLAINTIFFS' Fll<ST INTERROGATORIES
) 1\J"'\fD REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
) DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS [AND

Plaintiffs,

) RESPONSES THER.ttTO]

vs.

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY a'ld
CASUALTY INSURANCE. COMPANY, and
METLWE AUTO & HOME,
Defendants.

___

TO:

)

....·-·-······-·'"·

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

--

· DEFENDANTS aniJ !.hejr auon:v.;y of rccm·d, William J. Sr;hroeder, E~q., PainP. Hamblen,

LLP

.

Pleas::. answer these c.ii:-::covery requests ia the time-fr11.1m;s allowed 11nder friaho !aw.
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I. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFI~TfIONS

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
I.
Scope of Discovery. These document requests are directed to the above-named
Defenda:nt(s) and cover all information in its possession-. custody and control, including
information in the. possession of officers. employees, agents, servants, representatives, an.orneys.
or other per:::ons directly or indirectly employed or retained by them, or anyone e)se acting on·
their behalf or CJtherwise subject to their control, un<l any mer.ged, conrnlidai:ed, or acquired
predec(;!ssor or successor, parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate..

2.
Time Pc1iod. Unless otherwise indicated, these document
time period from October 1, 2009 to the pres~nL

r~(JLIC~ls

ai:,ply

to

the

' 3.
Supplemeni.al Responses. These document reque~ts ase ccnLinuing; wpplemcntai
documents musr be provided pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Ci vii Proecure - hetween the date
these rcquesrs ~re answered and the hearing on this matter.
4.
prc<luc~d in

f)detions from Documents. Where anylhing has been tlP.leted from a docun.1r;nt
rt$pO!lSC'. to a document request:

ll.

spt;:;;~ ry th~

b.

spe<;::fy th~ reason for the del~tion: and

c.

identify the person responsjb.le for the deletion.

nature of the1naterialdele.t.ed;

5.
Organization of Documents in Rcspo11sc. Documcncs submitted pursuant to '1
document requc.st should he grouped ;;;1d labeJed according to the individual paragraph(s) of the
document request Within each group, the documents sbould be arranged, to the extent possible,
iu chronological order. If any document is responsive to more than one document request, y6t1
may provide· a single copy indicaLing the paragraphs to which it is responsive.
·
6.
Document No Longer in Possession. If any document rcqw.~~tcd is no longer in the
po:;sc:::sior:, c1.1:aody, or conLroJ of the Defendant(s), state;
;,J.

v\ih,tt was dcnc witb the docunien~

h.

when such document was made;

C.
,.;
'

.....

the person who made the dechiion to trensfe.r or dis;>c,se of the document: aG.d
fri.:: mi.sons for t.be trnn.sfer o;- dispos:t.ion.
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7. .
Piivifoge as Applied Lo Document Production. If objection is made to producing
any document, or a..,y portion thereof, or to disclosing any information contained therein, on the,
basis of any claim of privilege, Defendant(s) are reguesred to specify in writing the nature of
such information anrl documents, and the nature of the claim of privilege, lil> Lhat the Court rnay
rule on the proprfoty of the objection. In rhe case of docur11en1.s, the DefendanL should slate:

a.
b.
report, etc.);

the tjtle of the document;
the nature of the docurncnt (e.g., int.eroffic(: memon.mdum, correspontle11ce,

C.

the author or sender;

d,

Lhe addressee;

e.

the date of the document;

f.

Lhe ua1ue of each person to whom the original or a copy was shown or circulaLed;

g.

the names appearing on any circuhltion list relating to the document:

h.

lhe basis on which privilege. is claimed; and

i.
a summary scaterrnmt of the subject rmmer :.1[ the documcrll in sufficient detail to
permit the Court to rule on the propriety of the o~jection.

Upon the ag1ec.menl of com1scl, cerl~tin doctuTients may be excluded fro111 these
requirements.

8.
Singular/Plural. Words used in the plural shall also be taken ro mean and include
Lhe sjngu)ar. Words llSed in the :,.;inguJar shall also be La.ken Lo 1nean and include tbe plural.
9.

"And" and "Or.'' The words "and" and ·•of shall be construed conjunctiveJy or

di~junctivcJy as necessary to make the requesL inclusive rather than exclusive.

JJE1'1NITJONS
Unless otherwise, ind.icated, the fo!Jowing definitions shall apply to these discovery
requests:

L

"Coi.:.rt'' shalJ mean t.he .D.isu·ict
Coun of lh~ First Judicial District of Idaho.
'
'

2.
"Compensation" shall mc&.1 anyLhin;,; of pecuniary v:.1.lue, to include but not
limiLed to: ca:;h, other forms of mc)ne.y, stock, stock opt;ons, si.lver, gold, and perq 1Jisite!',.
3.

"Defendant" ~haH mean the Defendants named in the above em.:aprioned matter.

PLA™1'W:ro%r:IRS'f lNTERROGt\TORlf.:S AI\TI
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4.
"Document" rneans all writings of any kin<l. including, without limiLation, the
originals and all nou-i<lemical copies, whether different from the originals by reason of any
notation made on such copjes or otherwise inclucfo1g, witJ1out limitation, correspondence,
memoranda, notes, diaries, statistics, letters, telegrams, minutes, contracls, bi.11s of Jading,
reports, studies, chel!ks, statements, receipls, returns, summaries, pamphlels, books, interoffice
and intra-office communications. notations of any conversations {inc!nding, without limitation;
Lelephone call% meetings. and other communications), bulletins, printed matt.er, computt!r
printouL;;;, teletypes, telefax, invoices, worksheets, grciphic or oral rccorcls or representations of
any kind (includ.ing, without 'JirnitaUon, photographs, charts, graphs. microfiche, microfilm.
videolapes, recordings, and molion pictures), electronic, mechanical, or electric records or
repre~entations of any kind (including, without limiLation, tapes, cassencs, discs, recordings and
computer memories), and all drafts, alterations, modifical.ions, changes and amendrnen1.s of any
of the foregoing.

5.
''Relate Lo," "rclaLing to," or "relates Lo" means constituting, defining, concerning,
embodying. reflecting, itlentjfying, stating, rcfening co, deahng wjth, or in any way pertaining to.
6.
''Subject matter of this action" shall mean the above encaplioned matter, the
und'!rlying events or this mauer from October 1, 2009 to the prcscnL.

7.
"You" ~.nd "your," unless otherwise indicated, means the Defendant t.:orporate antl
every past or present employ~e. agent, auomey, or ocher servant of Defendant.
You are requested to file within thirty (30) d~ys a written response to requesL on the
(attad1eu Document Schedule) and to produce those document.ti for inspection and copying on
.Plrumiffa' auorney at office address specified above.
(a)
Your written rcspon!-e shall stmc with respect to each ilcm or category, lbaL
inspection-related activitit!S will be perm.itLed dS requested, unless request is refused, in which
event t.he reasons for refusal shaJl be stated. If the refusal relalt!S lo pan of an item or calegnry,
that part. shal.l be specified.
(b)
fo at;cvr<lance, the documents shall be produced ~ they are covered in the usm1l
course of business or you shall organize and lubel them to con-esponcl wjth the categories in the
requesr..

(c)

The~e requesrs shall encompass all iterni:; within your possession, custody or

contl'ol.
(d)
These requesti; are continuing in character so as to requin: you to promptly amend
or :mppiement yout response if you obtain further material ir.form&tion.
(e)
lf in responding to these requests you cncounler any ,1mbiguity in construing any
request, instruction or definition, ser forth the matter deemed amhigunus in the construction v.sed,
in responding.
PL,\l<Nn-FfJ$0 FIRST L"ITERROG ATORlliS AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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III. INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatury No_ 1: Please state the busis of Defendants' contention Lhat Plaintiffs'
requested attorney's fee is unreasonahle.
Answer:

As set forth in Ms. Paukert's April t3, 2010 Affidavit filed with the
Court (and incorporated by retere11ce herein)~ a r.ompromise
settlement was reached on February 31 2010. As part of that
settlement, Plaintiff was to provide a full release as to all clain1S. As a
result, Plaintlffs' request for attorney's fees should be dismissed.
Defcndanlc. have a pending motion to dismiss the request for
attorney's l'ees because of the settlement reached,
In addition to the above, as stated in Ms. Paukcrt•s Aflidavitt two or
the claims made on behalf of Plaintiffs were unsupportoo by Idaho
law. MetLife looked for coverage under an alternative theory than
what PJajntiffs' cuunseJ provided. (See, Ms. Paukert's Affidavit)

Plaintiffs' counsel advl-,ed l\iietUfe's Adjust.er tn.nt he would grant her
additional time to rev[cw the claims since she wa.s going to b~ 011
vacation for three weeks in December 2009. Based upon statemenL~
Plaintiffs' cmmsd made to the M:etUfe Adjuster and Ms. Paukert,
PlaintifTi, are estopped from making a claim for attorney's fccN.
Plaintiffs' counsel .advised Ms. Paukert, as set forth in Ms. Paukert's
April U, 2010 Affidavit, that he was handling the case pro bono. As
some point just prior to .January 26, 2010, Phlintif.Ts' counsel signed a
,..;ontingcnt fee ag,:-eement.. After the J>arties reached a settlement,
Plaintiffs' counsel announced that be was making a claim fo.
attorney's fees. If, arguendo, attorney's fees are allowed, fees should
be limited to the time er.pended in prcpuring the Complaint.
Defenses to Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees arc also set forth in
Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses. Said Answer and
Affirmative Del'onses are incorporated by r.eference herein.
Defendants reserve the right to supplement this answer after

Plaintiffs' provide responses to diseovery f"!!qnests.

h1terro£acor~ Nn. 2: Please state any ca~ law or st:1.tutc which Defendrrnt~ rely upon fr1
making any legal arguments.
·
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This request seeks auorney work product. Without
waiving lhe objection, the case law or statue Defendants will rely upon
will he set forth in its memorandum of authorities l11cd with the Courl
in response to, and in support of, motions filed.
Objection:

Tnterrogatory N(). 3: Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 26, please stf'.ltc the n11111c of any witncsse:;, !ay
or expert.. that Defendants intend to t:al1 to the stand at the schedu]ed hearing of this matte~.

Answer:

It is Defendants' understanding that the hearing scheduled for 6/2/10
will be based upon Affidavits. Ms. Paukert will submit AmdaviL-, and
Dankce Da"i~ will submit an Affidavit. If this matter is set over for
an evidentiary trial, this answer will be supplemented.

Iut0m1l!at,.11)' No. 4: Pleitse state the compensation am.mgcmcnt between the law firm
l 1~uke11 and Tmppn-umn, PLLC and DefcndanL,.

Answ~r:

Objection: The requested information is not relevant and will
lead to tht discovery of admissil>1e evidence.

J1ol

lnti:rrc:igaror~ No. 5: Please state tl1e compensation arrangemcm heLween to the law fim1
Pruue Httrnhlcn, LLP and De[t::ndams.

Answer:

Ohicction: The requested information is not z·el~v1mt nncl will not
lend Lo the discovery of admissible cvid~nce.

!nlemigatory No ....Q: Please

sLale

the amount of money that DcfcndanLs valued Plaintiffs'

claims al.
An~wer:

Objection: It is vague as to what is being requested. Without wa~ving
the objection, as <;lisi;:ussed in Ms. Paukerts' Afndnvit, a compromised
settlement was reuchcd on 2/3/10. The settlement w;:15 $200,000.00 in
escchang\! for a ful1 release of all clttims.

Tntcnogatorv No. 7: Please state tne date of valuation of tllc amount requested rn

lnterrogatory No. 6 above.
PLATNTTFFS' FlRST [NTERR0GATORTES AND
REQUEST.-; FOR PRODUCTION OF oocu:VJENTS
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An;i;wer:

Obiection: It is vague as lo what is being riqucstcd. Without wai'1ing
the objection, as discussed in Ms. Paukert~· Affidavit, a compromised
settlement was reached on 2/3/10. The settlement was $200,000.00 in
exchange for a full release or .ull claims.

TV. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Request for Prmluction of Documents No_ l: Please produce a true, accurate, and
admissible complete, unredacted copy of correspondenr.:e between Plaintiffs ancl Defendants and
between Defendant1, and any second or third parties in Lhis matter.
Response:

OMeclion; Correspondence between Plaintiffs and Defendanlii lS m
Plaintiff:';' possession. Without waiving the objection, Defend.ants'
daim tile, redacted for attorney-client privilege, will be provided.

Reyuest fo( Production of Documcnl'l No_ 2: Please prn<luce a true, accurate. and
;;idmissible cnmpJete, unredacted copy of Defendants' claim file in this matter.

Rcspuw;e:

QbjccHon:
To the t!:dent Plaintiffs seek attorn~:1-ciie11t
communications, an objection is hereby mad~. \Vithout waiving the
objec.tion, Defendants' cl.aim file, with attorney-client cmmnunkations
redacted, will be provided.

Request for Production of Documents No. J: PJca.'te produce a u·ue, a.1..:curnte, and
adm.issible copy of Defendants' agent, Joe Foredyce's telephone records for Lhe months or
January and febmary, 2010.
Respomc:

Objection. The records are not rd,cnmt and wili not lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence concerning the sole rem~!ining chdm •

.R.cgucst for ProducLion of
admissible copies
1natter.
Respomc;

or documenl.-;

Do(2!:!!!_1£nt5 No. 4: Pk11se. produce a true, accurare., and
whk:b Defendants intend t0 introdu.::c. at the hearing or this

Ohl~tion: ,vork product. ~lithout wa1•.11ng thl! 1_1bjection, a
determination bas not h0~H1 m:.:)de as to :Exhibits. All E:r.h.ibHs uaed
will b~ attached to the Affidavit':> filed with the Cou!"t. If the case is set
o-ver for an e·i.idfmtiary he.\lring, thi!U"e!.if.:·lJ!se wiH be suspp]emcnte.rJ.
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B,eguest for Produ,;lion of Documents No. 5: Please produce a true,. . accurate, and

admis~ible copy of Defendants' couosel, Katherine Paukert, Esq. nnd P'aukerc & Trwppmann,
PLLC'~ 1elephone records for the! monch<. of Jamrary and February, 2010.

Qbjeclion: The records arc not relevant and will not lead.· to the
discovery
admissible evidence. Moreov~r, the records would

or

include all of tb.1t Firm's contacts wittJ clients rrom various cases and

thereby implicates tl1e atto:rney-client privHege.

and correct
copy of Ddendams' auorncy's biUingr~ in this matter. This request is intended to inc1ude, the
billings _of all principlt:s and employc-..es of Paukert & Troppmann, PLLC and Paine Hamblen
LLP.
Re.quest for Production of Documents No. 6: Plet1se produce a ~rue,

aC(;tJnttc,

Obi~&Q!!; The records are not relevant and will not lead to the
d]sco·1,ery of admissible evidence. Moreover, the biHings wou!ri
tfo.close attorm,y•dient commm2icalio:1.s and a:ttorney work prod!Jct

Respmase:

P,.,?-Q:Je.st fm Pmriur.tioil....QJ.' DQ_<;tn;.:1cms.....No. 7: Pursuant to I.P...C.P. 26(b)(2}, please
produce n true, accurnte, Md correct t.:opy of .any insuraoc~ agreements whk:h may be used 1.0
~atisfy pan of or all of any j~dg1m!:nl which may be cmer~d in this case.

None as to the snlf:! rem~i:nirlg daim of attorney·~ fees.
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I certify the responses in accordance with Tdaho Rule:-; of Civil Procedure Rule '26(f).
DATED this ___)_ _ day of May, 2010.
PAlNE HAMBLEN LLP

By,:$~/~--William . Schroeder, ISB No. 6674

.

Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771
Attorney for Defendants

..
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CERTU'f CA TE O.F SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~
day of May, 2010, I caused co be served u
trnc and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO DEJ:i'ENDANTS (AND
RESPONSES THERETO] to the foJlowing:

Kinzo H. Mihara.
Attorney at Law
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 -0969

DELTVERED
U.S. MAIL

--'L-

OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOJ>Y (FACSIMILE)
E-MAIL

:UJL.W.k-~. ~ - Debb.ie .Miller

i ·\Spudoc~\UII I \1\.1\llO I 5.lm!S('.I0()80J 179.l)( X: :lg
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Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940
Attorney at Law
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308
P. 0. Box 969
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 I 6-0969
P (208) 667-5486
F (208) 667-4695

2D![' ~' · '' 2S f~ f'i I l : 46
CU:.RK DISTRICT~

n

~.....~~~.......,~,,......,

Counsel for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Ihe ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KA TI-ILEEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
Defendants.

----------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 10-0677

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord and hereby reply to
Defendants' opposition to their motion for summary judgment as follows:
UNDISPUTED FACTS
The undisputed facts in this case have been relayed several times by both parties and, for
brevity's sake, will not be recited again herein.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs would assert that both parties correctly state the legal standards of review.
ARGUMENT
A. Defendants' cite neither statute, case law, nor legal doctrine to support their
contention that the stipulated order in this case precludes Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment.
In reviewing Defenda.'1ts' opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for sum.rna_ry judgment,
Plaintiffs are unable to find a single case, a singe statute, or a single doctrine of law that
Defendants rely upon to defend against the main thrust of Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment -that their answer failed to address the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint.
Indeed, after reviewing the Court's order in this case, Plaintiffs cannot determine how
Defendants' statement that, "given the Order by the Court, the only responsive pleading required
was to Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fees," can be a correct statement of the law. See
Defs' Memorandum in Opposition to Plfs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Indeed, upon
review of this Court's order, it is apparent that the Court did not dispense with any of the
pleading requirements in its order, nor did the parties do so via their stipulation. See Joint Motion
and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839. Despite the language cited on page 3 of their opposition, Defendants

fail to parse out, or explain how their utter failure to address the factual allegations of Plaintiffs'
complaint is addressed by the stipulation or the Court's order. Plaintiffs believe, but cannot be
sure, that Defendants confuse the terms 'factual allegations' and 'claims' and use those terms
interchangeably in their opposition. In short, it was Defendants who decided to file answer, and
to utilize the language used in that answer. Defendants should now be bound by that language.
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Plaintiffs would simply assert that Defendants' opposition is an admission by Defendants
that, for whatever reason, they failed to deny the factual allegations contained within Plaintiffs'
complaint. Plaintiffs can not advise this Court of any law as they have been able to find, case or
statute, regarding how a defendant's intent is relevant in failing to deny a factual allegation.
Defendants state in their opposition brief:
In the present motion, instead of addressing the merits of t.11e case, Plaintiffs take
the disappointing position that they may ( 1) enter into a Stipulated Order
dismissing "all claims" with prejudice and leaving only their pending Motion for
Attorney's Fees; (2) accept settlement; (3) observe Defendants' Answer
addressing the sole remaining claim for attorney's fees; (4) say nothing; and (5)
argue that "by failing to deny paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs'
complaint, Defendants have admitted the facts necessary for adjudication ofthis
matter and have negated any need for an evidentiary hearing... Such argument is
indicative of Plaintiffs' counsel's disappointing behavior in this matter.

See Defs' Memorandum in Opposition to Plfs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6-7 (emphasis
added). Plaintiffs would argue that arguing the law and the facts is exactly what has been
indicative of their attorney's behavior since the inception of this case. Defendants have been the
only party disappointed as they have been on the low ground; morally, legally, and factually.
Defendants state in their opposition brief, "Defendants' Answer specifically sets forth the
reason such paragraphs were not addressed... " Id at 7 (emphasis added). Hence, Defendants'
very argument in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is that they did not
address, hence did not answer, the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint.
It is for the foregoing reasons why Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be

granted.
B. Defendants ask this Court to award attorney's fees incurred after January 22, 2010.

Plaintiffs observe that Defendants state in their opposition that it is within the Court's
discretion to award, "at a minimum, attorney's fees incurred after January 22, 2010, as Mr.
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Mihara states he would have operated pro bono up to that date." See Defs' Opposition, p.12

( emphasis in original). It is undisputed that the contingency fee agreement was signed after
January 22, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "2;" see also Defs' Response to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 21 (citing the Aff. K. Paukert) ("At some point just prior to
January 26, 2010, Mr. Mihara signed a contingency fee agreement with the Plaintiffs."). It is
further undisputed th.at Plaintiffs attorney as spent a significa...'lt amount of time on this case since
January 22, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.); see also Aff. K. Mihara (May); see also Aff. K.
Paukert; see also Aff. D. Davis; see also Aff. W. Schroeder.
In short, Defendants invite this Court to award attorney's fees incurred after January 22,
2010. Finally, Plaintiffs and Defendants can agree. It is for the foregoing reason why Plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment should be granted and this case be closed.
C. Defendants fail to address how the attorney's fees sought by Plaintiffs are excessive
or unreasonable.
Defendants correctly note that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) contains the factors to which the Court
must look to determine a reasonable attorney's fee. Defendants do not, however, go through
those factors to come to a conclusion as to what a reasonable attorney's fee would be in this case.
Defendants' foundation for their sole argument that the attorney's fee claimed by Plaintiffs is
excessive and unreasonable is that they made their offer without the knowledge of the fact that a
complaint had been filed in this case. 1
Defendants statement that they were "exploring possible legal theories to provide
coverage ... ," is just window dressing to the fact that they were posturing to deny coverage

1
Defendants make their argument despite admitting that the offer was made on February 2, 20 I 0, accepted on February 3, 2010,
and that their agent totd them that the lawsuit had been filed on January 29, 2010 and that their attorney had the opportunity to,
and did, investigate the allegation. Cf Aff. K. Mihara, 11111 and 14; Exs. "7," "IO," and "I I."
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under the higher limit policies and were likely buying time to file a declaratory action against
Plaintiffs. 2
Hypothetically, should Defendants had tendered the limits of the higher policies into the
Court's registry and filed a declaratory action, prior to Plaintiffs filing a complaint- and without
telling Plaintiffs prior to filing, Defendants would now be claiming that the statute allows them
to do just that and avoid having to pay attorney's fees. See l.C. § 41-1839(2).

It is for the foregoing reasons why Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be
granted.

D. Defendants' "false representations" or "concealment of material facts" neither
addresses how such representations were "false" or how "material" facts were
concealed. Further, application of the doctrine of estopple does not pertain to the
statutory construction of the statute at issue.
Plaintiffs take issue with the first bullet point under section C, page 8 of Defendants'
Opposition filing. The second bullet point is uncontested. Plaintiffs further contest the third,
fourth, and fifth bullet points contained on page 9 of Defendants' opposition. Plantiffs would
offer that the first, third, fourth, and fifth bullet points do not create a dispute of a 'material fact'
to preclude summary judgment.
The Idaho code is explicit in its requirement for entitlement to attorney's fees. See l.C. §
41-1839(1) and (2). There are no exceptions if the adjustor goes on vacation. 3 Id. There is no
exception to the statute when the attorney is acting pro bono. Id. There is no exception if the
insured tells the insurer that they want a higher limit under another policy. Id. There is no
exception if the insurer does not know that the lawsuit is filed. Id. There is no exception if
Plaintiffs accept settlement after the lawsuit is filed. Id. The only exceptions under the law that

2

As noted in Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to J.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. ("Moreover, the
Defendants could have simply decided to bring a declaratory judgment action.")
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would shield Defendants from the application of the statute are that (1) the insurer tenders the
amount justly due within thirty (30) days from the date the insured provides proof of loss (LC. §
41-1839(1)), and/or (2) if the insurer tenders the amount justly due to the insured prior to the
filing of the lawsuit, is rejected, and subsequently tenders that amount into the Court's registry
(LC.§ 41-1839(2)).
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Idaho has interpreted the statute to include other
requirements, but has only gone on to reverse itself noting the simple application of the statute.
See Parsons v. Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18
(2007). The Court noted:
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear, and
unambiguous, courts are constrained to follow the plain meaning, and neither add
to the statute or take away by judicial construction... In Martin v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002), we held that Idaho Code
§ 41-183 9(1) contains two requirements for an insured to be entitled to an award
of attorney's fees: ( 1) the insured must provide proof of loss as required by the
insurance policy; and (2) the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within
thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss. Martin also made it clear that any
argument regarding the requirements for obtaining an award of attorney's fees
under Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1) must be based on the wording of the statute. The
issue is one of statutory construction. Arguments for additional requirements not
contained in the statutory language must be made by the legislature, not this
Court.
See Parsons at 617-18. (emphasis in oringial) (emphasis added).

It is abundantly apparent from review of Defendants' arguments that their bases for
opposition, therefore, are neither based on the language of the statute, nor the application thereof.
In short, the application of the statute is mandatory, and Defendants' arguments are meaningless
in light of the case law surrounding the statute.

3

Plaintiffs concede that, if, arguendo, extension were granted then such an extension would be an equitable consideration in
coming to a reasonable attorney's fee under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Plaintiffs specifically deny that such was the understanding of the
parties Qn or about early December of 2009. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "21."
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It is for the foregoing reason why Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be
granted.

E. Defendants' 'critical points' arguments that the attorney's fees sought are excessive
and unreasonable are contradictory to their previous f"llings.

In a comparison to the following "critical" points that Defendants note, Plaintiffs would ask
the Court to observe the contradictory arguments Defendants have made in other filings:

(I)

· "The settlement reached had nothing to do with the lawsuit, because Mr.

Mihara concealed the lawsuit from Ms. Paukert until after settlement." See Defs' Memo in
Opposition, p. 11.
C.f Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8 ("[O]n January 29, 2010 ... Mr. Foredyce told me he saw
in the COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Estate of Benjamin Holland had filed suit
against MetLife), c.f Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 25 ("On January 29, 2010, I
received a call from ... Daneice Davis. She told me that someone had seen in the
COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Holland Estate had sued MetLife. I had an
assistant check with the Court and was advised that there was not a record of such
a filing."), cf Aff. K. Mihara, ~~ 10, 11, Exs. "7" and "22."

The above shows that not only did Defendants know about the lawsuit before they made
the offer, but that despite their claims of "'good-faith" dealings, at least up to that point, neither
Daneice Davis nor Katherine Paukert even attempted to call Plaintiffs' attorney to see if he had
4

filed a lawsuit. To be sure, the only documentary evidence before this Court shows that
Plaintiffs' attorney attempted multiple written notifications to Defendants on the day the lawsuit
was filed.
(2)

"Settlement was a result of Ms. Paukert's efforts, with the encouragement of

MetLife, in locating alternative theories of coverage for the Additional Claims, other than those
proffered by Mr. Mihara." See Defs' Memo in Opposition, p. 11.

4
Please note that either Ms. Paukert or Ms. Davis could have simply called counsel and asked if a lawsuit had been filed. A party
cannot intentionally maintain ignorance in light oflikely facts and then benefit as a result of that ignorance.
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Cf Defs' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 17 ("Moreover,
during the process in which Mr. Mihara and Ms. Paukert conversed and proffered
theories back and forth in an effort to find coverage, such research and theories
necessitated additional proof of loss documentation ... ") c.f, Id., p. 19 ("including
Plaintiffs' attorney Mr. Mihara, who has been an active participant in searching
for theories that would allow coverage under the additional claims ... ") and ("Mr.
Mihara was an active participant in the parties' attempt to find coverage under the
Additional Claims, including, but not limited to, providing a seventeen-page
memorandum outlining his theories for coverage under the Additional Claims on
January 14, 2010, and numerous conversations between the period of January 14,
2010 and February 2, 2010 with Defendants' counsel Ms. Paukert, regarding
various potential legal theories that would provide coverage under the Additional
Claims.") ( emphasis added).
The foregoing shows how Defendants twist and contort the facts in an attempt to marshal
anything that could resemble a deformed semblance of a defense. For example, when discussing
.the reasonableness of the fee, the coverage theory under which the settlement was based was
totally Katherine Paukert's idea with encouragement from MetLife and nothing to do with
--

Plaintiffs' counsel. 5 However, when it comes to an argument of estopple or potential defense of
timely settlement, then of course Plaintiffs' counsel was in the thick of it and was actively
engaging in finding coverage theories. 6 Defendants' own filings show the extent to which they
are willing to go in their attempt to evade paying a reasonable attorney's fee in this case.
(3)

"Mr. Mihara acknowledges that he was handling the case pro bono just prior

to filing Plaintiffs' Complaint -which was itself filed without the knowledge of Defendants."

See Defs' Memo in Opposition, p. 11

Cf Aff. D. Davis,, 8 ("[O]n January 29, 2010 ... Mr. Foredyce told me he saw
in the COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Estate of Benjamin Holland had filed suit
against MetLife), cf Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, , 25 ("On January 29, 2010, I
received a call from ... Daneice Davis. She told me that someone had seen in the
COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Holland Estate had sued MetLife. I had an
assistant check with the Court and was advised that there was not a record of such
a filing."), cf Aff. K. Mihara,,, 10, 11, Exs. "7" and "22."
5

See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. See also Def's
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. I I.
6
See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 17-19.
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

F~f~ Y JUDGMENT- 8

Page 350 of 709

Again, in yet another filing, Defendants do not parse out how Plaintiffs' attorney's
willingness to help out a family who had just lost their only son, pro bono, up until negotiations
with their insurer reached intolerable levels, and waiting well after the statutory time limit had
expired - to the point where a complaint was necessary, is any reason to stiff Plaintiffs' attorney
out of a reasonable attorney's fee and give a windfall to an insurer who failed to act in a timely
manner to come to a coverage decision. Defendants don't have such an argument because such
an argument simply cannot be made under Idaho law.
Plaintiffs would ask the Court to note the contradictory arguments forwarded by
Defendants, and the way the defense of this case has been handled when coming to decision on a
reasonable attorney's fee. Plaintiffs shudder to think what litigation would be like if hundreds of
thousands of dollars, or more, were at stake and liability for the underlying claims was still being
contested.

It is for the foregoing reason why this Court should grant Plaintiffs' summary judgment
on the issue of entitlement to a reasonable attorney's fee in this case.

F. The public policy of encouraging attorneys to handle pro bono cases demands a
reasonable award in this case.
It is well known in the legal community that the bench and the public desire access to
justice. This access comes in the form oflegal counsel. It is also well known in the legal
community that cases such as these rarely, if at all, receive pro bono treatment by attorneys. To
allow Defendants in this case to prevail on such paltry and insulting arguments, arguments not
based on the law, but based on a twisted and contorted version of 'insurance company equity'
would be to send a message to the bar that no good deed goes unpunished and that despite
legitimate entitlement to statutory attorney's fees the court will turn their backs on attorney's
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who donate their services to members of the public who sustain catastrophic loss. 7 Plaintiffs'
counsel should not have to forego a justly earned fee just because Defendants could not figure
out the terms of their own policies.
It is for the foregoing reason why this Court should grant Plaintiffs' summary judgment

on the issue of entitlement to a reasonable attorney's fee in this case.
CONCLUSION
It is for the foregoing reasons why this Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary

judgment.
DATED this

Zl4>- day of May, 2010.
Counsel for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

0 ~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of May, 2010, I caused a true, accurate,
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via the
method indicated below:
William J. Schroeder
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P. O.BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Telephone: (208-664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338

[ ~VIA HAND-DELIVERY
[ ] VIA FACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338
[ ] VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL

Mailing Address:
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

7

Guidance is actually given by the courts to attorneys who receive statutory attorney's fees in pro bono cases. See I.R.P.C. 6.1,
commentary note 4. (Attached hereto pursuant to the Court's scheduling order of May 20, 2010).
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
JUDGMENT- JO

Fq1Mff-~:MtRY

Page 352 of 709

Idaho Rules
IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT- IRPC Effective 7-1-2004
Public Service
Includes all amendments throught June 5, 2006
Rule 6.1. VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBUCO SERVICE
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer
should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this
responsibility, the lawyer should:
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:

( 1) persons of limited means or
(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and eduGational organizations in matters that are
designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and
(b) provide any additional services through:

(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations
seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community,
governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes;
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.
In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal
services to persons of limited means.

Commentary

[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to
provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged
can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The Idaho State Bar urges all lawyers to
provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may
render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal
career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can
be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation
to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases.
[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of
limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the
disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of
a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative
lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent
persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers,
even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law.
[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for
participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial
resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but nevertheless, cannot afford counsel.
Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as the Idaho Volunteer Lawyers Program,
homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term
"governmental organizations" includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of
governmental or public sector agencies.
[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render
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free legal services is essential fort e work performed to fall within the meaning
paragraphs (a)(1) and (2).
Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award
of statutory attorneys' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from
inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to ·contribute an
appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means.
[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services
exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service
remained unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b).
Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers
and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where
those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bona responsibility
by performing services outlined in paragraph (b).
[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and
financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a
substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this
paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a
wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and
religious groups.
[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing
legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court
appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section.
[BJ Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal
system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal
services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator
or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a
few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph.
[9J Because the provision of pro bona services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical
commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in
pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bona responsibility by providing financial
support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should
be reasonably equivalent to the value of the tours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In
addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's
aggregate pro bono activities.
[ 1OJ Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that
exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs
to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing
direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible.
[ 11] Law firms should act reasonably to enable all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal services
called for by this Rule.
[12] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.
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William J. Schroeder, TSB No. 6674
Patrick E. Miller, lSB No. 1771
PAINE HAMBLEN T.J,P

II•,!

V

f'.1r

-
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CLERr:: D!STR1CT ::OURT
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701 Front Avenue, Suit~ 101
P.O. Bux E

Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Telephone; (208) 664-A 115
F11l:.:1imilc: (208) 664-6338

Mailing Address:
71 '7 West Sprague Avenue, Suile 1200
Spokane, Washingto11 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000

Fac;sirnile: (509) 83 8·0007
Attorneys for JJefendanls
lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FJRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATB OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP KOOTr:N Al

The ESTATE of B.cNJAMfN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, l'ITid
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,

Pla.intiffi:;,

)
) Cflsc No. CV 10-677
)
)
) SUR-REPLY TO PLAI.NTTFFS'
) MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
) PURSUANT TO l.C. § 41.1839
)

\IS.

)

METROPOLITAN PROPER TY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
Defendants.

----------

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

COME NOW, the Defendantl-l in th1:, ahov1:,-enliLled cause of action, by and through lht:ir
undersigned counsel, and rcspccti\llly ;;ubmit t~c following Sur-Reply to Plainti !Ts' Muliuu fur
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41- i839.

8UR,R.EPL Y TO Pl,/\IN'TIF'l-'S' "'1()TION POR

ATTORNEY'S fEES PIJRSllAJ',iT TO I.C. § 41-JSJ9 - J
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs' !iled their Motion and Memorandum for Attomcy·s .Pees l'ursuanc to LC. § 411839

on february 9, 2010. (See, Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuu.nl

10

LC.

s 41-1839

("Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fcc:i;"), filed Fcbruury 9, 20 l O; see, also. Memorandum in
Support of Pluinlffts' Motion for Attomey 1s Fees Pursuant tl) l.C. § 41.1839, Fikd February 9,
2010)

The following correspondence b~twccn Plaintifti.' Attorney, Kimm H. Mihara, ancl

Defendants' Attorney, William J. Schroeder. is relt:vant to Plaintiffs' argument that they arc

entitled to attorney's fees wider Idaho Civil Rule 54 for Defendants' failure to timely object:

•

A February 12, 2010 letter from Mr. Mihara to Mr. Schroeder di~cussing a potential
hearing date on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attomcy's Fees, which stales, in pertinent part:
"Should we need to set a hearing on this matter, I will umlersland, however [I] wuuh.l ask
that we meet and confer regarding our mutual schedules prior to setting·a hearing date."
(Sec, Supplemental Affidavit of William J. Schrne<ler in Support of Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's fet:S Pursuanl t,1 LC. ~ 41-1839 ("Supp.
Aff of Schroeder"), filed May 26, 2010, at 5, ExhjbH A)

,r

•

A febrnary 22, 2010 e-mail from Mr. Mihara to Mr. Schroeder, which states, in pi,;rtincnt

part: "Please let me know whether you want me to set the pending motion for atto~cy's
fees for hearing or if you want to discuss the matt.er funher." (1bld., at
•

GI

ir 6, fa,h1hit B)

A February 2.5, 20 IO lcncr from Mr. Mihara to Mr. Schror:dr:r, which states, in rok:v1111L
pan: "[h]ow m11ch time do you think that you will need to rcj~I.\Tch the fl.ttom1:y's foes
issue? Tf you would like to discuss, plca~c do not hcsita.te to e<mt:.u.;t me, otherwise, T plan
on selling the matter for hearing. T would like to get the altomcy's fees issut.l rn~ulvcu
~noner rather than later, however, l am willing to give you adequate time tt1 r~search the
lu.w a."'.l.d confer with your clitmt." (Ibid., at ~17, Exhibh C)
A Marc,.'.h 16th and 17th, 2010 e~mail ~.lCchansc between Mr. Mihara. and Mr. Schrot:der.
which ~tatcs, in pertinent part

Mr. Schroeder [March 16. 20l0, 7:27 AMJ: "On the auomcy fees issue,
we probably need tu have that issue resolved hy the Court. I suggest we
coordinate our schedules ond find a datt: convenient for hoth of u::.."
Mr. Mihara [March 16, 2010, 9:07 AMl: "As to the attorney's lees, l
believe we are set to discuss Lhe timing of setting the hearing tomorrow
i-lUK-Kt:t'LYTO rLAINTlf't'.'-.' M()'l'IUN ...-ui.

t1TTOl?NEV'S t'KE.S PURSUANT TO J.C. - Z
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morning along with any necessary discovery. Does 8:30am work for you
again? If not, please let me know."

Mr. Mihara [March 17, 20 l 0, 1:02 PM I; "Abo, per our conversation thi:5
morning, I have ta.lked with Jcann1e over at Judge Mitchell's chambers antl
w,: an: :set to go at 3:30pm on Wednesday, Mo.y 12, 2010." (Ibid., at ~I 8,
Exhibit D)

On March 26, 2010, Pluintiffs' noted th~ir Motion for Attorney's Fees for an eviclentiary
hearing on May 12, 2010.

(SELe, Note for

Hcarinc, filt:<l March 26. 2010) The parties then

proceeded with discovery. (See. e.g., Defendants' Notice of Service of Discovery Requests, filed
April 6. 2010, see, also, Plaintiffs' Notice of St!rvicc of Plaintiffs' First Request for Discovery to

Dcfc:1dants, tiled April 8, 2010) Despit~ prior rrpresentaLiuns, t)ll April 6, 2010, Plaintiffs'
r;ounscl advised Mr. Schro~der that he wa!i taking foe pC'lsition Lhat, under Tclaho Civil Rule 54, a

response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Ft::s was pas: du.~. Tn response, on /\pril 12, 2010,
Mr. Sch.roed~r st:nl au e-mail to Mr. Mihara discussing Plaintiffs' posilion that they ure entitled to

uttorncy·s fees under Idaho Civil Ruic 54:
J ,·e;wicwcd lRCP S4(c)(5) end 54(t1)(6) that your r~ferem.:cd in our call on 4/6. Ai;
I c1'pectcd, they deal with -post-judgment i:;:sues. Moreover, under 54(d)(S), after a
jud!;,'lllent baa he~n entered, the r~quest needs tn be made us part of a
Mt1morandum of Co~Ls. A.., you are aware:, a judgment has nol been enternd in this
case and the issue uf whether your di~nls arc entitled to attorney's fees has never
been adjudicated.
PL1tting to on~ side the fact that IRCP 54 is inapplicable since a JUtlgmcnt has not
heen entered, your new position is inconsistent with th~ request in your motion,
your numerous written and oral representations to me, your Notice of Hearing an<l
the discovery request you served.

One final note, pleas~

let me

know if,

i:lflE.1'

reviewing

inttmd to make tht: TRCP Rule 54 argument. lf )'Ou

furth~, you
ck>, I want to gel that issue
lhll maLtc::r

SUR-RErLY TO YLAINTlf'F:S' MOTION !-'(Ht
ATI'OHNt:Y'S FEES PllRSIIANTTO I.C. -3
38157-2010

Page 357 of 709

,v,,-.

-,·

I

........... , . . . . . .

,,..,1yn,.;1,,..i..,.1y,

~V::IDuDVVU I l

lYILl1

c..-

......

-·--·H'<'•,

befor~ the Cou,t as soon as poss1b!c. Also, given the above, l will be tiling a
count1;::r motion if an IRCP Rule 54 argument is made.
(See, Supp. All of Schrneder, at ~110, Exhibit F)
Given the above, Dcfendw1ts' Counsel advised Mr. Mihara that in his opinion Rule 54
dealt with post-judgam::cit pro~cc.dint;:s and wa.s innpplioable to th\'I case ut hi).nd, as nu Judgment
had bccCJ :mtercd. (Thid.) Moreover, since this was the first time Mt. Mihara had .raised thls

issue, find because it was inconsistent with his prior Tt.Trcsentations and the pleadings he filed,
Defendants' Couni:el ex.pressed. hi.s .surprise and disappointment in his newly adopted position.

(lbi,J.)

On April 29. 2010. Plaintitts' fiJed their Amended N!.)ticc of Hearing, resetting thiJ

evi.t:~ntfary hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attom~y's Fees for Juno 2, 20\0. {See, Arnended
Nuti.ce of Healing, filed April 29, 2010) in doi11g so, Plaintifls reserved the right to intrmlucc
~vidcmcc and/or ca11 witness~ at lh.: cvident1ary hearing. {!llli!-)
Dcfondanls fikd their Resrwnsc
to Plaintiffs' Motion for AHomcv's
.
- Fet:s Pursuant to J.C.
§ 41-1839 on May l 0, 2010. (See, Defendants' Response to Plai;iciffs' Motion for Attome:,,Js
Fees Pursuant m 1.C. § 41·1839, filed May 10, 2010)

The Defendants

w~~

served with

Ph1inhffa' Reply to Defendants' Respons-e to Pbf-lintiffs' Motion for Attom1:y's Fees Pursuant to

.I.C. § 41-1839 on May 11; 2010 (h,'.rci.naHer 11 Plaintiffs 1 Reply").

(See. Pluintiffs' Reply w

("?laintiffa' Rcp!:y''}. filed May 17, 2010) Plaintiffs' Reply inap-µroprialt:ly n.1if,c:s new issu1,,,~,
arguments and doc'\lments in rc&ponsive pleadings.

H. ARGUM~NT
lnitially, Plaintiffa untimely raise- !"lt~v. iss1.1os, arguments ru1d do;time..,11.s .for the fk;t time.
ir, Plainiiffs' Reply, Lr.eluding, hut nor limited to, rcfcrc11~r; tl1 ,m Ida..."10 Fcdcrul Bar.2c....""Upt~y uuse,

51Jfi.. RCt'I ,-,· TO ?LAL"i'rlff,:i' 11111:i T!Of'<I l'(Ot
,\T'ft)T.:.r/EY'S f~ES PIIKS{JANTTO l.C. -•I
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an argument tmdcr ldaho Civil Rule 54 and repealed citatinns to the Affidavit of Kin7,o H.
Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Mol1011 for Summary Juugmcnt (hereinafter "Affidavit of'
Mihara"), including over 100 pages or L=xhibits a.ttached thereto. Such issues, arguments and
documents should be saickcn as untimely for heing raised, in the first ini:itancc, in Plaintiffs'

Reply.
Aa~u1ning, argtum.do, that the Court is inclined to co11sidcr Plaintiffs' newly raised issues.

arguments and document~, they nonetheless do littlt.: to support Pla1ntiffs' position.

First,

Plaintiff~' relia.nc~ on the Idaho ft,tlt:ml Bau.k.ruptcy Ca$e Jn re Dari~c Jones, 401 B.R. 456

(Bkrtcy. D. ldaho 2009) is misplaci;d, as that cas.: is tlistinguis.hable from the present. Second,
j'\.'fr. Mihara's claim that he informed Defondaf!ts' Attorney Kathleen Puukt:rl Lhal he had filed

ii

Civil C1.)ntpl11i11t prior to settlement is factually incorr-:ct 1 And, final?y, ldaho Civi.! Rule 54 is

i.iappiicable to the case at hand because it upplies to post•j1.,dgme:--·: proceedings and is
inc~msistent wilh prior representations made by Plaintiff:;' Cc,1.1nscL
A,

PlatnUffs Should be Prohibited F!Q_m Unti.~1.::J!~l:sinii;)~~e.,_,~ Issue$, Argumenb 1md

!!..,o.cumencs ,n Thefr Reply Bt:ietlng.
Plaintiffs hu.ve ottcmpted to circumvent Jong-~tandirig ldaho c1.1mmon Jaw by u.n ncly

ruhsing new issues, arguments .ind ~fo1.:ume-ut.s for the first time in Plaintiffs' Reply.

Plaintiffs' Reply)

(See .•

Particularly, Plaintiffs mak1! Rn ,:i:rgument u:ader Iduho Civil Rule 54 and

reference an Idaho Federal Banbuptcy case, In re Jo11e~, 401 B.R. 456 (Bkrtcy. D, Jdahu 2009},
for the first time in Plaintiffs' Reply. (ibid.) Furthermore, Plai:ititrI, ma.1<.e repeated citations in

their Reply to the Affidavit of Mihara, including over !OU pagc;,s or attached exhibits attached
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thereto. (Ibid.) From the outset, such r~fcrcnce is inappropriate because the Affidavit nf Mihara

is in support of Plaintifts' Motion for Summary Judgment, not Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's

1-ees. (Ibid.) Moreover, the Affidavit or Mihara has well over 100 pu.gc::; uf attached exhibit::. that raise new issues, a,·brurnents and documents at the eleventh hour.
These actions circumvent long standing Idaho common law, which p1'ohihit1. arguments
and issue:; being raisud for the first time in n~ply briefing. See. e.g..

Stmhs

v. Prate~

Tccr.noln~ie<: 1 ln-c., 133 Idaho 715, 722, 992 f'.2d 164 0999) ("Because [Plaintiff] raised this

issue only in his reply brief. this Court win not address it."}, citing Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho
685. 687~ 905 P.2d 86 (1995); Stiit~ v. Raurlebaugh, 124 ldahu 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596 ( 1993);

see. also. Sta~:'· Garnbie, 146 h~arm JJ!, 336, 193 P.Jd !s78 (App. 2008) {"[l]ssu:s raised for
the first tim::: in the: reply brief will o:dinarily not b~ addressed hy this Court.''), citing Stat:~ v.
Killinger, 126 Jdaho 737, 740, 890 P.2d 3.23 (1995); .me, also, 11.enma:i v. Stat~, 132 Idaho 49,
51, 966 P.2d 49 (App. 1998); My~rs v. Wo:kmen's Auw lns .• Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3<l

r:;77 (2004).
In !ight M Plaintiffs new issues, ru-gumtmts and docum<:nLs, raised for the first time in
Plu'intiffa' Reply, DcfcndantB rn!.11.,ect that thii. Cr)urt itrike l'!aintiff.s' Heply to Defendant!-'

Response to Pla-inriffs' Motion lh, Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839. cogctiier wilh thu
'

Alfoiavit of Kin~o H. Mihara in Supp,Jrt of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, in their

tnlircty. Jn the alternative, Defendant reguestc- lhat the Court C{ll1.Sidcr this Sur-Reply in resp'.)nsc
to the new issues raised by Plaintiffs.

.SUR-Rf;rl.Y TO PLAINTJff~' MOTl>()N FOR
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Response to Plaintiffs' New Issues.
1.

The llnited States Bankrupt<.')! Case ln re Dari,·e .Jones, 401 B.R. 4JfJ (JJkrrcy.
D, Idaho 2009), Cited by Pluinti,lls· for the Fir.,·t Time In Plaint([fs' Reply, i.,·
Di~tinguLf;hable From the Pre.wmt Case.

1n an effort to overextend the scope of the attorney's fees provision under ldaho Code ~

4·1- 1839, Pluintilfa raise, for the first time in Plaintiffs' Reply, the Ur.itcd States Bankmptcy case

Tn

n:

Dari_££

foneti,

401 B.R. 456 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2009), and argue that 1 under the Banbuptcy

Court's decision, "settlement within the contex.t of a Cllntested claim results in a finding of the

'runount justly due."'

(See. Plaintiff~' Reply, p. 4)

Th;! Bankruplcy Court's decision is

distinguishable from the present case un multiple levels. At the outset, contrary lo Plaintiffs'
dahn, ,.uveragc was not contest~d in that case. The insured was injured in an alllomobilc

acciC:c::ri: cuust:u by the negligence of another driver on March 3, 2004, in.curring $60,000 in
~ocdical expenses as a result of injuries suffered in the accident. !ru.-e Darice Jo~~. 401 B.R. at
460. Th1.: insured sued the negligL.11l driver and recovered th1.: negligent driver's policy hrrnt of
$25,000. Ibid. Thereaitf!r, nn August 2, 2007, the insured filed a chapter 7 bmkruplcy petition.

!bid.

On November 14, 2007, the Court approved the trustee's employment of co:.mst:1 to

Nprcscnt the insured and trustee in pursuin!;'; culleclion of damage& from the i:tsu.rcd's March 3,
2004 automobile accident. Ibid.

The insured was untlisputcdly covered by a $25,000 !.mdcrinsurcd motorist ("UIM")

r:.ovt:rnge policy, as well as medical payment benefits in the amount of $10,000. ibid., at 460-61.
In fact, the insLlre; never disputed that tht:: in~ur:::Ll's damages exceeded th~ ncgli$ent dri_ver's
poli,;y limits. Ibid., at 465. On March 27, 2008, the insured's counsel sent the insur:::7 a letter

containing vurious documents supporting UTM benefits pursuant to the p::-;licy. fb,iQ. ac 4()1 .. On

Slm-m·;/LY 1·0 t'LAl!Yl'fff.J' MOTlON fOR
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June 12, 2008, the insured, through her counsel, sent the insurer u d~mand lcner for paymenl of
the $25,000 in UIM benetits and the $10,000 in medical pu)'lllents, as coverage wu!'i umfoiputed.
Ibid.

This letter also requested appruv~l for the insured to accopt payment of the negligent

drivds $25,000 policy limit. lbiq. When lh~ im:urcr failed to pay, on July l S, 2UU8, the insured
l'iled a lawi;uit againt-lt tbe insurer under the UIM coverage. lbid. In response to the lawsuit. on

July 25, 2008, 42 days after the June 12. 2008 lett~ and 10 days after the lawsuit was

commenced. the insurer tendered $35,000 to the insured, which she acct:plt.:d as full paym<.:.'l1t.
fbid. On August 4, 2008, the insured filed an amended complaint, seeking an award of attomey's

fees pL1rsuant to J.C. § 41 l 839. lbi~.
4

TI1ose fact:, a:-c distinguishable from the present in sevt!ral respects. Unlike the ins~1r~d in
Jones, the Plai;1ti ffs in this case ugreoo to sign a full release of their claim~ against M(;tL-i fo as
parl or a compromise settlement ov~r a co·;erag::: du;pULCJ Lh<1l, if litig~tcd, may have resultucl -in a
detennination that no sum was owi;)g. Alon2, the5e lin~~, Plaintiffs' citation to a quote reiternled

in Jones from the Idaho Supreme Court case .:,f Martin v. State foann Mut. Auto Lns. Co., 138
T<laho 244, 248, 61 P .3d 601 (2002) i!-: telling of this distinction:

1f the amount tendered by th~ insurer is WQQUQitiona1ly ac<.:eptl!U hy the insur~d,
then it will represent the "amount justly due" and the case ends.

Notubly, in lgne~, the Court found the insLArer paid the $35,000 "unconditionally" to the
insured, which ''she a,;cepte,i as the amount justly due :k~ her for benefits under the pofa.:y. 1' Ibid..:.,
al 467. As the Co\lrt noted, "this w:.ts the amount she-sought to collct;t t"rom Defendant 1insurcrl

from the heginning." lhi<1., at 467. Moreovt:r, Lhtm.: was no "condition" to payment. Ibid. Info.ct,
Plaintiffs simply amend1::u ihe.ir Compliiint seeking attomcy'3 foes and costs aftt,r tho msurer

tendered the $35,000. Ibid., o.t 461.
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Here, settl~menl was predicated on Plaintiffs "conditionally" si&•ning a full release of their
claims - which they agreed to do so. Stated another way, in this case, the parties emered a

com~)romise settlcml.111, neither side admining liability nor acknowledging Lhat the settlement
amount

11

justly due 1' to the Plaintiffs. As here, Jones may wc11 hnve turned out differently

wtL'5

had p5yment of th.e $35,000 been conditionecl on the insured signing a full rolcasc of her claims.
ln addition, unlike lhe l~wsuit i n ~ . in which the co,nplaint was lilcd and served with

the iusurer 1s knowledge prior to settlement, here the Flu.inti Ifs li1ed the lawsuit. settled the: t,;Use,
and then disclosed the Complaint to MetLife's counsel. Were the Defendants in this matter
seeking to settle w1th Lhe Plaintiffs in response to the lawsuit, there might he anargument that
attorney's fees m-e applicable. However, that is not the case btdtir':l Lhis Court. Ukewise,

llS

discussed above, in Jones, there was no dispute as to coverage. Tn contrast, in this case, although
not d·i~pnting coverage under Lhe Initial Claim, coverage under the Adc:lHiona!. Claims w~s
ui!ipuh;J, thus requiri11g the a1,!listai,cc of coverage counsel, rciwureh by counsel und the

submiss-ion of un additional proof of Joss.2
To find now that the Plaintifts are entitled to uttomt!y'~ lc.;c.:s would create a dangeruui:

precedent bey,md that contemplaLed by the ldaba Legislature. 1n pnu.:lical effoct, it would. pemiit

future insu.red's Ln file lawsuits without service, settle disputt:<l coverage claims. and the11 serve

th~ lawsuit

rn,

the insurer for attorney's fees following settlement. Ultimately, if liti.gated, the

Court may have dctcnnined that there was no ctwerage under the Parents' Polici1:~, and, therefore,
no rnon~y owing.

However, instead, the Doh,-ndan.ts ·worked with their im,urc<ls to find a

possible altem&tiw theory fur coverage and then entered a compromisell settlcrncot of disputed
2 Th,: i$.<.uc <Jf when proof of loss is sufficient is ordi..'larily a :t·~c~tion. uf fuel fo; the jury. Q;cenougb v,__F~rm
Dureau Mu~.

hlS,

Cn.

~.Q,

142 ldaho 589,130 P.3d 1127 (200€):
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It should not h~ lattrr punished for thost: efforts by virtue uf

claims concerning covt:rage.

Plaintiffs' tactical nondisclosure of the pendency of the current lawsuit.
2.

Mr. Mlhara's Claim Thar he J11formed Ms. Paukert of the January 26, 2010
Lawsuir Prior io Senlement is incorrect.

111 an attempt

hJ

11void i.hc implica.tinns of his own disappointing behavior, Mr. Mihurl:l

contends that he infonne<l Defendants 1 Attorney Kathleen Paukert that he had tiled a Complaint
on. beh1M of Plaintiffs aga1nsl Def1::nda,1ts on January 26, 2010 prior to settlement.

Initially.

Defendants were unaware Plaintiffs had filed a Cnmplaitil prior to settlement. (See, Affidavit of

Duneice Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees) ("Aff. or
Davis"), filed May 7, 2010,

ii

7, see, also, Affidavit

of Kathleen H.

Paukert {Submitted in

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fe,;:s) ("Aff. of Paukert"), filed April 13, 2010, ir
12; Supplemental Affi 1luv1l ul" Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plointit'i:-;·
Motion for Attorney's fees) ("Supp. Aff. of Paukerr."), filed May 7, 2010, i) 18)

IJ1 making such claim, Mr. Mihara sti'l.tcs that be lefl Ms. Paukert u rnc::1:1u~1.: ,m her phone

a.nd :.cnt her an e-mail

,m Junuury 26, 2010, the same dt1y the Complaint Wa.8 til~t.1, informing her

of th~ :;ame. (Plajntiffo' Reply, p. 6) Ms. Paukert never received a voic, ,nessag~ informing her
that a Complaint had been filed by Plaintiffs, and the e;.mail assL-i-tcd by Mr. Miho.rn as infonning,

Ms. Paukert of the lawsuit fails tn clo the sa.."llc. instead. it stat-:::;, in relevant part:
Subject: JU·:: Holland v. MetLife (Untiled); Demand und Statement ur Legal

Position
Kathy: Hopi.: i:lll is well. 1 have left a voice message on your 111achi11c. Please
advise as to your interpretation of the dynamics of the current situation. 1 calkd
Daneicc Davis with()ut re:~ults. RegardsKinzo

!,tili-lU;PL'r' TO rt,Al,~Tlfl'S' MO'J'IOI"' 1'0R
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(See, Affidavit of Mihara.! ii 11, Exhibit 7) Ahm, notably, paragraph 11 nf Mr. Mihara's Affiduvit

states: "It was the email dated January 26, 2010, (3:00pm) (Exhihit "7" above) that mcmoridlizes
the call l mtlde to Ms. Paukert to apprise her of the fact that T had just filed a law~uit against
MetLife. As noted hy lhc email correspondence, I left her a rne!'.l$agc." (Ibid.)
fTl)m the o:.1tsct, besides the fact thal no voice message was left with Ms. Paukert
infonning her of the same, the email docs not reference a .lawsuit in th-:;: heading or the body, nor
did Mr. Mihara attach the Complaint, a common professional courtesy. Moreover, Mr. Mihara':s

Affidavit claims that he had just filed the luwsuit, and that he subsequently sent an e-mail
informing Ms. Paukert of the same - yet, pecu1iarly, the subject line of the email uses the
1anguagi: 11 Unfile<l, "3 despite the law:sLJil al.ready bcing fi1ed. (Thid.) ln addition, no caust: m1mber
was pr1Jvided. (Thid.) Also, Mr. Mihani failed to make any mention c.,11' this lawsuit in a January
27, 2010 telephone conversation he had with Daneice Davis, the c1..ljuslcr, despite lhe lawsuit
being filed the pzior day. (See, J\ff. of Davis,

'if 7)

lnsti:a<l of taking rc3plmsibility for his disappointing behavior, Mr. Mihara <.:l..1in1s: ·- "lt is
not Plaimiffo' rcsponsibiliLy and/or duty to meet and confer with Dd~ndants prior to taking

action in this case" - apparently, stamling by his b~havior of withholding that the lawsuit had
been filed, reaching a compromise settlement of disputt!d claims, and then infonning Ms. Paukert
that a lawsuit had been tiled thereafter.

Notubl:Y, t>laioLiffa· Cc-ia?u::el u~cd ,he term "Untiled" in hii:: capliu,1 un corrc,:;pcm:kn•;e datinJJ buc.;k
Jammy 14, 2() 10. tSt.•c, Affidavit of Mih!i.:ll, ii':! l 0- I l, Exhibil 7)

J

10

at lcs.sl
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Idaho Civil Rule 54 i,:,· Inapplicable to This Case.
(a)

.Plaintiffs' Argument Under Jdallo t;lvll Kulc 54 Is Inconsistent With
Plaintiffs' Counsel's Prior Representalions.

At thr:i outset of this case, Plaintiffs' Counsel, Mr. Miho.ra, represented that Pluinli ff::i'
Motion for Attorney's Fees would he scheduled for u date ccnven:ic,nt to both onimi;el, makii1g

the following statements in correspondence:
•

Februurv 12, 2010 .. "Should we need to set a hearing on this matter. I will understand,
however [J] wo·uld a..~k that we meet and couter regarding our mutual schedules prior to
setting a hearing date," (See, Supp. A ff. of Schroeder. 1 5. Exhibit A)

• Fcbmm:y22. 201 Q- Plcasc let me know whether you want me to set the pending motion
11

for att<1mey's fees for hearing or if you want to discuss the matter further." (ibid., at 16,
Exhibit B)
o

Febmanr 25, 201 O- "How much time do you think that you will need to research the
attorney's fees is::iue? 1f you would like to discuss, plt:ase do not hesitate to contact me,
nthcrwise, l plan on setting the matter for hearing. T wouJd like to get the allurncy's fees
issue resolved sot.mer rather than later, however, I am willing to give you adequate time
to research the law and confer with your client."· (Jl:;id., at il 7, Exhibit C)

•

MaTch 16. 2010 - "As to the atlomey·s fees, I believe;: we arc set to discuss the ciming of
setting the hearing tomorrow morning along with any necessary discovery. Docs 8:30am
work for you again? It' not, please !et me know." (Ibid., at ir 8, E::ithibit D)

!
•

March 17, 2010 -"Also per our convenation this mnming, l have tulkc_· with Jeannie
over at Judge: Mitc;;hcll':i. i.:;hambcrs and we 11rc set to go at 3:30pm on WtHlnesday, May
12, 201U." Obid.)
These rcpreset,t1.1tions im.:huled proceeding with discovl:lry. (S,H,. e.g., Defi:mdants' Notice

or Service of Dh.:c.:overy Requests, see, also. Plaintiffs' Notice of Servic;~ of Plaintiffs' ~'irsl

Request for Discovery to Defendants)
Despite these prior representations, on April 6, 2010, Plaintiff.'i' counsel once again took a
disappointing stance, advising Dct'L"Iltlants' Counsel of his position that, und~ ldaho Civil Rule
54, u. response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Att.imey'i: Fees was past due. ln resplm:.e, on April 12,
:a:·~-IU\'.Pl,V '10 l'LAlNTlflFS' MO'\'lON r-on

ATl'UKNl!:~'S FEES PllRSUANTTO I.C. ·· 12
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2010, Ddt:ndants' Counsel sent nn ~-mai'I to Mr. Mihara inti:,rming him that in his opinion Idaho
Civil Ruic 54 wu~ inapplicable and expressing uisappointmcm with this m:wly adopted position
-- ~laling i:.1 peninent pan; ''Pulting to on~ side the fact that JRCP 54 is inupplicablc sine\-::

.:i

judgment has not been c;ntcrc:d, your new position is inoom1istent with the requet1l in your motion,
your numc;rous written o.nd orul rcprt1sentations to me, your Notice of Hearing, and the discovery
request you servod. '' (Soa. Supp. Aff ~)f Schroeder, at~[ 10, Exhibit F)

In light of the preceding, Plaintiffs' counsel's argument under 1daho Civil Rule 54 is

dis.appointing and misleading. Morcovc.-r, Defendants' Counsel had a right

Lo

rely upon such

representations; consequently, Piaintiffs should be prohibited from clajming they are ~ntilled to

attorney's foe!:> under Idaho Civil Rule 54.
(h}

Plaintifl's' Aetiom src Inconsistent with Idaho Civil Ruk 54.

On March 2Gi 2010, rla.inlitls' noted their Motion for Attorney's Fee; for un ~vidr.ritiary
hea!'ing i;ci1cdu1ed for i\hy 12, 2010. (See, Note for Hearing) The pllrti:Zs then procc.:~decl with

discovery. (See, e.g., Ddi:n<lant:;' Notice of Scrvico of Discovery Rt.-que~t.~, se.ti, a/90, Plaintiffs'
Notice of Service of Plaintiffs' First Request for Dit:.covf.lry to Defendants) On April 29, 2010,
Plaintiffs' filed thim Amended Notice of Hcsring, resetting the evidentiary hearing on

Plaintiffo'

Motion for Attorney's Fees for June. 2. 2010. (See, Amended Noti<.:e (If Hearing) in d,,ing su,

P1a:intiffa reserved the right to introduce ~vidence and/or cali witnt!~~e:.:; at ihe evidentiary

h~aring. (lli.(4.) Under. rdaho Civil RuJP. 7(b)(3), such hearing dalt: triggered the due date for
Defendants' responsiv.::.~ pkac.1ings - with responsive briefs due by Defendants sev~n (7) dayf

prior to r.he h,c.:,u-ing.

~.:lt-ilt:i"I.Y TO rLA.l[•m ...·~·:;• ~1l)l'l0~,
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Plaintiffs' actions ure inconsistcn.t with ldaho Civil Ruk 54. Spcci1ic:a1ly, ldaho Civil
Rule 54(d)(5), entitled "Memorandum of Costs," provides, in rt:le;:vam pan:
At any Lime after the verdict of a jury or a d~cision of th:: court, 9.,IlY purty who

fJ~ms costs may tile and serve on advem;e parties n wr-miornndum of costs,
itemizing each r;lalmcd expense, but ~uch memQrruidum of costs may not he filed
iati::::r than fourteen (14) dtly3 after entry cf judgment .. ,
(crnphru:iis added). Thus, Tdaho

instead, th~ submission

llf

Civil Rufo 54, doe!I not contemplate a motion being fil~. but

a ' 1mi:rnora.ndwn of costs. 11 to which, such costs may include a claim

for attomcy's fees .. allowing timely objection by the opposing party.

Here, instead of filing and serving a ,::memorandum cf ccms'' on Defomhmls, Plaintiffs
noted their motion for on evidentiar}: hearing, reserving the right to introduce evidence and/nr

i.:a11 witnesses. (See, Amemlt:d Notice of Hearing) Such actior.s i"riggered Dctcndants' responsive
b"riefing scb~dulc. l.R.C.P. § 7(h)(3). Plaintiffs' actions are not contcm!)lo.too by trus ldaho Civil
Rul~ 54 - namely, Plaintiffs' noted their motion for hearing (rather tlun :-;ubmitting u co.st

memorandum), reserved the right to introduce cvidcn~ und/or· ct!ll witnesses (riithur than
submilting u c.;osl memorandum and pe,mitting the opposing party to object), and triggered
rc::::Jponsive brief: ... g (rather than submitting a cost memorandum and p~'TTTlitting the op-- -'lsing
party to objecl within fou11ee11 (14) days).

In sum, Plaintiffa' a.ctions are in.;onsistent with the

Idaho Civil Rule 54 - essentially. because such RuJe is inapplicubl::i lo the case at hand.
Therefore. Plajntiffs' argument under Idnho Civil Rule 54 fails for the foregoing reasm~:;.
(c)

Jdaho Civil Ru~e 54 Docs ~ot Apply B~c.ause No Judgment \Vas
~:ntcred.
f,,
,.

Even igno;ing ~hat Plaintiffs' arg-J.ment under

t~ano
1·

Cjvil Rde 54 wu3 .raised for the fast

t:
~imC: in Pl£iinti ffs' Reply, Idaho Civ~l R~le 54 i'., in:Jp-~foabl.:; to th.; c;;asc at h~nJ, lnttinlly, Iduhu
l...

i·

1-'

,tm.•Rl:.~1.,,

'fi)

?!..i'll,"i1'11-'r·:-i• MOTJON :70~

r··
f:

AT"aO~Nl!Y'S fZES il'lJR:Sl:Al•ffTO I.C. - J.i
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Civil Rule 5·1 applies to post-fuclg1m.:nt issu-es; con*quenlly, suc:h rnk: is inapplicahle here
becouse no judgment has been entered. Spe<.,ifically,/fdaho Civil Ruic 54(e)(6), "Objection w
Attorney fees," states, in pertinent part, that: "[a)ny ofjcction
or to the amount th~reof, shall he made in the same inner

t(')

118

the allowunoc of attorney feei,,

un objection to coi;u.

?..$

provided

~:,

by Rule .54(cl)(6)." Td.1ho Ci-vii Rule S4(d){6), ''Objec{ion to Coi;t~," states, in rdcva11t part: '1 (a]

r

.

party may object to the claimed costs of smuther pai set forth in a mca,orandY!.O.J,1L~lSt$. by
f;l;ng and "'rving on the adver<c partie, a motion

1:disallow part or all of such Ollsls within

fo1..11te,"::n (i4) days of strvii.:c of the memorandum[of cost." (emphasis added) Idaho Rule
,·
. '
54(d)(5), "Memorandum of Costs,,, states: "[a]t any

tif

c after the verdict of a jury or a decision

~kve on adverse partii::s a m~1.umdu!!!..Qf

of thl'.! court, ~,y p:uty who claims co;:;t:., may fik and ,..

cost:s; iti:mi7.ing .::ach cbi;ned ex.pcnsc, but su.;h rneiorandllm nf costs may not b~ filed late!."

r

than fo:1rteen (H) days after entry l1,fjud~-rncpJ:' (em~asis added).

V
Thus, Iuabo ChrH Rule 54 is inapplic&ble whfe no judgment has been ,1ntere,!.,

i,tl

i::: the

case here. AJong these lines, in each cc\Gc 1,.-ited hy~]Plaintiffs there was a judgrmmt. S.,?c e.g.,
Con.ncr_v.:-Da!s£, 103 Idaho 761, 761, 653 P.2d

r
l[i73

(1982) (' 1ln the proceeding~ below.

Judgrnent was entered against the appellants ... 11 d~carless
~

Farris Who!tlsalg
V. liR~en,
.·

105
.

Idaho 699,701,672 P.2d ST7 (App. i983) ("The ttial,ourt ~mercdji1dgrm-mt in favor of Fearless

.

t

.

Fnrrfa';); E~b..~r v. Ho~~Jl. l 11 kfaho 132, l36; 72 l ~ .2d 731 (App. 1986) ("Thus., d11.~ Howf;ll]f;
\''
.
K
.

hnd t..:n day3 {rn.)w fourteen day~(l folltTwing such sertic·! to object to the cost:; and attorney foes
f.,

awarded in tht;. judgmel1t1'); Great Plains Equip, v. N

cline, t 32 Idaho 754, 759, 979 P .2cl

. , . th,;, t.id court f.hed ita

51)1'1-..-mr·c'I' TO rtt,Jl'Til'[•,'i/' M·:)Tl0t/ fQI:

ATfmt..'ll-:Y·~ )!f.[S ?Ur.SU,WJ'!"T() I.C - e
38157-2010
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I

Idaho 83, 84,656 P.2d 144 (App. 1982) ("Thejudgm t, entered the same.date a!i the order ..
. "); .(_\du County .High. Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 1daho 873, 673 'P.2d 1067 (1983) (''This is

a.11

appeal from only th11t portion of a judgment awnrding a.ttomey;:i' foes snd cost~ ... "); Camp v.

lin~i!!g, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (App. 1984' ("The <lislrict l.!ourt entered a summary
f

!.

judgment ... ").

Therefore, instf:lad of addressing the merits o .· is case, and despite Mr. M.ihara's prior
represent(itions, Plaintiffs now argue that they arc en 'tled to allomcy's fees pursuant to Idaho
Civil Ruic 54 for Defomlants failure to answer withi fourteen (14) days from any one

or the

foUowin 6 d~tcs - s~rvice of this motion, inilial ap aranc.:c, Defendants' initial motion, and
.Defendant~· Answer. (See, Plaintiffs' Reply, pp. 1::-1 ) Such argument if. crroneou..s in several
rc~p~~:s. Initially, Plaintiffs' counst:I orally and verb ly represemed ,hnt .Pl~i.nti 1·1~· Motion for
Attorney's Fees wouid be scheduled for a date conven ~ t to both cnun:iel, ruid yet now takes the
incongruous position that, under lduho Civil Rule 54,

efondsnt.s' re.::,pom~c to .PJaiT'tifts' Motiun

for Attorney':; Fees ,s past due.

Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs:' Counsel's

gument

under Idaho Civil Rlllo 54 is

di~appointing and misleading. in sum, Idaho Civil R le 54 appli~s to pu~L-judgrnent issues and

i;:; imwr;,licuhle to L11c case at hand.

III. CONC !!.fil...QN
! .
1

For the, reasons :1t.1l,;d above, together \.vith t ~se set forth in Dc::fendants' Response to
Phiintiffa' Mmion- for A t1-:-.rney·s 1-'t:us, Ddendants n• UC$t that P1aiiv.iffa' M.o:ion lbr Attorney'~
re:;::; Pll:'SUE':Jlt to LC. § 41- l 839 t-,~ ~kr.:icd.

:o.\111.-KU'LY Tf.l r1.1,WT1FFEJ' MOTlOJ'l 1-'{•tt

A'!~'QjlJ,ft,;V'S r"EES HJ~1.Slli\l'iT TO 1.C. - ,6
38157-2010
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DATED thi~ clay of May\ 2010.

I

···-·,

'

--

HAMBLEN LLP

PA

l:\SPOIXX:S\00199\001 mr1 .f-:AIJ\R I 1410

I
::Sl/R•Rr.t'L'I' TO PLAINTIFli'.',;' Ml)'i'ION FO~~

.<\TTORNEY':S n:1cs PURSUANT TO 1.C. • 17
38157-2010
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nHIVIOl-CIV'

JCE

r HER.EBY CERTIFY that on this ·:;} t, """"'da:
true and correct ~opy of the foregoing SUR-REPLATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO J.C.§ 41-18

· May, 2010, 1 caused to be servec.1 a
0 PLAINTIFFS' MOTlON FOR
: the following:

Kinzo H. Mihara
Attorney at Law
424 Sherman Avenue::, Suite 308
Coeur d'Alene:, Idaho 83816-0969
,.

,/

DELIVER£()
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FACSIMILE)

E-MAIL

1:\SPODOCS\OOI IJ\/\001 SZIJ'I.P.AD\H I !410

SllR-REJ'l,Y TO f'!..At.N'rlFFS' MOTION t'OR

/fffOJlNE\''S n:is PURSUANT TO
38157-2010
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN;

9:42AMj
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CL.ff~i<. DISTRICT COURT

William J. Schroeder, lSB No. 6674
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771

-

\' '

,,-

~-- ,L•"\i\.s~'"
DEPUTY ~S

PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
701 Front A venue, Suite IO l
P. 0. Box E

Coeur d'Alene . Idaho 83816-0328
Telephone: (208) 664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
Mailing Address:
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

Attorney for Defend ants
. tilJDJCJAL DISTRlCT OF
COlJNTY OF KOOTENAT

IN THE DTSTRICT COURT OF THE F
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
The ES'lATE of BENJAMIN HOLLA."ND,
DECEASED. GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,

)

)
)
) S · '. . ! .EMENT AL AFFIDAVIT OF

·L '. .AMJ.SCHROEDERIN
; : : [RT OF DEFENDANTS'
)
) '.ailt·ll NSS; TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

)

Plaintiffs,

IO,

vs.

. TTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT
§ 41-1839

)

)
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
)
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
)
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
)
)

Defendants.

~---

~--------·~--)

---·

STATE OF WASHINGTON)

:ss
COUNTY Of SPOKANE

)

Wll..LlAM J. SCHROEDER, being fir~t duly.,...,,,,.... on oath, deposes and st.ates that

38157-2010
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fN S:TrPPORT OJ.'OEFF.NDANTS' RESPONSE 'IO M..A.lNTIFFS'
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That ,Jn May 10, 2010, I provided an Affidavit cone .

, is matter and, in that Affidavit, there

were two paragraphs. To avoid contusion, I begin th'

. pplemental Affidavit with paragraph

No, 3.

3.

l am over the age of eighLccn and compe

4,

I am fa:eni;ed to practice law in both Id

5.

A true and correct copy of Kinzo

correspondence dated February 12,

2010. addre3Sed to me is attached as Exhibit A.

attached as Exhibit B.

,.,..

c1>rrespondcnce da,:ed Fcbm.1ry 25,

A tn1e ru11:l corred ,;opy of Kinzo

2010, addrnssed 10 me is anached as Exhibit C.

8.

me ;111d .KJ.nzo 1\IUJiat·a dated

Tru.e and cc,rrect u;iJie;; of e-mails

M!:n:cL 16, Z.OJO urn:: MJ.rch 17, 2010, are attached as .u........ ,.,
9.

rng,uding Pfointlffa'

A u·uc and correct copy of Plaintiffs'·

· , is uttached as Exhibit K
JO.

A true and correc.:t copy of my e-mail

•·

o Mihara dated April 12, 201<) is

ar.rnched a~ Exhibit F.

day of May, 2010, by WILLIAM J. ·

NOTARY PUBL]] . and for the Slal.B :)t'
Washington, resid .·g at Spokane.
My con1m1ssion c: 'i ' s:..J.1::.. \ .::;\..:..:,,J...C1..:-U--SUPPU:MENTbl, ,U'YIDAVl'l' OF Wll.LIAM J, SC..'U,O!DER
11'-' SVl'i'tORT OFDEFFJ>IDANYS· P.EiJ'>ONSI: TOPLAl'N1'Wf'S'

MOTAON li'OR AITORNE\''S .F£1!'.~' !'/.JWi!IAl'iT ·ro LC. t 41-1839 • 2. •
38157-2010
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN;

5098380007;

CE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ':) <ci·~ da
true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEME
SCHROEDER IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDAN
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT

o; May, 2010, l caused Lo be served a
T , AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM J.
S '. RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
O: .C. § 41-1839, to the following:

Kinzo H. Mihara
Attorney at Law
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308
Coellr d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969

DELIVERED
U.S.MA1L
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FACSIMILE)

E-MAIL

i

r
·1

su,,i~f&.f}.&!, Afi'r'IDA \I J1' 01-· W!LLI.AM J. sc1rn.05DER
IN Slll.'.l'OtlT Ot' J)K1''1tNOANT$' ltl"..~f"ONS~ TU J'L.A!NTl.r"J(S'

lr

Id
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Kinzo H. Mih
,, ' ara,: . ',
424 Sherman Avenue, l' .0. .
Coeur d' A1ene,:IdahoJJ3 $t
Ph. (208):667~5486r
Fax (208) 667..i469Sj
.
:
'

'

February 12; 20i0·-:
. ,:·
VIA pAINE HAMBLEN:.. LLPl: '•DRIER
. ,;
.:

'

' '.

Mr. William J. Schroeder, Esq.
PAINE HAMBLEN. LLP
717 W. Sprague Ave.
Suite 1200
Spokane~ WA 9920 I

'

:: ~
.

Estate of Benjamin C. Holl~d, et

Re:

'

:

Case No. CV-10-0677

l: .

j

at v.i

ife Auto & Home, et al.

Dear Mr. Schroeder:

a~~

Please let this letter con:fh"ID receipt:of
: ;m your client in the amount of
$200,000 made payable to my clients.
· · : i;
'·:
'

.:

'.
: :

,;
~

.'

To ilie extent that I am now in receipt of your '. · · ·t's tender, I will have my client
review and exe:::ute the full release a.5 agreed uppn. lI' is: · y understanding that Kathleen
Paukert, Esq. is preparing a release that she wish ·' :: present to my clients. I have
' already transmitted a draft copy of a full'telease: . .: r' ave prepared to her. a copy of
which is enclosed. Should Ms. 'Pauk.ert's iele&Se:iut<:tl; ·language concerning .indemnity,
attorney's fees, or any other matters otb.,~t iban ~ , . : :ease," I will instruct my clients
to sign the release I have sent Ms. Pauk.at ondico: : : my clients' obligation to yours
complete.

: ·· '

..4.3 it has taken your clients nine ·(9): daya

" sent my clients with a check
following the settlement of this matter, please giv¢ . y '. lients nine (9) calendar days to
forward a full reJease to your clients. I enticipat¢ : : ·· : said release delivered to your
offices no later than Monday February 22,:2010.. · ·: . •t to my email to Daneice Davis
of MetLife dated February 4, 2010, I will fuivi~Til~ l' '. nic copy of the release along
with proof of mailing prior to presenting the c1*k t '. : clients for their negotiation. Do

you wish me to send the electronic cupy of the rel : ' !and mailing to Ms. Davis, or to
yourselfi' Please advise. Should you have any insu~ · the exchange of d1Y..."Uments as
proposed, please let me.know immediately;
·

ohlf ;, . · g issue betweeo our clients

· It is my further understanding that the
is the attomey's fees issue. As you will• see from;
motiO!l, memorandum,. and affidavit in support

or;, ;·

38157-2010
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. e. • aterial enclosed, I have filed a
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'I
ii

to attorney'& fees, however, I
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9:44AM;

Page :ca1a,

look forward to working with you to resolve :that .
short of Court involvement.
Should we need to set a hearing on this matter, I will uh.-1"'"'Land, however would ask that
we meet and confer regarding our mutual schedul~s p • r o setting a hearing date.

In addition, per our discussion on the telepho :·
copy of the filings in this case, enclosed please jijid a :
to date. Further enclosed are documents that I recent!'
enclosed are: (1) Complaint, (2) Summons, i(3)

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney's ;
Motion for Attorney's Fees. (6) Letter to K.. Paukert, •
· and Stipulaled Order to Dismiss, and (8) Draft Full R ~. e

esterday and your request for a
· of aU of the filillgs_ in this case
• t to Ms. Paukert. Specifically..• 'on for Attorney's Fees, (4)
·• s, (5) Affidavit in Support of
2/9/10, (7) Draft Joint Motion

• , however, should you nm into
an issue with regards to a document sent or received . · may not be in your file, please
advise and I will check my files and make copiesias rd;:nlltsted.
I trust that MetLife's file on this matter i~co

Cc: Greg and Kathy Holland
Enclosures (es noted)
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May-26-10

5098300007;
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r

From:

Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subjet1:
Attachments:

Kinzo Mihara [kmihara@indian-law.org ,.
Monday, Fcbrnary 22, 20 IO 11:33 AM ·
William J. Schroeder
t
hoUank@hotmail.com
.
RE: Holland Estate - Revised Dratl RO • : l:
100222.Release.MetLife.DOC
!',.

f
i
,·

t

;1

Bill:

t
i·

;·

j:
r:
:II: j

I have made the following changes to the release ihat you sentlme: ;

l

• I have inserted the following language pursuant 10 our telephone

.
.' i:'
"IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that Melropo~tan 1:ro~rty and Casually Insurance Company, and Metl ife
Auto and Home waives its subrogation interests in this matter.·:
• f

f I also changed the signatures of Greg and Kathy to read

0
11

J

Gregory"
"Kalhleen" and then put their abbreviated namei;
~lter in brackets. i.e., (Gr~g). "as the Per~anal F~ep~es~ntative for th:: Eltate of B~njamin Holla~d" at the end of the si?naluf,
hne and deleted the last signature - I believe that signing tw,c:eiwoul bi duphcatlva, however, 1f you want, we can re1nse1.
Both Greg and Kathy aie co-personal reprasentatives of the Estate ' B~njamin Holland with tho power to bind the estate, I
believe that MetLife already has a copy of the PA paperwork, but if .. u ~uld like a copy I can forward via tax.
'

:

p

Please reply to this email and let me know if tre attached rek~a~e m ·. -~;wit11 your approval. If it does, I ph:m on discussin 1J
with my clients and anticipate that they will sign. I w:11 l1ave 1ry ~lien 1 . e~acute the release in auplicate, one origina; for yo Jr
client and one for my clients, Please a!so give me approval ~o t:;lisou-: ·a
Ch'9cks in my possession once the at1ached
document is fully executed.

.

,he

·

;:

..

(:

Please also forward the draft Stii,::ulated Motion to Dismiss al yciu; c • v~i,ience. Please also let me know whether you wan!
me to set the pending motion for attorney's fees for hearing or ff you: a~t to discuss the matter further,
:

I thank you for your consideration a.nd attention in this matter.

:

';,·

:.1

[

',.

A/
Kinzo

1

- rf

:.,·
.

I
i

,;'!

:
f

.i
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Kinzo H. Mihara,; • g.
424 Sherman Avenue, P; . ~ox 969
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 8·· 8lf6--0969
Ph. (208) 667-5: 6f
Fax (208) 667-4;

9sl_

February 25, 20: Ot:
VIA FACSIMILE: (509. 8~8-0007
VIA USPS : \

t

Mr. William J. Schroeder, l!sq.
PAINE HAMBLEN, LLP
717 W. Sprague Ave.

.,

Suite 1200

(

Spokane, WA 99201
Re:

:l ;.

ii Auto & Home, et al.

Estate of'Bcnjrunin C. HoJJand, et aJ. v. Me·
~~ii_e No, CV-I0-0677

Dear M~~er:

f

.

.

f
etf: release, origina1 leut:r and enclosures w

·

/,

Enclosed is an advanced copy of the executed, si
follow via USPS. With this submission, I believe that my cl. D~ have complied with all of the settlement
1·
term:s.
.: '
,.
;·,

'

r

~

Also enclosed is a signed motion to dismiss. To th ·: e~. how much time do you think that you

will need to research the allorney's fees issue? If you wo ·. Jd ~i.lce to discuss, please do not hesitate w
contact me, otherwise, J plan on setting the matter fo~ hearin·,. IfwouJci like lo get the attorney's fees issue
resol:ved sooner rather than later, however, I am willing to &( e
adequate time to research the law and
: r
confer with your ~lient. .
:
;:
As aJways, sl10uld you have any other questions or · nc~rns, please do not hesitate to contact me.

tou

"

'

i'

Rei£··
~
~-i4 flt

Ce: Greg and Kathy Holland
Enclosures (as noted)

i:~H-Mli~l·

jJ_

,.~.
,·

i

..
,

:I

t:
,'

]l

;

::_·.11

i'

t·

i

r
:.J
.
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From: Kinzo Mihara [mailto:kmihara@lndian-law.org]

sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 1:02 PM
To: William J, Schroeder
Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife

Bill:
Thanks tor the speedy reply.
(

Anached please find
discuss.

i:I

draft stipulation for the upcoming hearing on: tt~rney's tees. Please feel free to give me a call to
'

Also, per our conversation this morning, I have talked the Jeannie o. eJat J1Jdge Mitchell's chambers and we are set to ! o 3t
3:30pm on \IVednasday~ May 12. 2010.

:.
~.

Please 1eel lree to let me know if you have any furtht,r questions or: 'i'Cems.
Regards,
~ir,20
._-:·.·11.
.

I.:

from: William J, Sch7o,_e_d_e_r-[m_a_il-to_:_w_ill_ia_m___
sc_h_ro_e_d_e_r@-pa-1-~-.h-a_m_b_,..,n-.F,_,o-m-]----····-·--~---..- - - - - - - - -

Sent: WednesdQy, March 17, 2010 11:40 AM
To: Kinzo Mihara
Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife

· \
;

,

Kinzo-

Than ks for the heads up. Feel free to ca II the Metlife representatl e to wo rK out the 1099 issue,
Regard~.
..;.·

Biil

-·· .-----·From:
-------·---·------······---~- ____41l____ .• -·-·------·- -·· -·
Kinzo Mihara [mallto:kmihara@indicm-taw.org]
I

Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 11:lS AM

/

L

To: WIiiiam J. Schroeder
Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife
Bili-

·1

,.

,.lusl received a call from a ''Barbara" {;t;3f~6l) from Metlite-h~~~rding thG 1099 lssue. i advised her that my clier ts
this issue. If you do not hav,: ci
were curre"ltly engaged in litigation with i'kc!Uie and i was::~qr.king ·uvougi'i you
problem, I will call her back directly ar:d work 1rrough the
issue ·Nith her - I baiie,_ve lhat all she needs is sx.-1e

11oar

j

on

i!

.1

;.

•1

I
I
38157-2010
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I .
I

'

information: .but did not get ~o that as I advised her that I wanje~\o get direction from you before speaking with her
about specifics. Please advise.
t

i

Regards.
Kinzo

From: William l.Schroeder[mailto:william.schroeder@pa1n a~blen.c:om]
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 9:48 AM
To: Kinz"' Mihari,

Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife
Will d., -· Bill

---------- ----------------i-------···--·--~ ·-·~-~- .-..-.,.,-__..._. ___________ _
From: Kinzo Mihara [mailto:kmihara@indian-lavv.org]

Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 9:07 AM
To: William .l Schroeder
Subject: RE; Holland/ MetLife
Bill:

Per our conversation this am, please have MetLife make the 1089 oul to: The Estate of Benjamin C. Holland. i bi: lie v,
that the compan, already has the Tax ID-11umber, but if not. he;number is 27·6316986. His home ls sold, so ple.;se
use Greg and Kothy's ;;ddrs:ss on Holland Road.
i:
·

As to ·the attorney's feos, I believe that we are set to dlscussf M.'.r timing of setting the heating
with any l'lecessary discover}. Does 8:30am work tor you ag inJ It not, please let me kn:iw.

torncrr,w morning c lo 11;
-

;(
;.

T:::1:1<.

10

ycu tnmor,ow.

I r

·

i

I

F1egards,

I

Klnzo

'

i

i

i

From: William J. Schroeder [mallto:wllliam.schroed~r@pai~hamblen.corn]
Sent: Tuesday, Mareh 16, 2010 7:27 i\M
r
To: kmihara@indian"law.org
sut1ject: Holland/ iv.eture
'

l<inz.o-

I

II

,.

Sorr-1 I 1nlssed your call ye,1;terday. On the 1099-Misc. issueJ it ~ppears we can get that changed.

I would appr•:ciiu

vou sending me an e-mail advising how vou want the 1099-rik. to read.
0.n the attorney fees issue, we will probably need to have itadissue re,o lved by the Court. I suggest we coord: 1a te
our schedules and find a date con11enienr for both of us.
t
1

II

Regirds,
Bill
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By: PAINE HAMBLEN;

r>age ~9/ ~,

50983B0007 j

.Kinion.Mihara·1sITTf7940

Attorney at Law
424 Sherman Ave., Ste. 308
P.O. Box969
Coeur d' AJene, Idaho 83 816-0969
P (208) 667-5486
F (208) 667-4695

7

t-: /. . 010 ·'.·i26
PM ~:31
1 1

CLER."I Dl$Tn1CT COURT

Counsel/or Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST rt.JOJCIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY
OF KOOTENAI
,.
;

Casq Nb. CV-10-0677

Tne ESTATE ofBENJAMlN HOLLAND, )
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLANDi
)

A.:ad KATIILEEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
v_

ME'1ROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY WSURANCE COMPANY.
And METLIFE AUTO & HOME
Defendants.
.. TO:

)
NOTICE OF HEARING

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS, and their attorney ofrecord, -\VIL~IJ.M J. SCHROEDER1 Esq.
Paine Hamblen, LLP
'

Please U!ke notice that a hearing had been set and will be he]d on Plaintiffs' pending
motion seeking attorney's fees pursua.'1.t to 1.C. 41-1839 bef~rc the. Fi:st District, Kootetci

CoI,r,ty District Court, Hon. John T, Mitchell _presiding, Ju.c;~ce Building, 324 "\V. Garden

!'
·NO'filf.ufi-0RHEARING
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN;

5D9B3BODDi'j

May-2H-·~

9:4~AMi

Page ;;iu,~,

Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, ldho, 8S·8-I 4;·tm.-th-e-t2th·day-of-Ma, ,261·0ilt-3-:3-0-p:m:-i.u·the-afte1110an· · ·
or as soon thereafter as such motion may be heard. Please b~ on notice that Plaintiffs may
introduce evidence and/or call witnesses in support of said thotion at such time as said motion
may be heard. Please participate as you deem appropriate. ,

Respectfully submitted this

.f{,,... '
:
day ofMarch, 201p.

U_

~- itf.fL
~a
Attorney for Plllintiffi

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Ii Kinzo H. Mihara, cenify that I ca.used th~ foregoing document to be served upon
Defendants via their attorney by serving them with such byithe following method thisZf ~day
of March, 2010:
'

[1
HAND-DELIVERY
f]

Wllliam J. Schroeder, JSR No. 6674

PAINE HA.MOLEN LLP

FA~SIMJLE @(208) 664-6338

701 Front Avenue, Suite 101

[ ] FACSIM1LE@(509) 838-0007
[ ] V}AFIRST-CLASS MAIL

P.O.BoxR
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Telephone: (208-664-81. 15
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
Mu.iling Addres~:
717 West SprBr:,aue Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, \Va::i.hington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838·0007

2 .
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U

I /

U

I

William J. Schroeder
Monday, April 12, 2010 3:24 PM

:From:

Sent:
To:

Subject:
Attochments:

'Klnzo Mihara·
HoHand Estate
Holland · Answer.pd{

KinzoI reviewed IRCP 54{e)(S! and 54(e)(6) that you referenced in our call on 4/6. As I expected, they deal with post-judgment
issues. Moreover, under 54{d){S), after a judgment has been entered, the request needs to be made as part of a
Memorand•;m of Costs. As you are aware, a Judgment has not been entered in this case and the issue of whether your
clients are entitled to attorney's fees has never been adjudicated.

Putting to rJne side the fact that IRCP 54 is Inapplicable since a judgment has not beer. entered, your new position is
inconsistent with the request in your motion, your numerous written and oral representations to me, your Notice of He,iri·1f
and the rHscovery request you served,
With respect to the evidenti.Jry hearing you have scheduled for May 12, 2010 at 3:30 p.m., please let me know If you inter,d
to call witnesses as your Notice seems to indicate. If so, please advise how muct1 tlme has been reserved with the Courl, If
witl'lesses wi:i be called, I expect the hearing will take 3-4 hours.

l suggest we attempt to schedule a Status Conference with the Court to di::cuss how '·Nie are proceeding in lhlr. matter.
pr~sume that if there are disputed issues of material fact, the Court wili provid2 u.s with a triai :l.::te.
In revinwinf thiI ma:.ter furth~r. I would like to work toward preparing ext.cnsiva nonclusorv stipulated facts in hopes th ~t

we can avoid J fuii 'Jvidcntiary trial on this matter.
One final note, please let me know if, after reviewing the matter further, you intend to make the IRCP Rule 54 argumen1. If
you do, I want to eet that issue before the Court as soon as possible. Also, given the above, I will be filing a counter mot 011
if an IRCP Ruie 511 urgu",ent is made.

Bill

38157-2010
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.OF IDAHO
County of KOOTENAI

1-~D

)55
r

JD

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, ET AL,

Plaintiffs,

vs.
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, cT
AL.

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
}
)
}
)
}
)

)
}
Attorneys:

Case No.

CV 2010 677

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER:
1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 2) DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND 3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AND
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
ATTOR.NEY FEES.

For the Plaintiffs:
Kinzo Mihara
For the Defendants:William Schroeder

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND.
This case involves a Sb(tled dispute over insurance coverage, with the issue of
attorney fees still in dispute.
On January 26, 2010, plaint;tfs Estate of Benjamin Holland, deceased, Gregory
Holland and Kathleen Hol:and (Hcllands} fiied this action alleging defendants
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance and MetLife Auto and Home (MetLife)
wrongfully failed to pay the amo1.:nts due under an insurance contract within thirty days
of being provided proof of ioss as required under the contract. Hollands claim three
counts of breach of contract, twc counts each of negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and three counts of bad faith .. A_cJdJtionaiiy, Hollands claim:
38157-2010
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND OR!)!:R
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The Estate of Benjamin Holland, Gregory Holland, and Kathleen Holland
are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120, § 12121, § 41-1839, and any other applicable statutory authority and/or judicial
doctrine w~1ich allows for recovery of attorney fees.
Complaint for Damages, p. 7, ,i IV.
Benjamin Holland died October 25, 2009, as a result of a motor vehicle accident
involving an underinsured motorist. Complaint for Damages, p. 3, ,i,i 6, 7. Benjamin
owned a policy of insurance with MetLife wl1ich named Benjamin as the named insured,
and had iimits of $·100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Id., p. 2, ,i 3.
Benjamin's parents, Gregory and Kathleen Holland, also owned a policy with MetLife,
with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, which extended
coverage to relatives who resided in their household. Id., ,i 4. Hoilands claim just prior
to the accident and Benjamin's ensuing death, Benjamin was in the process of moving
into a house he had bought, but still had a significant portion of his personal property at
his parents' home, and Benjamin continued to receive mail at his parents' home. Id., p.

3,

~

6.
On February 9, 2010, Hollands filed "P1°aintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees

Pu: ~;uant to I.C. 41-1839", an "Affidavit of Kinzo H. Miham in Support .__f Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and "Piaintiff5' Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to i.C. '1-1-1839". Hollands
claim their counsel are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in ti1c amount of $60,000,
that amount being 30% (under a contingency fee agreement) oi the $200,000 ultimateiy
recovered from MetLife, pL!rsuant to I.C. § 41-1839, as a result of Metlife's aileged
failure tc pay the amount justly due under the insura_nce contract 'Nithin thi:"ty days after
receiving proof of loss.
On March 2, 2010, the parties stipulated to dismiss cill claims, ?Jut for the pending
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motion for attorney's fees, and the Court entered an Order dismissing all claims with
prejudice and without costs to either party on March 3, 2010. MetLife filed "Defendants'
Answer and Affirmative Defenses" on April 12, 2010, addressing only the Hollands'
claims for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839, because given the Court's dismissal of
all other claims with prejudice, ''no Answer is required as to paragraphs 1 through 33,
as all claims, except for the claim for I.C. § 41-1839 attorney's fees, alleged in
paragraph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice." Defendants'
Answer and Affirmative Defenses, p. 2. On April 13, 2010, MetLife filed an "Affidavit of
Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for _Attorney Fees)."
Kathleen Paukert was retained by fl/letLife an January 8, 2010, to provide a coverage
apinion concerning claims made against Nletlife by Ho!!anc. Id., p. 2, ~ 3. On April 28,
2J10, MetLife filed a "Motion to Compel Pe.rformance Under the:; Settieinent and
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees" and a "Memora:1du:-·1 of Authorities in
Support of Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees". In addition to the initial Pauke1t affidavit, on May 7, 2010,
M~?tlife filed in support of its motion to r.ompel the "Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen
H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees)" and the
affidavit of "Daneice Davis (Subrnittecl in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees)" (Davis), the adjuster assigned by MetLife to the claims made by Benjamin
Holland's estate. On May 10, 2.01 G, rvietlife filed "Defendants' F~0sponse to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's fees Pursuant to \.C. § 41-1839", and the "Affidavit of William J.
Sc:hroeder in Support of Defendant's Resµons8 to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Feesw Pursuant to I.C. 4'1-1839."' On May 1-1.2010, MetLife filed the "Supplemental
Affidavit of Daneice Davis (Submitt~d in Opposit:on to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees)". On May 17, 20·10, Hollands tiied "Ph?,intiffs' Motion for s~rcmary Ju,ctgtJ1ent,
38157-2010
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"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment", "Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendants' IVlotion to Compel Performance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion
for Attorney's Fees", and "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Response to Plantiffs' Motion
for Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839". On May 20, 2010, Hollands filed
"Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Their Motion for Summary Judgment."
In Hollands' motion for summary judgment they argue their entitlement to attorney's
fees in the amount of $60,000 or entitlement to fees in general are based on Metlife's
failure to have specifically denied the allegations of Hollands in the Complaint. On May
24, 2010, MetLife objected to Hollands' motion to shorten time on their motion for
summary judgment because Hollands' chosen course of proceeding did not provide for
a briefing schedule as contemplated in the civil rules. Defendants' Response to
Plaintiff':/ Motion to Shorten Time for He3ring on Plaintiffs' IVlotion for Sur.irnary
Judgment, p. 2.

However. MetLife assured the Court:

Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be
filed anci served on IVlay 25, 2010. Defendants ·have no objection to
having Plaintiffs' May 17, 2010 Motion for Summary Judgment heard on
June 2, 2010, if the Court has sufficient time to hear all of the motions.
Id. On [\,fay 25, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition t,::

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" and an "Affidavit of William J. Schroeder in
Opposi'iion to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment". On May 2.6, 2010, MetLife
filed its ".Sur-Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839",
and the "Supplementai Affidavit of Mr. Schroeder William J. Schroeder in Support of
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pur:;uant to I.C. § 4·11829." On May 26, 20·10, Holland'.; filed "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defenrlants' Opposition to
Plaintiff~.' Motion for Summary Judgment." Finally, on May 28, 2010, MetLife filed
"Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel
38157-2010
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Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees."
In summary, before the Court now are Hollands' motions for attorney's fees,
motion to shorten time on summary judgment, and for summary judgment on the issue
of entitlement to attorney's fees. Also before the Court is Metlife's motion to compel
(actually a motion to enforce a settlement) and motion to dismiss Hollands' motion for
attorney's fees. All of these motions are interrelated.
Oral argument was held on June 2, 2010. Due to the extremely large amount of
briefing filed a short amount of time before oral argument, the Court was required to
take these motions under advisement.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in considering a motion for summary
judgment, the Court is mindful that summar, judgment may properly be granted only
where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitied to
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determining whether any issue of material
fact exists, this court must construe all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192,
194, 706 P.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1985). Summnry judgment must be denied if reasonable
persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the
evidence. Smith v. MeridianJointSchoolDistrictNo. 2, ·128 ldaho714, 718,918 P.2d
583, 587 (1996).
In any case which will be tried to the court, rather than to a jury, the trial judge is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 ldabo_51_5, 518-20,
M~ci~A.~Jij D!:CISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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650 P.2d 657, 661-62 (1982). In the present case, neither party has requested a trial
by jury. Accordingly, this Court can reach the most probable inferences from the
undisputed material facts before it.
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision,
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744,
753, 86 P.3d 458, 467 (2004). Subsection (3) of I.R.C.P. 54 obligates the Court to
consider factors (A) through (K) in determining an amount of fees through the use of
mandatory "shall" language. The Rule requires the District Court to consider all eleven
factors plus any others that the Court deems appropriate. Lettunich v. Lettunich, ·141
Idaho 425, 435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005). The Court need not address each one of
the factors in its decision, but the record must demonstrate that the Court considered
them all. Parsons v. Mut. Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614,
618 (2007) (quoting Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 168, 775
(2002)).
Ill. ANAL YSiS.
A. Hollands' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839.
Hollands move this Court for attomey's fees under I.C. § 41-1839. Hollands
argue MetLife wrongfully failed to pay on the insurance contract within thirty days of
being provided with proof of loss. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine
Attorney's Fees, p. 6. Hollands argue attorney fees in the amount of $60,000, or 30%
of the $200,000 settlement in this mater, are appropriate and reasonable in iight of the
factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A)-(K), with emphasis on the amount of recovery obtained
for the clients and the recovery having been obtained without" ... having to bear the
emotional bu~den of litigating the underlying claims." Id., p. 8.
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Hollands provide a factual background for the Court in their memorandum. Id.,
pp. 2-4. On October 25, 2009, Benjamin Holland died as a result of an accident in I\Jez
Perce County, Idaho. Benjamin and his parents, Gregory and Kathleen, had three
policies with MetLife. On November 8, 2009, Hollands' claim their attorney Kinzo
Mihara (Mihara) tendered notice of a claim to MetLife. Id. At that time Mihara was
acting pro bona. Id., p. 2. MetLife designated this initial claim as Claim No. FRO
373130, and assigned the matter to MetLife insurance adjuster Daneice Davis.
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 411839, p. 2; Affidavit of Daneice Davis, ,i 3. On November 12, 2009, MetLife requested
additional documentation to support the claim. Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Hollands contend that information was submitted on
t\Jovember 17, 2009. Id., and Complaint, p. 3, ,T10. On December 8, 2009, Mihara
claims he discovered the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland may also
support claims by the estate of Benjamin Holland. Id. MetLife claims Mihara on
December 7, 2009, stated the matter could not be concluded by payment of the initial
policy limits because Hollands had decided to make claims against the two additional
MetLife policies. Mihara claims he discussed these claims with MetLife's adjuster on
December 8, 2009, and was made aware that the adjuster had made a request for
extension of a response until after the Christmas and New Year's holidays.
Mernorar.dum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Those claims
were assigned Claim No. FRD 408440. Id., p. 3. This was an automobile.policy held

by Gregory and Kathleen Holland. There was also a claim :-nade on ,a motorcycle policy
which was assigned Claim No. FRO 408370. Defendants' Respor.2~3 to Plainti~fs'
Motion for attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 4·1-1839, p. 3. "Af,'er the holidays'', Mihara
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then "demanded that MetLife come to a decision and tender an amount justly due by
January 8, 2010." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p.
3. On January 8, 2010, the adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could
not decide whether or not coverage was applicable under the policy and that a
coverage opinion would be sought from an independent attorney. Id. On January 13,
2010, the independent attomey, Kathleen Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and
requested an extension to come to a coverage decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an
extension until January 22, 2010. id. On January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara
and requested another extension, which Mihara denied.
On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf of
Hollands. On February 2, 2010, Paukert ~dvised Mihara that, based on her research,
there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by Mihara, but there was

-

possible coverage on the motorcycle policy under a theory Mihara had not advanced.

Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 411839; Affidavit of Paukert,

'if 9.

Paukert advised Mihara that MetLife was offering to

pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had received from the
negligent party), provided Hollands signed a full release. id. On February 26, 2010,
counsel for the parties signed a "Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All
Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees;', representing that "the parties
have fully resolved all claims in the matter except for the pending motion for attorney
fees." On March 3, 2010, this Court signed the Order dismissing all claims between the
parties "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees filed on February 9, 201 O."
MetLife respond:; to Holland's motion for feGs by arguing: (1) any claim by
Hollands to fees undAr I.C. § 4·i-1839 is barred t:;~, the Settlement agreement,
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discussed infra; (2) Hollands were not the prevailing party and are therefore not entitled
to fees: (3) MetUfe's tender of their coverage decision and amounts justly due were not
untimely (beyond the 30-day time limit in I.C. § 41-1839) because "additional theories,.
developed through the course of shared research, required supplemental
documentc1tion demonstrating proof of loss, the thirty-day clock arguabiy did not begin
until January 27, 2010, the date the last proof of loss was requested by the Defendants"
(Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 17.);
(4) Hollands' claim for fees is barred by judicial estoppel as Hollands previously had
taken the position that they did not want the policy limits under the initial claim filed
(upon which a determination had been reached as early as December 7, 2009, but
subsequent to which ~v1ihara informed Metlife's Daneir:e Davis that Hollands wou!d
make additional claims against the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland)
and had actively participated with MetLife in finding covera99 fJr the additional ~,aims
up until February 2, 2010 (in addition to granting an extension for a coveragis dec:ision
deadline), and then after February 2, 2010, H~l\ands took the position that MetLife
failed to pay amounts justly due within thirty days; (5) that disputed questions of·
material fact remain; (6) that the award of fees requested by Hollands is unreasonable
in part because the settlement amount l1ad nothing to do 'wvith the lawsuit as .MetLife
(and its agents Davis and Paukert) were unaw::1re

a lawsuit had been filed at the time

the settlement v;as reached; and (7) MetLife as!-:s the Court to lln~it fe8s, if any are
granted, to the time Hol!ands' counsel was not operating pro bona. Response to
Pia;ntitfs' .!'vlcton for Attornay\.~ i·7ees Pursuant t;J i.C. § 41-18.39,

p;:L ·J0-23.

'I. Did Hollands "Prevail"?
As ar~1~ied by MetLife, to be entitled to fees ,,nder I.C. § 4·!-1r339, an insured

rnust "pre.rail'' in an action. Arreguin v. Farmers ins. C:D. cf Idaho. 1'-1,5.Jd_grv.} ~5~1, 464,
1
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180 P.3d 498, 503 (2008). To prevail, the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full
amount requested, only an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer. Halliday

v. Farmers Ins., 89 Idaho 293, 301, 404 P.2d 634, 638--39 (1965). The determination of
which party prevails, on which issues, and to what extent is in the discretion of the
Court. Zimmerman

v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67,

73 (1996). importantly: "Vvhere the rnsurer is sued for attorney fees incurred in a
separate successful action ... the insurer is obligated to pay attorney's fees only if its
initial refusal to pay the claim were unreasonable." Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636,
641,496 P.2d 97, 102 (1972) (discussing uninsured motorist insurance cases). In

Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614 (2007), the
Idaho Supreme Court upheld a $20,000 contingency foe award to Parsons pursuant to
I.C. § 41-1839, where the insurer tendered $60,000 in uninsured motorists coverage on
November 12, 2004, and where Parsons had filed her lawsuit on October 26, 2004, and
served Mutual of Enumclaw the next day. 143 ldano 743, 745, 152 P.3d 614, 616.
Parsons had received the $50,000 Allstate policy limit from the negligent driver who
caused the accident she was involved in, she then sought Mutual of Enumclaw to pay
the amount she was justly due under her $100,000 underinsured motorist coverage with
them as her damages excee.ded the liability coverage limits of the Allstate policy. Id.
Parsons filed a motion seeking 3ttorney's fees under I.C. § 4·1-1839, and the Idaho
Supreme Court upheld the District Court's award of $20,000, finding there was no
abuse of discretion in fixing the award amount. 143 Idaho 743, 748, 152 P.3d 614,
619.
In response to MetLife's arguir,ent, Holl,.rnd;:; rngu8 prim to their lawsuit MetLife
was ready to tender only $50,000 tc se'ttlo the claims, not the;: $200,000 ultimately
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offered which led to settlement. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for
.Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 5. Hollands also note the settlement
release entered into by the parties specifically references the lawsuit. Id., p. 6; Exhibit
A to Answer, p. 1. That document was signed by the parties on February 24, 2010.
And, Hollands argue Davis and Paukert had notice of the lawsuit as early as
.January 29, 2010, before the settlement by the parties was reached. Id.
The facts before the Court indicate that MetLife was prepared to pay policy limits
in Claim No. FRO 373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was
seeking to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Holland's policies and
would not con.sider the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. A.s such, there w2s no tender on
or aoout December 7, 2009. Also, t·:> the extent there was a tende~ as to Claim No.
FRO 373130, subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claitT. number, claims
under the two polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were ihereafter assigned
Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not
contemplated within the initial $50,000 offer. And, unlike the Parsons case, the facts in
this case do not indicate MetLife was served with a Complaint and Summons or
otherwise knew of the Hollands' lawsuit at tile time the offer was tendered. Although
Hollands cite to the Affidavits of Davis and Paukert, in which both discuss the Coeur
d'.Alene Press listing re~12rding Hollands having sued MetUf'a, both aiso

st1te Paukert's

assistant could find no record of this filing when she investigc:1ted with the Court. See
Suppiernental Affidavit of K8thlcen Paukert, p. 4,

?i 8.

,r 25, Affidnvit of Daneice D3vis,

p. 3,

Thus, there is a dlspute of material fact as to the timing cf MetUfe's know!edge of

Hol!dand's lawsuit Even if that dispute of fact were resolved in favor of Holiands,
Holl2nds foce a daunting task trying to prove Hollands prevaiied wl~hin thP. meaninQ of

f•,1~~h17A~irn,r DEC!SION AND ORDER DENYING- PLAiNT:cFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JU0G.'11l:N,

I.C. § 41-1839 and Parsons where: 1) there was no initial refusal by MetLife to pay,
and 2) where MetLife was not served with a Summons and Complaint in this matter at
the time their offer was tendered, and arguably had no knowledge at all of Hollands'
lawsuit at the time their offer was tendered. Because there is

iJ

dispute of fact as to

knowledge, and the facts surrounding the reasonablenes3 of the initial refusal to pay
the claim, determination of prevailing party cannot be decided at this time.

2. Did Hollands' Counsel Mihara Grant an Extension Which Resulted
in Settlement Being Timely?
MetLife points out their December 7, 2009, settlement offer for the policy limits
on Hollands' initial claim on Benjamin's policy was not accepted by Hollands as their
counsel Mihara informed adjuster Davis that additional claims would be made against
two policies owned by Gregory and Kathleeen Holland. Defendants' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. ln her Affidavit, Davis
states she informed Holland's counsel ~ilihara she would be going on a three-week
vacation and would not return until January 6, 2010, at wt-1ich time the two new claims
would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2,

i13.

Davis states this delay was

acceptable to Hollands, but that she die' ,1ot send out a letter confirming her
conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife
on january 8, 2010, and she had cc11tact with Holland's counsel regularly from
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss theories coverage on the
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370. Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839. pp. ·15-17.
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock i:unning on
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 20·10, settlement timaly. Id.
Hollands reply they provid'3d proof of !0s3 on November 10, 2009. Plaintiffs'
38157-2010
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Reply to Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 7. Hollands
also state that the cumulative tirne between November 10; 2009, to December 7, 2009,
_addeQ.JQ. the period from January 7, 2010, to January 26, 20'i 0, amounts to well over
the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justiy
due. !d., p. 9. Finally, Hollands argue MetLife had knowledge of the lawsuit having
been filed at the time of settlement because they were told on January 29, 2010, that
notice had been published in the Coeur d'Alene Press. Id.
This wiil be discussed more fully in the analysis of Metlife's Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement, but there are flaws in Hollands' motion for attorney fees and
Hollari.:ls' argument that the settle111ent was untimely. First, there are separate offers
mad-e at ::;eparate times on separate policies. As mentioned above, MetUfe was

prepared to pay policy limits in Claim No. FRO 373130, the initial claim, ~ut Hollands'
counsel Mihara was seekinrJ to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen
Holland'.:; policies and would not consider the initial matter concluded. Defendants'

Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such,

there was no acceptance of the tender on or about December 7, 2009. Also, to the
extt2nt there was a tender as to Claim No. FRD 373130, subsequent to the December
7, 2009, offer on that ciaim number, claims under the two polices held by Gregory and

l<athl,Jen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370,
and those claims were clearly not conternplai.ed within the initial $50,000 offer. Again,
in he,· Affidavit, Davis states she informed ~/fihara sl1e would be going on a three-week
v::ication and vmuld not return ur.tii January 6, 2010, at which time the t\:vo new claims

would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2,

1i 3.

Davis states th:s delay vvas

acce0table to Hollands, but tt1at she did not send out a letter confirming her
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conversation with Hollands' counseL Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife
on January 8, 2010, and Paukert had contact with Holland's counsel regularly from
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss coverage theories on the
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370. Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17.
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock running on
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement timely .. Id. Second,
counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative argument that these
time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on separate policies
should be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue the cumulative time between November
10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, added to the period from January 7, 2010, to January
26, 2010, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was
required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court can find no such case law to
support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these are separate offers made at
separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no factual basis to aggregate
these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf of MetLife found the
coverage theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and if Mihara on
behalf of Hollands accepted that higher amount based on the coverage theory that
Metlife's attorney developed, how can Hollands prove there was an unreasonable
refusal to pay Hollands' claim under I.C. § 41-1839? Suffice it to say that regarding
Hollands' motion for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839, that motion must be denied at
this time. The question remains, following an analysis of MetLife's Motion to Support
Settlement Agreement, whether there will be a "later time" for Hollands.
Another issue for this Court is whethAr the proof of loss submitted by Hollands
provided MetLife with sufficient information to allow it to investigate and <llei:efJlline its
38157-2010
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liability. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 130
P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006).

This issue also precludes this Court from awarding Hollands

attorney fees at this time. The November ·10, 2009, notice was met with an offer on
December"!, 2009. This falls within the time limits of the statute. On December 8,
2009, MetLife was informed that additional alternative claims were being made on two

other polices, those of Gregori and l<Rthleen Holland. Memorandum 1n Support of
Motion to Determine Attorney's Fee, p. 2. Thereafter, Hollands granted a determination
extension until January 22, 2010. Id., p. 3. A material question of fact remains for this
Court as to whether in light of the research and theories discussed by Holland's counsel
Mihara, and Metlife's counsel Paukert, including a request by MetLife for a legible copy
of a motorcyc!e title on January 27, 2010, even after the January 22, 2010, deadline
imposed by Hollunds, MetLife had sufficient information to investigate and cetermlne its
liability. Because of remaining disputed facts :n this regard, this Co!Jrt cannot properly
find a date certain cin which proof of ioss submitted by Hollands was sufficient to start
the clock or. ttle 30 day timeline. Arguably, a question of fact also remains regarding
MetLlfe's know:edge of when the lawsuit was flied, although it is unclear why a direct
question in that regard was never posed to Hollands' counsel. In any event, disputes of
fact remain prec:ludlng the CoU!t from granting Hollands' motion for attorney fees at this
stage.

3. Are Ho!lands Estopped from Bringing the Fees Claim?
MetLife argues HoHands initiaily tGok the positio11 that they did not want the
policy knit, under the in1tiai clai:-n flied upor which a deterrn;n8.tion had been rear.;hed
as ear-1 1' as Oe.cern~e, 7, 200!3, but subs2quer.t!v, Hollands' Gounsel r,.,fo·1a!'a :r.fcrmed Davis that Holland~, \V0:..1id mal,e additionc:11 claims against the two additional policies
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coverage determination on those additional policies, and Hollands actively participated
with MetLife in finding coverage for the additional claims up until February .2, 2010.
Hollands thereafter took the position that MetLife failed to pay amounts justly due within
30 days. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to
I.C. § 41-1839, p. 19. MetLife states it relied on the representations that additional time
would be given to find coverage for the additional claims made on December 8, 2009,
invested time and effort to find additional coverage under alternative theories, and
would suffer if Hollands are permitted to maintain their position that the 30-day
attorney's fee provision in I.C. § 41-1839 is applicable here. Id., pp. 19-20.
Hollands reply the reasons set forth in their response to lVletlife's Motion to
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for AttCJrney's
Fees addresses the estoppel argument. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 9-10. In that brief,
Hollrmds argue in part MetLife should be estopped from now arguing the settlement
precludes their recovery of attorney's fees whf.)re they previously had agreed to settle all
daims but for the claim for attorney's fees. Plaintiffs' Response to MetLife's Motion to
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees, p. 3.
Both parties in essence (albeit regarding diffeient issues) argue the other should
be estopped from tak:ng a position inconsistent with one praviously taken in the snme
matt~r. Here, there is no evidence before the Court that Hollands ever claimed no
lawsuit ·.vould b,9 filed or that no attorney's fees wo1jld be sought. !r; fact, the notice
Davis received ·from MetLife demanding

::1

covefE19~;1 deci3ion on the alts·rnate claims by ,

January 8, 2010, indicated Hollands believed the 30-day cloci<. was no~ only n.mning, but
was about to expire. Equitable e5toppel, as discussed by MetLife, requires:
38157-2010
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that
the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the
party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to
his Oi her prejudice.
Willig v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971

(1995). Quasi-estoppel, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth elements
and applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to asseIi a right
inconsistent with a prior position. Id. Here, it is difficult to see at this juncture what
false representation or concealment of a material fact (before the suit was filed on
.January 26, 2010, and not directly disclosed until February

2010) was made which

caused MetLife to rely on statements or concealments by Hollands to its prejudice.
Similarly, MetLife never purported to be unapposed to Hollands' claim for attorney fees.

4. Are Hollands Requested Fees Reasonable?
Hollands requested fees of $60,000 or 30% of the amount sett!ed for are
unreasonable per MetLife. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 21-22. MetLife makes this argument on the basis of
Hollands' counsel havin::; originally taken the case pro bono but having entered into a
contingency fee agreement with Hollands thereafter (it is unknown when the
contingency fee agreement was entered into as the Z!greernent itself is undated [Exhibit
2, Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Pl::1intiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment],
and the affidavit of Mihara itself does not provide such date [Id., p. 2, en 4]); Hollands
h3ving not dis,::losed their filing of the suit during conversation on January 27, 20·1 0;. and
the settlement not naving beEm reached because of the lawsuit, as MetLife hacl no
knowledge of tha suit at the time it was sGttled. id., pp. 21-22. As such, MetLife argues
fees, if awarded at :;ill, should be limited to the time during which Hollands' counse! was
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not acting pro bono. Id. p. 23. Hollands reply MetLife has set forth no support for the
contention that their counsel's having initially appeared pro bono should result in a
downward departure from the sought amount of fees. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 1012.
Hollanrls also note the purported tender on December 7, 2009 was not in writing and
therefore does not amount to actual production or tender. Id., citing LC.§ 9-150·1.
Hollands' argument is well-taken. Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw involves the
Supreme Court discussing this issue. There, the Supreme Court upheld an award of a
conk,gency fee under I.C. § 41-1839, reasoning that so long as a court clearly
recognized the matter of fees as a matter of discretion and acted within that discretion,
the Courhvould not be overturned. 142 ld2ho 743, 748, ·152 P.3d 6·14, 619. The
factors for the Co~rt to determine the reasonableness of the awaid of foes sought by
Hollands car. be found in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3), and the argument~ set forth by MetLife find
no support in Idaho statutes, rules, or case law.

In sum, although Metli'fe's arguments regarding estoppel and the
unreasonableness of fees fail at this juncture, whether Hollands have prevailed and

vvhen the 30-day time limit began to run also remain material questions of fact in
dispute. Therefore, tl1is Court cannot. exercise its discretion and grant Hollands' motion
for fees at this time.

8. Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment.
H~!!ands moved for summary judgment on the question of their entitlement to
faes ir. tris rn::itter on May ·:7, 2010. The matter was nc~ notlccri u;:;
. . for hearing.... until
,

Ma; 21, 2010, but ME.;tlifr~ only objected to the motion to shorter tirnecmd the Court's
hearing the motion for summary judgment to the extent T'le Court wot.lid not ;1?vc the
time to hear al! ~he motions during the june 2, 2010, hlC;ar:ng time set S1sideJo; these
38157-2010
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matters. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time, p. 2.
Hollrmds :;:_irgt..es three things: (1) Metlifo's fail:Jre to deny the allegations in the
Cotnt)laint amourit to an admission c1nd Ho:13nds are therefore entitled to summary
judgment on all issues; (2) ·Metlife has failed to presen~ any support for its equitable
2stoppel argument in opposition to the claim for fees· and (3) Hollar.ds' claim for fees is
reasonabie and propei as f)aukert's ar:d Davis' affidavits recite the amount of time and
effort which went into settling this rnatte.r. Mernorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-·1 ·1. In response, MetLife argues the parties' stipulated

rriotion and Order to Dismiss preclude;; its having to deny claims made by Hollands ;n
the:r Cornpiaint Marnorandum in Op;Josition to Plaintlffs' Motion for $ummary
j 1Jdgment, p. 6. MetLife tl·,en reiterates the arguments

e3t::ppol

0f

if has prsviously made regarding

Hoiiar;ds' claim for fees nnd tht='~ unr~~asc.mabier,e~;s rr? tees c 1nimed. Id., pp

8-12.
The. estoppel argurn0nt is discu3sed supra. In s1..nn, r:t th:; tme f'vletUfe :;rguably
r,·.;\;9d upon any statements ot Hollands' in dec:iding to further research coverage in this
matter, i.e. between the fane it was notified of the additionai claims on December 8,
20D9, and the time Davis vtent on vacation, and ag:1in from the tbie Davis returned on

,!anu,:iry G, 2010, until the exµirat10n o-f the:. extension (~mtil .January 22, 2010) granted
b1/ Hollands, U1me were
•

n:1 st3tsrrents rna:iA

bv Holl~1r:ds uDon which iv1etUfe could
•

j

•

>.

•

•

.e2son;;!bl-::;;·1ess of foes argument r.iust likely .3fso f3fl Lleca:1se the question of fees is
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I.C. § 41-1839, but has nothing to do with the award, if any, of fe~s by this Court.
Likew:se, Hollands' counsel hoiding himself out as pro bona and later entering into a
contingency agreement is mereiy one of several factors for the Court to consider.
Remaining is Hollands' argument that all claims in the Complaint are deemed
admitted for failure by·Metlife to deny them. Indeed, all averments in a complaint not
denied are deemed admitted. Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 48, 577 P.2d 24, 27
(1978), quoting I.R.C.P. 8 (d). But here, as argued by MetLife, the Court's February 3,
2010, Order dismissed all claims with prejudice except for the attorney's fee claim.
Defendants' Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7.
Therefore, MetLife argues, only a responsive pleading to the pending motion for
attorney's fees was required or,·alternatively, MetLife asks for direction from this Court
with respect to which portions of a previously dismissed Complaint Defendants would
be expected to answer. Id., pp. 7-8.

This Court dismissed all claims "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for ,ll.ttorney fees
filed on February 9, 2010, ... with prejudice and without costs to either party." Joint
~,,"Jtion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the Pending Motion for
Attorney Fees, pp. 2-3. It follows thaf only paragraph 34 on page 7 of the Corn plaint
remained at issue and, becf.luse the February 9, 2010, motion only addressed fees
under I.C. §'41-i 839, this statute would be the only possible basis for recovery by
Hol!ands. Hollands' argur71ent that Metlife's failure to deny parngmphs 9, 10, 13, 16,
17 and· 18 of thG Complaint operates as admissions is without merit. The plain
iang~.1ag2

of tr.is bourt's Order excepts only "Plaintiff's Motion for .Attorney fees filed on

remrJfn before the Court.· In eff~\ct,aii of the Compl:.:iint was disre1issed with prnjudice 01,

February :~, 2010, and Holiar,ds' E:H"e not entitled tci judgmer.t at;
38157-2010
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C. MetLife's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement.
in response to the motion for attorney's fees flied by Hollands, MetLife filed a
motion to compel Holland's performance under the settlemont and to dismiss their claim
for attorney's fees. MetLife argues the February 3. 2010, settlement between counsel
for Hollands and the coverage evaluator, Paukert. contemplated Hollands would sign a
"full release" of "all claims'' in consideration of MetUfe's offer of $200,000 and, as such,
their February 9, 2010, request for attorney's fees should be dismissed. Memorandum
of Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel Performance Under the

Settlement ancl Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Feei;, p. 7. MetLife submitted
the affidavits of Paul<ert and Davis in support of its mot:on. ln r.er affidavit, Paukert
states she and counsel for Hollands discussed on several occasions hts appearing for
the.m pro bona. Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, p. 2,

fl 4.

On or about February 3, 2.)10, upon 1eceiving Mr. Miha;a's confamation
that his clients had accepted Metlife's offer, I called Mr. Mihara to confirm
that his clients would provide MetLife with a full release. He said that they
would, but that he was now making a clairr. for attorney's fees. I reminded
Mr. Mihara that he had agreed that his clients would provide a full release.
He said tl1at they would: however, he was personally going to sue MetLife
for attorney's fees. 1believe that it was during this conversation that. Mr.
Mihara, for the first time, told me that he had filed a lawsuit against
MetLife on Jan~iary 26, 2010. It m3y have been on Febructr'I 2, 2010. It
wss absolutely nfter a settlement had been reached.
Id.,

p. 5, 1[ 12.
Hollands reply to the motion to compel performa:1ce under ·the settlement

i:·ssentiaily makes fow· argument::,: (1) that MetLife cites r;.-) :ule basis or other auth•Jrity.
for its motion; (2) that MetUfr~ shculd be ;udic:aliy :~stopped from sf1pulating to dismiss
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February 3, 2010, by email, was not an enforceable contract as material terms were left
to be negotiated, namely the full release itself; and (4) that Hollands did not have the
authority to waive their counsel's entitlement to attorney's fees because I.C. § 41-1839
establishes a statutory duty for an insurer to pay attorney's fees and this duty cannot be
waived or exempted. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees,
pp. 2-9.
In response to Hollands' motion for fees, MetLife argues the settlement
agreement must be enforced. Although Metlife's motion is captioned a motion to
compel, it is actually a motion to enforce settlement, i.e. an action in contract. A
settlement agret~ment is a new contract settling an old dispute. I/Vi/son

·1.

Bogert, 81

lda!io 535, 347 P.2d 341 ( 1959). The settlement of a legal dispute constitutes an
executory accord. Hershey v. Simpson, 111 Idaho 491, 725 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1986).
Such an agreement supersedes all prior claims and defenses. However, i-f one party
breaches the agreement, the other party has the option of enforcing the executory
accord or rescinding it and proceeding with the origina! cause of action. Id. The
interpretation of a settlement agreement is an issue of law. Mays v. United States
Postal S.ervice, 995 F.2d 1056 (Fed.Cir.1993). To the extent the settlement agreement

is clear!y stated and under·stood by the parties, it is enforced according to its terms. If
any ambiguity is found, the coun:'s role is to 1rnplernent the intent of the parties at the
time the agmement was made. King v. Department of Navy, 130 F. 3d 1031
(Fed.Cir.1997)

For· a contr2ct to exist, there must be a distinct and common

understanding between the paities. Hoffman v. S. V. Co.; Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 628.P.2d
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Here, the agreement was reached on or about February 3, 2010. However, the
parties disagree as to whether attorney fees were covered by that agreement. Both
Davis and Paukert state in their affidavits they had no knowledge a suit had been filed
by Hotlands until February 8, 2010. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 4, ~ 10; Affidavit of
Kathleen Paukert, p. 5, ~ 13. Thus, MetUfe argues attorney fees were not
contemplated in the February 3, 2010, agreement. While this Court appreciates
Metlife's argument that settling the matter and requiring a full release contemplated no
claim by Hollands for attorney fees (Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, pp. 2-3), that argument has been undermined by
Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P .3d 754 (2007). In Straub, the parties stipulated to
dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice, but that stipulation was silent on the issue of attorney
fees. This Court decided that failing to include the attorney fee issue in the stipulation
indicated the parties intended to bear their own attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme
Court disagreed, and held Smith did not waive his right to argue costs and fees when
the stipulation was silent on the issue. 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758.
"Furthermore, we have said costs and attorney fees are collateral issues which do not
go to the merits of an action and that a district court retains jurisdiction to make such an
award after a suit has been terminated." Id., citing lniand Group of Cos., Inc. v.
Obendorff, 131 ldaho473, 475, 959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998).
While MetLife through its agents believed the matter had been settled such that
a full release regarding all claims would bring an end to the matter, and that Hollands
had not filed suit and were iepresented pro bona, Hoi!ands believed they VJere settling a
matter afte, suit had been filed and after their counsel had entered into a contingency
fee agreement with them, so that an entitlement for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-
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1839 existed. This issue of fact precludes Hollands' motion for summary judgment, see

infra. However, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement involves a new contract
settling an old dispute. Wilson, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 34 7 P.2d 341, 345 ('1959). In

Wilson, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote:
Where the parties to a legal controversy, in good faith enter into a contract
compromising and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is
binding upon the parties, and, in the absence of fraud, duress or undue
influence, is enforceable either at law or in equity according to the nature
of the case. Ticknor v. McGinnis, 33 Idaho 308, 193 P. 850; Nelson v.
Krigbaum, 38 Idaho 716, 226 P. 169; Moran v. Copeman, 55 Idaho 785,
47 P.2d 920; Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 124 P.2d 826; 11 Am.Jur.,
Compromise and Settlement, § 35, p. 283. Such a contract stands on the
same footing as any other contract and is governed by the same rules and
principles as are applicable to contracts generally. 11 Am.Jur.,
Compromise and Settlement, § 35, p. 283. An agreement of compromise
and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims which the
parties intended to settle thereby. Moren v. Copeman, supra; Shriver v.
Kuchel, 113 Cal.App.2d 421, 248 P.2d 35; 15 C.J.S. Compromise and
Settlement§ 24, p. 739. Such prior claims are thereby superseded and
extinguished. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previoL•sly existing
controversy. The existence of a valid agreement of compromise and
settlement is a complete defense to an action based upon the original
claim. Bruce v. Oberbillig, 46 Idaho 387, 268 P. 35; Shriver v. Kuchel,
supra; Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 49 Cal.2d 706,
321 P.2d 460; 11 Am.Jur., Compromise and Settlement, § 36, p. 284.
In an action c,mught to enforce an agreement of compromise and
settlement, maae in good faith, the court will not inquire into the merits or
validity of the original claim. l-feath 11. Potlatch Lumber Co., 18 Idaho 42,
108 P. 343, 27 L.R.A.. ,N.S., 707; Nelson v. Krigbaum, supra.

Id. The Court discounts Hollands' argument that no ruie basis or other authority exists
pursuant to which MetLife can seek enforcament of the settler.-1ent ag reernent.

See

Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance
Under Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' M0t:on for Attorney's Fe·as, p. 6, citnf1 /oung
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sufficient to support a contract. A.n enforceable contract requires "distinct
understanding common to both parties." Hoffman v. S V Go., Inc., 102 ldaho 187, 189,

628 P.2d 218,220 (19S-1). Accept;mce must be unequivocal and identical to the offer
and the parties' minds must meet as to all terms before a co:itract is formed .. Twner v.
Mendeniw/1, 95 Idaho 426, 429, 510 P 2d 490, 493 (1973). Proof of a 1Tr3P-ting of the

minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of the agreement and
tile assent of both parties. Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 356, 796 P .2d 1026,

1029 (Ct.App. 1990).
A settlement agreement by the parties, purportedly evidenced by the email from
Paukert to Hollands' counsel on February 2, 2010, offering $200,000 and a full release,
end from Holian::!'s counsel to Paukert on Februmy 3, 2010, ciccepting tl1e offer ~nrl
st2-ti-1g f-bllands "wiii sign a full release of their claims against MetUfe", c.~pp2E1l'3 to
constitt~te a meeting of t'ne minds. See Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, pµ. 4-5, ,i ,-i 1011

However, ''[tjhe question of whether there was a sufficient iT1eL~ling of the minds io

form an express agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact." Corder v.. Idaho
Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353,359,986 P.2d 1019, ·1025 (Ct.App. 1998) citing Bischoff
v. Q.:iong-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826. 828,748 P.2d 4'i0, 412 (Ct.App. 1987).

At is~ue hE:re is whether the full rdP-ase contemplated in the em2.iis 1,v~uld inch.. de the
G!air,1 fo, attorney's fees because on the or:e hand Mdlife ciaimsd to h,.:l'/e had
•
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'they believed hirn to be appearing pre bono, and on the other hand, Hollands' had filed
'.:iUlt and 1101iv· claim they fully intended to ss0,k attorriey's fee:::; ~rt ti1e tirr,,=,. the seH!emsr-,t

contract oecausc rnsterial terms vvere not ne.J~>tiated.
-~:-·1e "m:0t2rir.1l l::n ··ns·· wh;ch
,,

Hollands identify are limited to release at issue in this case. Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 6. "It is also undisputed that subsequent to the
February 3, 201 O; emails, the parties' attorneys negotiated the specific terms of the
release in this case." Id., citing Affidavit of Kinzo Mihara. In order to grant Metlife's
motion to compel on this theory, the Court would require zidditional evidence on the
question of a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a contract or settlement in this
matter, both on the question of what a "full release" constituted in general and on the
question of whether MetLife and Hollands' counsel specifically contemplated the
settlement to settle all claims including any fees at the time the settlement agreement
was entered into. Straub certainly indicates there is no presumption that attorney fees
are not included if the agreement is silent on the issue.
Thus, this Court cam1ot grant Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under
Settlement upon Metlife's argument that fees we,e not contemplated in the sett!ernent
agreement, undef either a contract interpretation analysis or a waiver analysis.
· Hollands also make the argument that MetLife.should be estopped from taking
the position that the settlement agreement, entered into volunlarily and exp1·essly
exc!ujing the claim for fees from settlement, shouid now be viewed by the Court as a
basis for denyin,0 the ciaim for fees because it settled ail pending ciaims. Plaintiffs'
Response to OGfendants' Motion to Compel Peiiom1ance Ui1de;- the Settlement and
Dismiss Plaintiffs-' Motion for AttorneY:s Fees. p. 3. 1Nhat is confusing here is Hollands'
use of "settl$ment document." is i't the "Jolnt Mction to Dismiss AJI Cla1ms Except fo~

the Pending Motion fr>r.A1tornG:i's F2e;;" tc, ·.vhich Ho!!31;(:]~, refer, or is itthe emaii
exchange which MetUfe argL:es amounts· to a sett:eme:nt of a:: c:aims?

As d;scussed sup,·a, equitabL:1 '3Sto;::ipe! requlres:

~'\:W.~llM DECISION AND OrWER :)StNING i'L,\IN:FF5' MJ",'ION rOP. s:.:rtMA.RY .l;)DGMENT

(1) a false representation or concealment of a m2.terial fact made with
actua1 or constructive knowledge of 1he truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that
;
the rnisrepresentaUon or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the
~arty c1ss1:lrtin9 estoppe! reik!d on the misrepresentation or concealment to
his or her prejudice.

l/1/i!fig v. State, Dep't off-lea/th & 'v\/elfare, 127 Idaho 259, 26'1, 899 P.2d 968, 971
(1 H95). A.nd, quasi-estoppei, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth
elements and applies when it wo:.Jld be unconscionable to allow a pa~y to assert

3

right

inconsistent with a oricr
'
.oosition. /cl. Because the issue of fees remained at tl1E: time
the Order granting the joint motion to dismiss ail claims was e:Ttered, there was no false
representation or c;oncealment of msterial fact made by MetLife. lndc-:ed, it was
Hollands who arguably bad conc.E1a!ed the fact that a lawsuit was filed and attorney':,
fees would be sought at tr1e time the settle;nent fo'" $200,000 and a full 1elease was
entered into by ihe parties
As m'~ntioned above (pages 12-15 cf this decision), there are questions of fad
as 'to whether there was an exten5ion of time within which MetLife col!ld resporid.
Ultimately, material questions o'f fact also remain as tc whethe:- the agreement reached
through the February 3, 2010. email w:~s an enforceable contract. And, although
Hol!anus· estoppel argument fails, a material question in disputs remains as to whether

the sottiernent c:1gn?.tmient constituted a meeting of th,3 minds. /\7., su 1:;h, the Hoi,ands' .

i1avin:::J '\vaivcd" th,3ir couns8i's right to fees via the re!ease turi-;S on 'Nhether. the
~et:lernent agret:ment giving rise to ti1e reiease was a valid contract between the

part;e., See Plaintiff:;.' Response to Defendants' f\foticn t-J Compel Pe1.formanc:;::; Unc!er

purported settlement agreement alone does not provide a basis for granting Metlife's
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement /l.greernent.
However, there is a basis upon which MetLife's Motion to Compel Performance
Under the Settlement Agreement must be granted. In this area, the ,above issues of
disputed fact are not relevant.
Idaho Code§ 4·1-1839 (and sanctions under I.C. § 12-123) pro,rides the
exclusive basis for recovery of attorney's fees in actions between insureds and insurers
involving disputes arising under insurance policies. J.C.§ 41-1839(4). An insurer who
fails to pay an amount justly due under a policy for thirty days after proof of loss has
been furnished shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees as adjudged by the Court
in any action thereafter brought against the insurer for recovery under the terms of the
policy. I.C. § 41-1839(1). The statute requires: (1) the insured to provide proof of ioss
as required by the insurance policy and (2) the insurer riu!.:t fail to pay the amm.:nt just:y
due within thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss. Parsons v. ;\1ut:Ja/ of Enumclaw

ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18 (2007). "As defined by this
Court [the Supreme Court of Idaho], a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when an
insured provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." GmEH7ough v. Farm Bureau Mut.

In:;. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593. 130 P.3d 1127, 113'1 (200f:3); citing Brinkman v.
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in mind that it was MetLife and its directive to its attorney Paukert to be creative in trying
to find additional coveiage for Hollands. The only theories for additional coverage
expounded by Hollands' counsel Mihara were determined by MetLife to be without
merit. Defendants' Response .to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. §

41-rn39; Affidavit of Paukert,

~

9.

As discussed above in analyzing Hollands' motion for attorney fees, there are
additional reasons that, in analyzing Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement,
show MetLife was not provided with "a reasonable opportunity to investigate and
determine its liability", given the January 22, 2010, deadline that Mihara agreed to and
beyond which he was unwiiling to extend. As set forth above, on January 8, 2010, the
adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could not decide whether or not
coverage was applicable under the policy and that a coverage opinion would be sought
from an independent attorney. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine
Attorney's Fees, p. 3. On Januar/ 13, 2010, the independent attorney, Kathleen
Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and requested an extension to come to a coverage
decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an extension until January 22, 2010. Id. On
January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara and requested another extension, which
Mihara denied. On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf
of Hollands. A few days later, on Februar; 2, 2010, Paukert advised Mihara that, based
on her research, there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by
Mii1ar2, but there was possible coverage -on the motorcycle policy under a theory
Mihma had nGt advar::ced. Defend;:ints' Response to Pl3intiffs' Moticn for Attorney's
FGes Pursu.::1nt to LC. § 4 ~--'1839; Affidavit of Pauls:ert, ~ 9. Pauke:~ advised Mihara that

MetUfewas offing to pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had
received from the negligent party), p.ovided Hollands signed a fui! release. Id.

~1:r-lAt.'l:JOM DESISIGN AND ORDER DENYING PLA:t\Tl~FS' ",lCJTION FO~ SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Obviously, MetLife on January 22, 2010, felt Mihara's theories were not
plausible, but MetLife was still working on coming up with its own theories to provide
additional coverage. Ten days later, those theories, developed only by MetLife and not
by Mihara, resulted in additional coverage which in turn resulted in settlement on
February 2, 2010. Hollands have provided no facts which would counter such findings.
In light of such, Hollands, through Mihara, did not provide MetLife with "a reasonable
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability".
The following was discussed above at pages 13-14, but is now analyzed in more
detail. First, this started out as somewhat of a moving target for Hollands, and thus,
MetLife. This impacted Metlife's "reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine
its liability". As mentioned above, there were separate offers made at separate times
on separate policies. MetLife was prepared to pay policy limits in Claim f\Jo. FRD
373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was seeking to make
additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Ho:Jand's policies and would not consider
the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, there was no tender on or about December
7, 2009. Also, to the extent there was a tender as to Claim No. FRO 373130,
subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims under the two
polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers
FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not contemplated within the
initial $50,000 offer. In her Affidavit, Davis states she infmmGd Holland's counsel
Mihara she would be going on a three--.Neek vacc:tion and v:ould rmt return untii January
6, 2010, at which time the t\vo new c!alms would b~ reviewed. fa.ffidavit of Daneice
Davis, p. 2,

i-i 3.

Davis states· this delay ·Nas accep~able to Hol!a:·1ds, but that she did

not send out a letter confirming her conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id.
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Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 2010, and she had contact
with Holland's counsel regula1·ly from January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to
discuss theories coverage on the additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO
408440 and 408370. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17. MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the
30-day clock running on January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement
timely. Id. Second, counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative
argument that these time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on
separate policies should be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue the cumulative time
between November 10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, added to the period from
Janua1y 7, 2010, to January 26, 20·10, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of
ioss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court
ran find no such case law to support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these

are separate Qffers made at separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no
factual basis to aggregate these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf
of MetLife, found the theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and
Mihara on behalf of Hollands accepts that higher amounts based on the theory
Metlife's attorney created, how can Ho!lands' claim at this time that MetLife was
provided "a r-2•asonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability"?
For these re::isons alone, this Court finds Hollands have faiied to meet their
burden under Greenough v. Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593,

'i30 P.:3d ·11 ?7, ·1-n·1 (2006) and Brinkman v. .AID Ins. Co., 115 ldGhea 346, 349-S!J, 7_66
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investigate and determine its liability, when it was MetLife that came up with the
creative theory for additional coverage.
Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement must be granted, and
Hollands are not entitled to attorney fees.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be
denied. Additionally, questions of material fact remain regarding the motion for
attorney's fees and the motion to compel performance under the settlement.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Hollands' Motion to Shorten Time to hear Hollands'
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT !S FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment is

DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Attorney Fees is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under the
Settlement Agreement and to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. The Settlement Agreement is enforced. As a result of the granting of
MetLife's Motion to Cornpel Performance Under the Settlement Agreement and to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Hollands are not entitled to attorney
fees under i.C. § 41-1839.
Entered thls 20ih day of July, 2010.

Jo( T. \,. itci1el!, District Judge
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William J. Schroeder, ISB No. 6674
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. Box E
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328
Telephone: (208) 664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
Mailing Address:
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
Defendants.

)

) Case No. CV 10-677

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS'REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
PERFORMANCE UNDER THE
SETTLEMENT AND DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES

I. INTRODUCTION
A settlement, in its most basic sense, is a resolution of a disagreement between two
parties. The question presented in this matter is simple - whether a party may enter into a

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UN,Q]j:g,!,m;.$ETILEMENT AND DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
MO'tit')'Ni,'tjii ATTORNEY'S FEES- I
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compromise settlement agreement over a disputed claim, acknowledge entering into such
agreement, renege on such settlement agreement after the fact and then be permitted to avoid the
settlement. As addressed below, this questions must be answered in the negative.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs filed a Civil Complaint on January 26,
2010, and that such Complaint included Plaintiffs' claims against three MetLife insurance
policies and a claim in Section IV, paragraph 34, for attorney's fees pursuant to J.C. § 41-1839.
(See, Civil Complaint ("Complaint"), filed January 26, 2010)

Further, it is undisputed that on February 2, 2010, Defendants' Attorney, Kathleen H.
Paukert, informed Plaintiffs' Attorney, Kinzo H. Mihara, that MetLife was willing to settle the
matter for payment of the motorcycle policy limit, provided Plaintiffs sign a full release. (See,
Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees) ("Aff. of Paukert"), filed April 13, 2010, at

<J[

9) Likewise, it is undisputed that, following

their conversation, on February 2, 2010, Ms. Paukert sent the following e-mail offer to Mr.
Mihara:

Subject: Offer
Dear Mr. Mihara:
This letter confirms Met is offering your client the limits of the motorcycle
policy minus the offset. It is my understanding, the Motorcycle policy is
$250,000 and you received $50,000 from the tortfeasor. Therefore, Mets offer is
$200,000.00. Obviously, we will require a full release.
Sincerely,
Kathleen H._ Paukert
(Ibid., at <]l 10, Exhibit 1, e-mail from Ms. Paukert to Mr. Mihara (emphasis added)).

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE SETI'LEMENT AND DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
MmlNJN"~ ATTORNEY'S FEES - 2
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It is also undisputed that on February 3, 2010, at 8:43 a.m., Ms. Paukert received the
following e-mail acceptance from Mr. Mihara:

Subject: [SPAM] Acceptance
Ms. Paukert:

Please let this letter confirm that my clients accept MetLife's offer of
$200,000. My clients will sign a full release of their claims against MetLife.
At your earliest convenience, please send certified funds payable to:
Gregory and Kathleen Holland
c/o Kinzo H. Mihara
424 Sherman Ave., Ste. 308
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Yours very truly and sincerely,
Kinzo H. Mihara
(Ibid., at <]I 11, Exhibit 1, e-mail from Mr. Mihara to Ms. Paukert (emphasis added))
The following facts are also undisputed. On February 3, 2010, following Mr. Mihara's
confirmation that his clients had accepted MetLife's settlement offer, Ms. Paukert called Mr.
Mihara to confirm that his clients would be providing MetLife with a fuH release. (Ibid., at~[ 12)
During that conversation, Mr. Mihara said that his clients would, but, for the first time, informed
Ms. Paukert that he was now making a claim for attorney's fees. (Ibid.) Ms. Paukert reminded
Mr. Mihara that his clients had agreed to a full release of their claims. (Ibid.) He responded that
they would, but that he was personally going to sue MetLife for attorney's fees. (Ibid.) Mr.
Mihara further informed Ms. Paukert, for the first time, that Plaintiffs had filed a Civil Complaint
on January 26, 2010, prior to settlement. (Ibid.)
In addition, Plaintiffs acknowledge that on February 3, 2010, Plaintiffs accepted
Defendants' settlement offer, stating in relevant part:
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UNQ~R-Tll,1;_1,~TTLEMENT AND DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
MOtioN Jl'('jJ't' J\ TTORNEY'S FEES - 3
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One of the primary factors that went into the decision to accept the amount due
was that acceptance of the offer extended in Exhibit "A" [referring to the February
2nd and 3rd e-mail exchange above] of the aforementioned affidavit was that
acceptance would effectively end the litigation and allow Ben Holland's family to
continue their grieving process without have to simultaneously battle their insurer
in litigation
(See, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to l.C. § 41-

1839, filed February 9, 2010, at p. 8)
On February 8, 2010, Mr. Mihara faxed Ms. Paukert a copy of the Complaint. (See, Aff.
of Paukert, at 'I[ 13) Despite the settlement reached, on February 9, 2010, Mr. Mihara mailed Ms.
Paukert a letter that included a Motion for Attorney's Fees and other supporting documents.
(Ibid., at 'I[ 14)
After reneging on the compromise settlement reached, as well as their agreement to sign
a full release of their claims against the Defendants, the parties filed a "Joint Motion and
Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees" on
March 3, 2010. (See, Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the
Pending Motion for Attorney Fees ("Stipulated Order to Dismiss"), filed March 3, 2010) It is
important to note the precise language used in the Stipulated Order to Dismiss:
COME NOW the parties, by and through their counsel of record and hereby move
this Court to dismiss, with prejudice, all claims in the above-captioned matter,
except for Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839 filed on
February 9, 2010. The parties fmther stipulate to the form of the Order below.
This motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4l(a)(l)(ii). The basis of this motion is
that the parties have fully resolved all claims in this matter except for the pending
motion for attorney fees referenced above.

THE COURT, pursuant to the joint motion of the parties above, and upon good
cause appearing, does ORDER that all claims in the· above-captioned matter,

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM JN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTJON TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AND DJSMISS PLAJNTJFFS'
McMOO-JtlntlATTORNEY'S FEES - 4
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except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees filed on February 9, 2010, are
dismissed with prejudice and without cost to either party.
(See,

Stipulated Order to Dismiss)
By its terms, the Stipulated Order to Dismiss dismissed all claims except Plaintiffs'

pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. In other words, the Complaint was dismissed, leaving only
Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, although no Answer was
required (because all claims had been dismissed except Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's
Fees), to make the record clear, Defendants answered Section IV, paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint by denying that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to LC. § 41-1839
and asserting Affirmative Defenses regarding the same. (See, Defendants' Answer and
Affirmative Defenses ("Answer"), filed April 12, 2010)
The foregoing facts are not disputed by Plaintiffs. (See, Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees,
filed May 17, 2010, pp. 1-2)
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs now take the position that the February 3, 2010 compromise
settlement agreement - resulting in a resolution between the parties and acknowledged as such
by Plaintiffs - did not include the claim for attorney's fees in Section IV, paragraph 34 of
Plaintiffs' Complaint. (See, Complaint) As discussed below, the grounds offered by Plaintiffs to
avoid enforcement of the compromise settlement agreement are not supported by the law.
Therefore, Defendants respectfully ask this Court for an Order compelling the Plaintiffs herein to
render performance under the compromise settlement agreement, and dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion
for Attorney's Fees.
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II. ARGUMENT

A.

Plaintiffs' Contention That Defendants Have Failed to Cite Law or Authority
For Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees is in Error, and Reflects an
Effort to Avoid Addressing the Merits of this Motion
In responding to the current motion, Plaintiffs painstakingly avoid discussion of the issue

actually before the Court; namely, enforcement of the compromise settlement agreement reached
by the parties on February 3, 2010. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' motion fails to state
the rule or law upon which it is based, and thus, must be denied. (See, Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendants' Motion to Compel Pe1formance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
("Plaintiffs' Response"), filed May 17, 2010, p. 2) 1

In doing so, Plaintiffs correctly cite Idaho Civil Rule 7(b)(l) as the rule addressing
motions, which states, in relevant part:
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made
during a hearing or trial, shall be in writing, shall state with particularity the
grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, under
which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. ...
I.R.C.P. § 7(b)(l). Here, Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees complies with the rule. (See, Defendants' Motion
to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
("Motion to Compel Perf. Under the Settlement"), filed April 28, 2010)

1

It should be noted that Plaintiffs even go as far as Lo change the heading of Defendants' motion. Specifically,
Plaintiffs avoid using the phrase "Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement," and insert an
"or" where Defendants used an "and." Defendants seek to compel performance under the settlement reached hy the
parties on February 3, 20IO, which would effectively dismiss Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees; thus, the "or"
used by the Plaintiffs is inappropriate in this context.
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AND DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
Mmllf>N(FJOR ATTORNEY'S FEES - 6

Page 422 of 709

It is undisputed that Defendants' Motion is in "writing" and sets forth the "relief sought" -

namely, an Order compelling performance under the settlement reached on February 3, 2010,
and dismissing Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. (Ibid.) Moreover, Defendants' Motion
refers the Court to Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees,
which provides ample common law authority in support of enforcement of the parties' settlement
agreement; thus, specifying the "grounds" for which relief is sought. (Ibid., see, also, Defendants'
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under
the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees ("Memo. to Compel Perf.
Under the Settlement"), filed April 28, 2010)

Notably, common law provides grounds for

enforcement of the parties' settlement agreement; thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, citation
to court rule and statute is not needed.
Given the above, Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants' Motion fails to state the rule or law
upon which it is based is without merit, and enforcement of the compromise settlement
agreement is appropriate.
B.

Plaintiffs' Judicial Estoppel Argument Relies Exclusively on Actions Taken
Following Plaintiffs' Failure to Comply With the Terms of the Compromise
Settlement Reached by the Parties, and Thus, Is Inapplicable to Defendants'
Effort to Enforce the Settlement Reached by the Parties on February 3,
2010
In an attempt to avoid the implications of the parties' compromise settlement, Plaintiffs

contend that the Stipulated Order to Dismiss, executed post-settlement, precludes Defendants
from enforcing the compromise settlement reached on February 3, 2010.

(See, Plaintiffs'

Response, pp. 3-5)
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To this end, Plaintiffs' argument is exclusively post-settlement, relying only on the
Stipulated Order to Dismiss. In other words, the argument is premised on actions following
Plaintiffs' refusal to comply with the terms of the compromise settlement reached by the parties
on February 3, 2010 and, for which, Defendants seek enforcement. 2 In this regard, Plaintiffs'
argument is circular, in that Defendants' post-settlement actions were a consequence of Plaintiffs'
underlying refusal to abide by the settlement that had been reached.

As such, Plaintiffs'

argument is both circular in nature and inapplicable to the case at hand, as it avoids discussion of
the issue actually before the Court - enforcement of the compromise settlement agreement
reached by the parties on February 3, 2010.
Essentially, Plaintiffs' argument would permit them to: (a) file a Complaint making a
claim for attorney's fees under LC. § 41-1839 (Section IV, paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint); (b) reach a compromise settlement with Defendants agreeing to "sign a full release
of their claims against MetLife"; (c) acknowledge that a settlement was reached; (d) renege on
the settlement by refusing to dismiss the claim for attorney's fees under LC. § 41-1839; and (e)
then argue, after the fact, that such behavior precludes Defendants from enforcing the settlement
agreement originally reached by the parties. 3

2
In fact, it should be noted that Defendants' Answer includes, as an Affirmative Defense, that "Plaintiffs' claim for
attorney fees under l.C. § 41-1839 are barred because Plaintiffs agreed to sign a full release of their claims against
MetLife." (See, Answer)

3

Remarkably, Plaintiffs have also attempted to avoid responsibility for their breach by suggesting that Ms. Paukert
allempted to revoke the amount of the settlement and/or improperly condition the payment of the same. As
explained in response to Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions to Defendant, those aspersions by Plaintiffs are
both factually incorrect and improper (See, Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions to Defendants, Request Nos. 26
and 27, attached to the Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion of Summary Judgment, as
Exhibit 19)
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Given the foregoing, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' argument of judicial estoppel,
relying exclusively on actions that occurred because of Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the
terms of the compromise settlement, are inapplicable to Defendants' efforts to enforce the
settlement reached by the parties on February 3, 2010.
C.

Contrary. to Plaintiffs' Contention, the February 3, 2010 Compromise
Settlement Was Enforceable, With AH Material Terms Negotiated
Plaintiffs next contend that the compromise settlement reached on February 3, 2010 was

unenforceable because material terms still needed to be negotiated. (See, Plaintiffs' Response,
pp. 5-7) To support their position, Plaintiffs rely upon Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,
204 P.3d 532 (App. 2009). A review of that case, however, reveals that it does not support
Plaintiffs' position, but rather lends credence to Defendants' claim that an enforceable settlement
agreement was reached on February 3, 2010.

In Lawrence, the defendants' counsel spoke with the plaintiff by phone, agreeing upon a
payment amount to settle a legal malpractice action brought against defendants. Ibid., at 895,
204 P.3d 532. Subsequent thereto, the defendants discovered that the plaintiff had assigned all of
his claims to a medical provider, potentially exposing them to further liability. Ibid., at 896, 204
P.3d 532. Over a year later, for the first time, the plaintiff argued that an enforceable settlement
agreement had been reached, and should be enforced against the defendants. Ibid., at 896, 204
P.3d 532. The defendants argued that no settkment was reached because the confidentiality and
indemnity provisions were material to the agreement, were not agreed upon, and, therefore, no
enforceable settlement agreement existed. Ibid., at 897, 204 P.3d 532. Thus, the primary issue
was whether the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement when the parties

DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AND DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
M~ll~ffi8 ATTORNEY'S FEES - 9

Page 425 of 709

orally agreed to a monetary figure to settle a legal malpractice action, which the Court ruled in
the negative. Ibid., at 897-898, 204, P.3d 532.
Those facts are distinguishable from the present matter in several important respects.
Initially, unlike the parties in Lawrence, the settlement agreement in this case was in writing.
Moreover, Plaintiffs, in this case, agreed to sign a full release of all their claims against MetLife
for a specific sum of money, as part of a compromise settlement over a coverage dispute. All the
material terms were present - payment of $200,000 in exchange for release of all their claims.
Notably, these facts are undisputed and explicitly set forth in writing. (See, Aff. of Paukert, at <][<JI

-

10-11, Exhibit 1, e-mails)
Also, in Lawrence, the Court found that the only term that was agreed to was the "money

amount of settlement." Lawrence, 899, 204 P.3d 532. By contrast, in the present case, the
parties did more than simply determine the "money amount of settlement." Instead, they reached
a definitive agreement to pay $200,000 in exchange for release of all Plaintiffs' claims.

In

addition, unlike Lawrence, in which the Cou1t emphasized that the plaintiff only sought to
enforce the settlement one year later, here, the Defendants filed this Motion within three months
of settlement. (See, Motion to Compel Perf. Under the Settlement) Moreover, the Defendants
denied that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to LC. § 41-1839 in their
Answer, and asserted Affirmative Defenses regarding the same, stating, in relevant part, that
"Plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839, are barred because Plaintiffs agreed to
sign a full release of their claims against MetLife." (See, Answer) Given these distinctions,
Lawrence supports enforcement of the settlement agreement reached in this case on February 3,
2010.
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Moreover, again, similar to Plaintiffs' previous argument, Plaintiffs' position is circular,
in that it relies on actions that occurred post-settlement - e.g., the Stipulated Order to Dismiss,
the Release and the payment of $200,000 - to avoid enforcement of the settlement agreement.
(See, Plaintiffs' Response, pp. 6-7) Along those lines, Defendants' actions post-settlement were a

consequence of Plaintiffs' refusal to abide by the settlement reached, including their refusal to
honor their promise to execute "a full release of their claims against MetLife." (See, Aff. of
Paukert, at 'Il'Il 10-11, Exhibit 1, e-mails)
In sum, while Plaintiffs claim that they "have fully complied with their obligations under

any agreement reached on February 3, 2010," just the opposite is true.

(See, Plaintiffs'

Memorandum, p. 7) Defendants received the following e-mail acceptance on February 3, 2010:

Subject: [SPAM] Acceptance
Ms. Paukert:

Please let this letter confirm that my clients accept MetLife's offer of
$200,000. My clients will sign a full release of their claims against MetLife.
At your earliest convenience, please send certified funds payable to:

***
Yours very truly and sincerely,
Kinzo H. Mihara
(Ibid. at 'fl 11, Exhibit 1, e-mail from Mr. Mihara to Ms. Paukert (emphasis added)) Pursuant to
the settlement agreement reached, Defendants paid Plaintiffs $200,000 in certified funds. (See,
Plaintiffs' Response, p. 6) Reneging on the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs refused to release
their claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839 in Section IV, paragraph 34 of the Complaint.
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Such actions support compelling the Plaintiffs to render performance under the settlement
agreement and dismissing Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees.

D.

Plaintiffs' Claim that an Insured May Not Reach a Settlement Agreement,
Releasing a Potential Claim For Attorney's Fees Under J.C. § 41-1839 is
Without Merit
Assuming, arguendo, Plaintiffs are entitled to seek attorney's fees under l.C. § 41-1839,

Plaintiffs take the remarkable position that they lack the authority to settle such attorney's fees
claim (asserted in Section IV, paragraph 34 of their Complaint), claiming instead that "statutory
rights and duties may not be waived or exempted by contract. "4 (See, Plaintiffs' Response, p. 7)
In doing so, Plaintiffs emphasize that this attorney's fees law, governing insurance relationships,
has existed in Idaho for "almost sixty (60) years." Nonetheless, Plaintiffs can point to no case
holding that an insured may not reach a compromise settlement of a disputed claim, releasing
any potential claim for attorney's fees under such statute. (Ibid.)
Instead, Plaintiffs reference a personal injury case, Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976,
695 P.2d 361 (1984), misconstrue both the Court"., reasoning and its holding and then manipulate
quotes from the Court to support their unfounded premise. In Lee, the plaintiff argued that the
release agreement, absolving the defendant from liability arising out of injury to its guests, was
invalid because a statute controlled the relationship between outfitters, guides and their guests,
imposing a public duty on the defendant. The defendant was licensed in Idaho as an outfitter and
guide and provided equestrian trail rides for tourists, while the plaintiff was a guest who was
injured on such ride. Ibid., at 977-78, 695 P.2d 361. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the

4

Plaintiffs' citation to the Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Insur. Co., 75 ldaho 524,275 P.2d 969 (1954) case is
not applicable as Defendants do not contest the constitutionality or the attorney's fees statue at issue, or that it was
within the police power's of the state to enact such statute, which was the thrust of that case.
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release agreement did not absolve the defendant of its statutory "public duty" because the
Legislature expressly intended the statute to establish a standard of care within the tourist
industry. Ibid., at 978, 695 P.2d 361.
In contrast to Lee, Plaintiffs can point to no legislative history or case that stands for their
contention that an insured may not reach a settlement releasing any potential claim for attorney's
fees under LC. § 41-1839.

Moreover, Plaintiffs make claims that are inconsistent with the

Court's reasoning and holding in Lee.

For example, Plaintiffs claim the Court in Lee -

"recognized the general rule of law that statutory rights and duties may not be waived or
exempted by contract." (See, Plaintiffs' Response, p. 7) However, the Court never made such a
statement, instead, finding the contrary - "[t]here are some statutory rights and duties which may
be waived or exempted by contract," "[o]ther statutory rights and duties may not be waived or
exempted by contract," 5 "[w]e do not attempt to articulate a general rule applicable to all
statutes," and "the general rule [is] validating exculpatory contracts." Ibid., at 979, 695 P.2d 361.
Likewise, in support of Plaintiffs' argument, Plaintiffs manipulate the following quote in Lee:
However, we do hold that where the legislature has addressed the rights and
duties pertaining to personal injuries arising out of the relationship between two
groups, i.e., employers/employees, outfitters and guides/participants, and has
granted limited liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties,
then such duties become a "public duty" within the exception to the general rule
validating exculpatory contracts ....
Ibid., (emphasis added) Thus, the Court found that where the Legislature has addressed the
rights and duties pertaining to "personal injuries" between two groups, in some situations, such

5

Among others, the Court referenced (a) minimum wage; (b) property exemptions from attachment and execution;
(c) worker's compensation benefits; (d) statute of limitations; (e) unemployment compensation; and (t) statutory
right of exemption. Ibid., at 979, 695 P.2d 361. When noting such exemptions, the Court states: [t]he citations
above are merely examples of other jurisdictions' treatment of specific contractual waivers of statutory rights. They
are not necessarily precedent for the same disposition in Idaho." Ibid., FN2.
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rights and duties may not be waived or exempted by contract. Ibid. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs
manipulate the quote, removing the word "personal" from "personal injuries," attempting to
apply the quote to the situation at hand. Given these distinctions, together with Plaintiffs' failure
to identify any case holding that an insured may not reach a settlement releasing potential claims
for attorney's fees under LC. § 41-1839, Lee supports enforcement of the settlement agreement
reached on February 3, 2010.
Likewise, Plaintiffs' contention that - "only the state may 'release' a defendant from
liability [referring to LC. § 41.1839]" - is without legal foundation. Simply stated, there is no
authority to support such claim and if the State of Idaho is required to sign off on any such
settlement, then it would be a necessary party to this action. As such, Plaintiffs' claim that they
did not have the legal authority to reach a settlement with the Defendants that would encompass
a claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839 is without merit and should not be adopted by
this Court.

III. CONCLUSION
A settlement, in its most basic sense, is a resolution of a disagreement between two
parties. On February 3, 2010, the parties in this matter reached such a resolution, wherein the
Plaintiffs agreed to accept $200,000, in exchange for signing "a full release of their claims"
against Defendants. In light of the foregoing, as well as the points and authorities discussed in
Defendants' Memo. to Compel Perf. Under the Settlement, Defendants respectfully ask the Court
for an Order (a) compelling Plaintiffs to render performance under the settlement agreement; and
(b) dismissing Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees.
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2:J

day of May, 2010.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

By:$~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, ET AL,
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)
Plaintiffs,

vs.
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET

AL
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
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)
)
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CV 2010 677

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER:
1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 2) DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES-AND 3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AND
DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES.

)
Attorneys:

For the Plaintiffs:
Kinzo Mihara
For the Defendants: William Schroeder

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND.
This case involves a settled dispute over insurance coverage, with the issue of
attorney fees still in dispute.
On January 26,2010, plaintiffs Estate of Benjamin Holland, deceased, Gregory
Holland and Kathleen Holland (Hollands) filed this action alleging defendants
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance and MetLife Auto and Home (MetLife)
wrongfully failed to pay the amounts due under an insurance contract within thirty days
of being provided proof of loss as required under the contract. Hollands claim three
counts of breach of contract, two counts each of negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and three counts of bad faith. Additionally, Hollands claim:
38157-2010
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The Estate of Benjamin Holland, Gregory Holland, and Kathleen Holland
are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-120, § 12121, § 41-1839, and any other applicable statutory authority and/or judicial
doctrine which allows for recovery of attorney fees.
Complaint for Damages, p. 7,

,r 1v.

Benjamin Holland died October 25, 2009, as a result of a motor vehicle accident
involving an underinsured motorist. Complaint for Damages, p. 3,

,r,r 6, 7.

Benjamin

owned a policy of insurance with MetLife which named Benjamin as the named insured,
and had limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Id., p. 2, .,i- 3.
Benjamin's parents, Gregory and Kathleen Holland, also owned a policy with MetLife,
with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, which extended
coverage to relatives who resided in their household. Id., ,i- 4. Hollands claim just prior
to the accident and Benjamin's ensuing death, Benjamin was in the process of moving
into a house he had bought, but still had a significant portion of his personal property at
his parents' home, and Benjamin continued to receive mail at his parents' home. Id., p.
3, ,I 6.
On February 9, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839", an "Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839". Hollands
claim their counsel are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $60,000,
that amount being 30% (under a contingency fee agreement) of the $200,000 ultimately
recovered from MetLife, pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, as a result of MetLife's alleged
failure to pay the amount justly due under the insurance contract within thirty days after
receiving proof of loss.
On March 2, 2010, the parties stipulated to dismiss all claims, but for the pending
38157-2010
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motion for attorney's fees, and the Court entered an Order dismissing all claims with
prejudice and without costs to either party on March 3, 2010. MetLife filed "Defendants'
Answer and Affirmative Defenses" on April 12, 2010, addressing only the Hollands'
claims for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839, because given the Court's dismissal of
all other claims with prejudice, "no Answer is required as to paragraphs 1 through 33,
as all claims, except for the claim for I.C. § 41-1839 attorney's fees, alleged in
paragraph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice." Defendants'
Answer and Affirmative Defenses, p. 2. On April 13, 2010, MetLife filed an "Affidavit of
Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees)."
Kathleen Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 2010, to provide a coverage
opinion concerning claims made against MetLife by Holland. Id., p. 2,

,r 3.

On April 28,

2010, MetLife filed a "Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees" and a "Memorandum of Authorities in
Support of Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees". In addition to the initial Paukert affidavit, on May 7, 2010,
MetLife filed in support of its motion to compel the "Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen
H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees)" and the
affidavit of "Daneice Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees)" (Davis), the adjuster assigned by MetLife to the claims made by Benjamin
Holland's estate. On May 10, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and the "Affidavit of William J.
Schroeder in Support of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Feesw Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839." On May 11, 2010, MetLife filed the "Supplemental
Affidavit of Daneice Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fe~fY.·20,, May 17, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgmemf, 435 ot 7o9

"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment", "Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion
for Attorney's Fees", and "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Response to Plantiffs' Motion
for Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839". On May 20, 2010, Hollands filed
"Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Their Motion for Summary Judgment."
In Hollands' motion for summary judgment they argue their entitlement to attorney's
fees in the amount of $60,000 or entitlement to fees in general are based on Metlife's
failure to have specifically denied the allegations of Hollands in the Complaint. On May
24, 2010, MetLife objected to Hollands' motion to shorten time on their motion for
summary judgment because Hollands' chosen course of proceeding did not provide-for
a briefing schedule as contemplated in the civil rules. Defendants' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 2. However, MetLife assured the Court:
Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be
filed and served on May 25, 2010. Defendants have no objection to
having Plaintiffs' May 17, 2010 Motion for Summary Judgment heard on
June 2, 2010, if the Court has sufficient time to hear all of the motions.

Id. On May 25, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" and an "Affidavit of William J. Schroeder in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment". On May 26, 2010, MetLife
filed its "Sur-Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839",
and the "Supplemental Affidavit of Mr. Schroeder William J. Schroeder in Support of
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 411839." On May 26, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment." Finally, on May 28, 2010, MetLife filed
"Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
38157-2010
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Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees."
In summary, before the Court now are Hollands' motions for attorney's fees,
motion to shorten time on summary judgment, and for summary judgment on the issue
of entitlement to attorney's fees. Also before the Court is Metlife's motion to compel
(actually a motion to enforce a settlement) and motion to dismiss Hollands' motion for
attorney's fees. All of these motions are interrelated.
Oral argument was held on June 2, 2010. Due to the extremely large amount of
briefing filed a short amount of time before oral argument, the Court was required to
take these motions under advisement.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in considering a motion for summary
judgment, the Court is mindful that summary judgment may properly be granted only
where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determin'ing whether any issue of material
fact exists, this court must construe all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. I.R.C.P. 56{c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192,
194, 706 P.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1985). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable
persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the
evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d
583, 587 (1996).
In any case which will be tried to the court, rather than to a jury, the trial judge is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
un~~rqt~erted evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 lda.hQ 5,.15, 54:8~07t7o9

650 P.2d 657, 661-62 (1982). In the present case, neither party has requested a trial
by jury. Accordingly, this Court can reach the most probable inferences from the
undisputed material facts before it.
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision,
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744,
753, 86 P.3d 458, 467 (2004). Subsection (3) of I.R.C.P. 54 obligates the Court to
consider factors (A) through (K) in determining an amount of fees through the use of
mandatory "shall" language. The Rule requires the District Court to consider all eleven
factors plus any others that the Court deems appropriate. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141
Idaho 425,435, 111P.3d 1 to, 120 (2005). The Court need not address each one of
the factors in its decision, but the record must demonstrate that the Court considered
them all. Parsons v. Mut. Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614,
618 (2007) (quoting Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 168, 775
(2002)).

llf. ANALYSIS.
A. Hollands' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839.
Hollands move this Court for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839. Hollands
argue MetLife wrongfully failed to pay on the insurance contract within thirty days of
being provided with proof of loss. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine
Attorney's Fees, p. 6. Hollands argue attorney fees in the amount of $60,000, or 30%
of the $200,000 settlement in this mater, are appropriate and reasonable in light of the
factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e){3){A)-{K), with emphasis on the amount of recovery obtained
for the clients and the recovery having been obtained without" ... having to bear the
emotional burden of litigating the underlying claims." Id., p. 8.
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Hollands provide a factual background for the Court in their memorandum. Id.,
pp. 2-4. On October 25, 2009, Benjamin Holland died as a result of an accident in Nez
Perce County, Idaho. Benjamin and his parents, Gregory and Kathleen, had three
policies with MetLife. On November 8, 2009, Hollands' claim their attorney Kinzo
Mihara (Mihara) tendered notice of a claim to MetLife. Id. At that time Mihara was
acting pro bona. Id., p. 2. MetLife designated this initial claim as Claim No. FRD
373130, and assigned the matter to MetLife insurance adjuster Daneice Davis.
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 411839, p. 2; Affidavit of Daneice Davis, ,13. On November 12, 2009, MetLife requested
additional documentation to support the claim. Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Hollands contend that information was submitted on
November 17, 2009. Id., and Complaint, p. 3, 1110. On December 8, 2009, Mihara
claims he discovered the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland may also
support claims by the estate of Benjamin Holland. Id. MetLife claims Mihara on
December 7, 2009, stated the matter could not be concluded by payment of the initial
policy limits because Hollands had decided to make claims against the two additional
MetLife policies. Mihara claims he discussed these claims with Metlife's adjuster on
December 8, 2009, and was made aware that the adjuster had made a request for
extension of a response until after the Christmas and New Year's holidays.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Those claims
were assigned Claim No. FRD 408440. Id., p. 3. This was an automobile policy held
by Gregory and Kathleen Holland. There was also a claim made on a motorcycle policy
which was assigned Claim No. FRO 408370. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs'
Motion for attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839, p. 3. "After the holidays", Mihara
38157-2010
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then "demanded that MetLife come to a decision and tender an amount justly due by
January 8, 201 O." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p.
3. On January 8, 2010, the adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could
not decide whether or not coverage was applicable under the policy and that a
coverage opinion would be sought from an independent attorney. Id. On January 13,
2010, the independent attorney, Kathleen Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and
requested an extension to come to a coverage decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an
extension until January 22, 2010. Id. On January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara
and requested another extension, which Mihara denied.
On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf of
Hollands. On February 2, 2010, Paukert advised Mihara that, based on her research,
there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by Mihara, but there was
possible coverage on the motorcycle policy under a theory Mihara had not advanced.
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 411839; Affidavit of Paukert,

,r 9.

Paukert advised Mihara that MetLife was offering to

pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had received from the
negligent party), provided Hollands signed a full release. Id. On February 26, 2010,
counsel for the parties signed a "Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All
Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees", representing that "the parties
have fully resolved all claims in the matter except for the pending motion for attorney
fees." On March 3, 2010, this Court signed the Order dismissing all claims between the
parties "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees filed on February 9, 201 O."
MetLife responds to Holland's motion for fees by arguing: (1) any claim by
Hollands to fees under I.C. § 41-1839 is barred by the Settlement agreement,
38157-2010
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discussed infra; (2) Hollands were not the prevailing party and are therefore not entitled
to fees; (3) Metlife's tender of their coverage decision and amounts justly due were not
untimely (beyond the 30-day time limit in I.C. § 41-1839) because "additional theories,
developed through the course of shared research, required supplemental
documentation demonstrating proof of loss, the thirty-day clock arguably did not begin
until January 27, 2010, the date the last proof of loss was requested by the Defendants"
(Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p.17.);
(4) Hollands' claim for fees is barred by judicial estoppel as Hollands previously had
taken the position that they did not want the policy limits under the initial claim filed
(uponwhich a determination had been reached as early as December 7, 2(:)09, but
subsequent to which Mihara informed Metlife's Daneice Davis that Hollands would
make additional claims against the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland)
and had actively participated with MetLife in finding coverage for the additional claims
up until February 2, 2010 (in addition to granting an extension for a coverage decision
deadline), and then after February 2, 2010, Hollands took the position that MetLife
failed to pay amounts justly due within thirty days; (5) that disputed questions of
material fact remain; (6) that the award offees requested by Hollands is unreasonable
in part because the settlement amount had nothing to do with the lawsuit as MetLife
(and its agents Davis and Paukert) were unaware a lawsuit had been filed at the time
the settlement was reached; and (7) MetLife asks the Court to limit fees, if any are
granted, to the time Hollands' counsel was not operating pro bona. Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 10-23.

1. Did Hollands "Prevail"?
As argued by MetLife, to be entitled to fees under I.C. § 41-1839, an insured
m~ti 1 ~~ail" in an action. Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, ·145 Idaho 459p'464~t 709

180 P.3d 498, 503 (2008). To prevail, the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full
amount requested, only an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer. Halliday

v. Farmers Ins., 89 Idaho 293,301, 404 P.2d 634, 638-39 (1965). The determination of
which party prevails, on which issues, and to what extent is in the discretion of the
Court. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67,
73 (1996). Importantly: "Where the insurer is sued for attorney fees incurred in a
separate successful action ... the insurer is obligated to pay attorney's fees only if its
initial refusal to pay the claim were unreasonable." Dawson

v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636,

641,496 P.2d 97, 102 (1972) (discussing uninsured motorist insurance cases). In

Parsonsv. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743; 152 P.3d 614 (2007), the
Idaho Supreme Court upheld a $20,000 contingency fee award to Parsons pursuant to
I.C. § 41-1839, where the insurer tendered $60,000 in uninsured motorists coverage on
November 12, 2004, and where Parsons had filed her lawsuit on October 26, 2004, and
served Mutual of Enumclaw the next day. 143 Idaho 743, 745, 152 P.3d 614, 616.
Parsons had received the $50,000 Allstate policy limit from the negligent driver who
caused the accident she was involved in, she then sought Mutual of Enumclaw to pay
the amount she was justly due under her $100,000 underinsured motorist coverage with
them as her damages exceeded the liability coverage limits of the Allstate policy. Id.
Parsons filed a motion seeking attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839, and the Idaho
Supreme Court upheld the District Court's award of $20,000, finding there was no
abuse of discretion in fixing the award amount. 143 Idaho 7 43, 7 48, 152 P.3d 614,
619.
In response to Metlife's argument, Hollands argue prior to their lawsuit MetLife
was ready to tender only $50,000 to settle the claims, not the $200,000 ultimately
38157-2010
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offered which led to settlement. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 5. Hollands also note the settlement
release entered into by the parties specifically references the lawsuit. Id., p. 6; Exhibit
A to Answer, p. 1. That document was signed by the parties on February 24, 2010.
And, Hollands argue Davis and Paukert had notice of the lawsuit as early as
January 29, 2010, before the settlement by the parties was reached. Id.
The facts before the Court indicate that MetLife ~as prepared to pay policy limits
in Claim No. FRO 373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was
seeking to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Holland's policies and
would not consider the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I. C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, there was no tender on
or about December 7, 2009. Also, to the extent there was a tender as to Claim No.
FRD 373130, subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims
under the two polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned
Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not
contemplated within the initial $50,000 offer. And, unlike the Parsons case, the facts in
this case do not indicate MetLife was served with a Complaint and Summons or
otherwise knew of the Hollands' lawsuit at the time the offer was tendered. Although
Hollands cite to the Affidavits of Davis and Paukert, in which both discuss the Coeur
d'Alene Press listing regarding Hollands having sued MetLife, both also state Paukert's
assistant could find no record of this filing when she investigated with the Court. See
Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, p. 4, ,I 25; Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 3,

,I 8. Thus, there is a dispute of material fact as to the timing of Metlife's knowledge of
Holldand's lawsuit. Even if that dispute of fact were resolved in favor of Hollands,
Hc$arres1face a daunting task trying to prove Hollands prevailed within t~_p,.~artmg4~of709

I.C. § 41-1839 and Parsons where: 1) there was no initial refusal by MetLife to pay,
and 2) where MetLife was not served with a Summons and Complaint in this matter at
the time their offer was tendered, and arguably had no knowledge at all of Hollands'
lawsuit at the time their offer was tendered. Because there is a dispute of fact as to
knowledge, and the facts surrounding the reasonableness of the initial refusal to pay
the claim, determination of prevailing party cannot be decided at this time.
2. Did Hollands' Counsel Mihara Grant an Extension Which Resulted
in Settlement Being Timely?
MetLife points out their December 7, 2009, settlement offer for the policy limits
on Hollands' initial claim on Benjamin's policy was not accepted by Hollands as their
counsel Mihara· informed adjuster Davis that additional claims would be made against
two policies owned by Gregory and Kathleeen Holland. Defendants' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. In her Affidavit, Davis
states she informed Holland's counsel Mihara she would be going on a three-week
vacation and would not return until January 6, 2010, at which time the two new claims
would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2, ,I 3. Davis states this delay was
acceptable to Hollands, but that she did not send out a letter confirming her
conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife
on January 8, 2010, and she had contact with Holland's counsel regularly from
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss theories coverage on the
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRD 408440 and 408370. Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17.
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock running on
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement timely. Id.
Hollands reply they provided proof of loss on November 10, 2009. Plaintiffs'
38157-2010
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Reply to Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 7. Hollands
also state that the cumulative time between November 10, 2009, to December 7, 2009,
added to the period from January 7, 2010, to January 26, 2010, amounts to well over
the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justly
due. Id., p. 9. Finally, Hollands argue MetLife had knowledge of the lawsuit having
been filed at the time of settlement because they were told on January 29, 2010, that
notice had been published in the Coeur d'Alene Press. Id.
This will be discussed more fully in the analysis of Metlife's Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement, but there are flaws in Hollands' motion for attorney fees and
Hollands' argument thatthe settlement was untimely. First, there are-separate offers
made at separate times on separate policies. As mentioned above, MetLife was
prepared to pay policy limits in Claim No. FRD 373130, the initial claim, but Hollands'
counsel Mihara was seeking to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen
Holland's policies and would not consider the initial matter concluded. Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such,
there was no acceptance of the tender on or about December 7, 2009. Also, to the
extent there was a tender as to Claim No. FRD 373130, subsequent to the December
7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims under the two polices held by Gregory and
Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370,
and those claims were clearly not contemplated within the initial $50,000 offer. Again,
in her Affidavit, Davis states she informed Mihara she would be going on a three-week
vacation and would not return until January 6, 2010, at which time the two new claims
would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2,

,r 3.

Davis states this delay was

acceptable to Hollands, but that she did not send out a letter confirming her
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conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife
on January 8, 2010, and Paukert had contact with Holland's counsel regularly from
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss coverage theories on the
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRD 408440 and 408370. Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17.
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock running on
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement timely. Id. Second,
counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative argument that these
time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on separate policies
shoutd be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue-the-cumulative time between November
10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, added to the period from January 7, 2010, to January
26, 2010, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was
required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court can find no such case law to
support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these are separate offers made at
separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no factual basis to aggregate
these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf of MetLife found the
coverage theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and if Mihara on
behalf of Hollands accepted that higher amount based on the coverage theory that
Metlife's attorney developed, how can Hollands prove there was an unreasonable
refusal to pay Hollands' claim under I.C. § 41-1839? Suffice it to say that regarding
Hollands' motion for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839, that motion must be denied at
this time. The question remains, following an analysis of Metlife's Motion to Support
Settlement Agreement, whether there will be a "later time" for Hollands.
Another issue for this Court is whether the proof of loss submitted by Hollands
pfl!>Vitlwticfv1etlife with sufficient information tc;> allow it to investigate and~fite011ft<Jei it-s:i of 109

liability. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 130
P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). This issue also precludes this Court from awarding Hollands
attorney fees at this time. The November 10, 2009, notice was met with an offer on
December 7, 2009. This falls within the time limits of the statute. On December 8,
2009, MetLife was informed that additional alternative claims were being made on two
other polices, those of Gregory and Kathleen Holland. Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Determine Attorney's Fee, p. 2. Thereafter, Hollands granted a determination
extension until January 22, 2010. Id., p. 3. A material question of fact remains for this
Court as to whether in light of the research and theories discussed by Holland's counsel
_Mihara, and Metlife's_co_uns_eJ Paukert, including are_questbyMetlife for aJegibJe copy
of a motorcycle title on January 27, 2010, even after the January 22, 2010, deadline
imposed by Hollands, MetLife had sufficient information to investigate and determine its
liability. Because of remaining disputed facts in this regard, this Court cannot properly
find a date certain on which proof of loss submitted by Hollands was sufficient to start
the clock on the 30 day timeline. Arguably, a question of fact also remains regarding
Metlife's knowledge of when the lawsuit was filed, although it is unclear why a direct
question in that regard was never posed to Hollands' counsel. In any event, disputes of
fact remain precluding the Court from granting Hollands' motion for attorney fees at this
stage.

3. Are Hollands Estopped from Bringing the Fees Claim?
MetLife argues Hollands initially took the position that they did not want the
policy limits under the initial claim filed upon which a determination had been reached
as early as December 7, 2009, but subsequently, Hollands' counsel Mihara informed
Davis that Hollands would make additional claims against the two additional policies
he~ 1~¥2'J1~gory and Kathleen Holland, Hollands then granted an extension for ~ge 447 ot?o 9
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coverage determination on those additional policies, and Hollands actively participated
with MetLife in finding coverage for the additional claims up until February 2, 2010.
Hollands thereafter took the position that MetLife failed to pay amounts justly due within
30 days. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to
I.C. § 41-1839, p. 19. MetLife states it relied on the representations that additional time
would be given to find coverage for the additional claims made on December 8, 2009,
invested time and effort to find additional coverage under alternative theories, and
would suffer if Hollands are permitted to maintain their position that the 30-day
attorney's fee provision in I.C. § 41-1839 is applicable here. Id., pp. 19-20.
Hollandsreply-the reasonssetforthin-their respons~to MetUfe's.Metion to
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees addresses the estoppel argument. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 9-10. In that brief,
Hollands argue in part MetLife should be estopped from now arguing the settlement
precludes their recovery of attorney's fees where they previously had agreed to settle all
claims but for the claim for attorney's fees. Plaintiffs' Response to Met Life's Motion to
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees, p. 3.
Both parties in essence (albeit regarding different issues) argue the other should
be estopped from taking a position inconsistent with one previously taken in the same
matter. Here, there is no evidence before the Court that Hollands ever claimed no
lawsuit would be filed or that no attorney's fees would be sought. In fact, the notice
Davis received from MetLife demanding a coverage decision on the alternate claims by
January 8, 2010, indicated Hollands believed the 30-day clock was not only running, but
w~1@b~t to expire. Equitable estoppel, as discussed by MetLife, requires:
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that
the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the
party asseIiing estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to
his or her prejudice.
Willigv. State, Dep'tofHealth & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969,971

(1995). Quasi-estoppel, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth elements
and applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right
inconsistent with a prior position. Id. Here, it is difficult to see at this juncture what
false representation or concealment of a material fact (before the suit was filed on
January 26, 2010, and not directly disclosed until February 2, 2010) was made which
caused MetLife to rely on statements or concealments by Hollands to its prejudice.
Similarly, MetLife never purported to be unapposed to Hollands' claim for attorney fees.
4. Are Hollands Requested Fees Reasonable?
Hollands requested fees of $60,000 or 30% of the amount settled for are
unreasonable per MetLife. Defendants' Respc;mse to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 21-22. MetLife makes this argument on the basis of
Hollands' counsel having originally taken the case pro bono but having entered into a
contingency fee agreement with Hollands thereafter (it is unknown when the
contingency fee agreement was entered into as the agreement itself is undated [Exhibit
2, Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment],
and the affidavit of Mihara itself does not provide such date [Id., p. 2,

,r 4]);

Hollands

having not disclosed their filing of the suit during conversation on January 27, 201 0; and
the settlement not having been reached because of the lawsuit, as MetLife had no
knowledge of the suit at the time it was settled. Id., pp. 21-22. As such, MetLife argues
fees, if awarded at all, should be limited to the time during which Hollands' counsel was
38157-2010
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not acting pro bono. Id. p. 23. Hollands reply MetLife has set forth no support for the
contention that their counsel's having initially appeared pro bono should result in a
downward departure from the sought amount of fees. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 1012.
Hollands also note the purported tender on December 7, 2009 was not in writing and
therefore does not amount to actual production or tender. Id., citing I.C. § 9-1501.
Hollands' argument is well-taken. Parsons v. Ml.{tual of Enumclaw involves the
Supreme Court discussing this issue. There, the Supreme Court upheld an award of a
contingency fee under I.C. § 41-1839, reasoning that so long as a court clearly
recognized the matter of fees as a matter of-Eliseretion anEl actedwithin that discretion,
the Court would not be overturned. 142 Idaho 743, 748, 152 P.3d 614, 619. The
factors for the Court to determine the reasonableness of the award of fees sought by
Hollands can be found in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3), and the arguments set forth by MetLife find
no support in Idaho statutes, rules, or case law.
In sum, although MetLife's arguments regarding estoppel and the
unreasonableness of fees fa.ii at this juncture, whether Hollands have prevailed and
when the 30-day time limit began to run also remain material questions of fact in
dispute. Therefore, this Court cannot exercise its discretion and grant Hollands' motion
for fees at this time.

B. Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Hollands moved for summary judgment on the question of their entitlement to
fees in this matter on May 17, 2010. The matter was not noticed up for hearing until
May 21, 2010, but MetLife only objected to the motion to shorten time and the Court's
hearing the motion for summary judgment to the extent the Court would not have the
tirmeS".02mear all the motions during the June 2, 2010, hearing time set aside for ~oanog

matters. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time, p. 2.
Hollands argues three things: (1) Metlife's failure to deny the allegations in the
Complaint amount to an admission and Hollands are therefore entitled to summary
judgment on all issues; (2) MetLife has failed to present any support for its equitable
estoppel argument in opposition to the claim for fees; and (3) Hollands' claim for fees is
reasonable and proper as Paukert's and Davis' affidavits recite the amount of time and
effort which went into settling this matter. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-11. In response, MetLife argues the parties' stipulated
motion and Order to Dismiss precludes its having to deny claims made by Hollands in
their-Complaint. Memorandum ir'.l Opposition to Rlaintiffs' Motion for-Summary ..
Judgment, p. 6. MetLife then reiterates the arguments it has previously made regarding
estoppel of Hollands' claim for fees and the unreasonableness of fees claimed. Id., pp.
8-12.
The estoppel argument is discussed supra. In sum, at the time MetLife arguably
relied upon any statements of Hollands' in deciding to further research coverage in this
matter, i.e. between the time it was notified of the additional claims on December 8,
2009, and the time Davis went on vacation, and again from the time Davis returned on
January 6, 2010, until the expiration of the extension (until January 22, 2010) granted
by Hollands, there were no statements made by Hollands upon which MetLife could
reasonably rely that no lawsuit would be forthcoming. See supra. Similarly, Metlife's
reasonableness of fees argument must likely also fail because the question of fees is
one committed to the discretion of the Court with the consideration of the factors in
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) mandatory upon the Court. The statement by MetLife that the
settlement had nothing to do with the lawsuit raises a question of material fact with
reQa~t~!Whether Hollands are the "prevailing" party within the meaning of thaUe;rlns»-bf?o9
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I.C. § 41-1839, but has nothing to do with the award, if any, of fees by this Court.
Likewise, Hollands' counsel holding himself out as pro bono and later entering into a
contingency agreement is merely one of several factors tor the Court to consider.
Remaining is Hollands' argument that all claims in the Complaint are deemed
admitted for failure by MetLife to deny them. Indeed, all averments in a complaint not
denied are deemed admitted. Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 48, 577 P.2d 24, 27
(1978), quoting I.R.C.P. 8 (d). But here, as argued by MetLife, the Court's February 3,
2010, Order dismissed all claims with prejudice except for the attorney's fee claim.
Defendants' Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7.
Therefore, MetLife argues, only a responsive pleading -to the pend1ng motion for
attorney's fees was required or, alternatively, MetLife asks for direction from this Court
with respect to which portions of a previously dismissed Complaint Defendants would
be expected to answer. Id., pp. 7-8.
This Court dismissed all claims "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees
filed on February 9, 2010, ... with prejudice and without costs to either party." Joint
Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the Pending Motion for
Attorney Fees, pp. 2-3. It follows that only paragraph 34 on page 7 of the Complaint
remained at issue and, because the February 9, 2010, motion only addressed fees
under !.C. § 41-1839, this statute would be the only possible basis for recovery by
Hollands. Hollands' argument that Metlife's failure to deny paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16,
17 and 18 of the Complaint operates as admissions is without merit. The plain
language of this Court's Order excepts only "Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney fees filed on
February 9, 2010"; therefore, no averments in the Complaint, even if deemed true,
remain before the Court. In effect, all of the Complaint was dismissed with prejudice on
Fe~McffiYo3, 2010, and Hollands' are not entitled to judgment as a matter of lawFQfie~tfut109
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issue.
C. MetLife's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement.
In response to the motion for attorney's fees filed by Hollands, MetLife filed a
motion to compel Holland's performance under the settlement and to dismiss their claim
for attorney's fees. MetLife argues the February 3, 2010, settlement between counsel
for Hollands and the coverage evaluator, Paukert, contemplated Hollands would sign a
"full release" of "all claims" in consideration of Metlife's offer of $200,000 and, as such,
their February 9, 2010, request for attorney's fees should be dismissed. Memorandum
of Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel Performance Under the
Settlement and Ojsmiss_PlaJntiffs' Motjoo focAttoroey's Fe_e_s,_p. 7. Metlife_submitted
the affidavits of Paukert and Davis in support of its motion. In her affidavit, Paukert
states she and counsel for Hollands discussed on several occasions his appearing for
them pro bono. Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, p. 2,

1l 4.

On or about February 3, 2010, upon receiving Mr. Mihara's confirmation
that his clients had accepted Metlife's offer, I called Mr. Mihara to confirm
that his clients would provide MetLife with a full release. He said that they
would, but that he was now making a claim for attorney's fees. I reminded
Mr. Mihara that he had agreed that his clients would provide a full release.
He said that they would; however, he was personally going to sue MetLife
for attorney's fees. I believe that it was during this conversation that Mr.
Mihara, for the first time, told me that he had filed a lawsuit against
MetLife on January 26, 2010. It may have been on February 2, 2010. It
was absolutely after a settlement had been reached.
Id., p. 5,

1J 12.

Hollands reply to the motion to compel performance under the settlement
essentially makes four arguments: (1) that MetLife cites no rule basis or other authority
for its motion; (2) that MetLife should be judicially estopped from stipulating to dismiss
all claims but the fees issue and thereafter claim the settlement would preclude the
Court form awarding statutory attorney's fees; (3) that the agreement reached on
38157-2010
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February 3, 2010, by email, was not an enforceable contract as material terms were left
to be negotiated, namely the full release itself; and (4) that Hollands did not have the
authority to waive their counsel's entitlement to attorney's fees because I.C. § 41-1839
establishes a statutory duty for an insurer to pay attorney's fees and this duty cannot be
waived or exempted. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees,
pp. 2-9.
In response to Hollands' motion for fees, MetLife argues the settlement
agreement must be enforced. Although Metlife's motion is captioned a motion to
compel, it is actually a motionJo enforce.settlement,j.e .. an action.in .contracL A .
settlement agreement is a new contract settling an old dispute. Wilson v. Bogert, 81
Idaho 535, 347 P.2d 341 (1959). The settlement of a legal dispute constitutes an
executory accord. Hershey v. Simpson, 111 Idaho 491, 725 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1986).
Such an agreement supersedes all prior claims and defenses. However, if one party
breaches the agreement, the other party has the option of enforcing the executory
accord or rescinding it and proceeding with the original cause of action. Id. The
interpretation of a settlement agreement is an issue of law. Mays v. United States
Postal Service, 995 F.2d 1056 (Fed.Cir.1993). To the extent the settlement agreement

is clearly stated and understood by the parties, it is enforced according to its terms. If
any ambiguity is found, the court's role is to implement the intent of the parties at the
time the agreement was made. King v. Department of Navy, 130 F.3d 1031
(Fed.Cir.1997). For a contract to exist, there must be a distinct and common
understanding between the parties. Hoffman v. S. V. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d
218 (1981).
38157-2010
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Here, the agreement was reached on or about February 3, 2010. However, the
parties disagree as to whether attorney fees were covered by that agreement. Both
Davis and Paukert state in their affidavits they had no knowledge a suit had been filed
by Hollands until February 8, 2010. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 4, ,T 10; Affidavit of
Kathleen Paukert, p. 5, ,T 13. Thus, MetLife argues attorney fees were not
contemplated in the February 3, 2010, agreement. While t~1is Court appreciates
Metlife's argument that settling the matter and requiring a full release contemplated no
claim by Hollands for attorney fees (Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Motion Jar Attorney_ Fees, pp. 2-3),Jhat ~rgymenth~s be.E3n yngerrninecl by
Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007). In Straub, the parties stipulated to

dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice, but that stipulation was silent on the issue of attorney
fees. This Court decided that failing to include the attorney fee issue in the stipulation
indicated the parties intended to bear their own attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme
Court disagreed, and held Smith did not waive his right to argue costs and fees when
the stipulation was silent on the issue. 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758.
"Furthermore, we have said costs and attorney fees are collateral issues which do not
go to the merits of an action and that a district court retains jurisdiction to make such an
award after a suit has been terminated." Id., citing Inland Group of Cos., Inc. v.
Obendorff, 131 ldaho"473, 475, 959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998).

While MetLife through its agents believed the matter had been settled such that
a full release regarding all claims would bring an end to the matter, and that Hollands
had not filed suit and were represented pro bona, Hollands believed they were settling a
matter after suit had been filed and after their counsel had entered into a contingency
fe~ERW..~8,r;rent with them, so that an entitlement for attorney's fees under I.C. § 'fla'1ie 455 of 709
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1839 existed. This issue of fact precludes Hollands' motion for summary judgment, see
infra. However, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement involves a new contract

settling an old dispute. Wilson, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341, 345 (1959). In
Wilson, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote:

Where the parties to a legal controversy, in good faith enter into a contract
compromising and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is
binding upon the parties, and, in the absence of fraud, duress or undue
influence, is enforceable either at law or in equity according to the nature
of the case. Ticknor v. McGinnis, 33 Idaho 308, 193 P. 850; Nelson v.
Krigbaum, 38 Idaho 716, 226 P. 169; Moran v. Copeman, 55 Idaho 785,
47 P.2d 920; Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 124 P.2d 826; 11 Am.Jur.,
Compromise and Settlement, § 35, p. 283. Such a contract stands on the
same footing as any other contract and is governed by the same rules and
principles as are applicable to contracts generally. 11 Am.Jur.,
Cempr-emise aAd-$etllement-, § 35; p,--283.-Ar-i--agreement-Gf c0mpm~se ..
and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims which the
parties intended to settle thereby. Moran v. Copeman, supra; Shriver v.
Kuchel, 113 Cal.App.2d 421, 248 P.2d 35; 15 C.J.S. Compromise and
Settlement§ 24, p. 739. Such prior claims are thereby superseded and
extinguished. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing
controversy. The existence of a valid agreement of compromise and
settlement is a complete defense to an action based upon the original
claim. Bruce v. Oberbi/lig, 46 Idaho 387, 268 P. 35; Shriver v. Kuchel,
supra; Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 49 Cal.2d 706,
321 P.2d 460; 11 Am.Jur., Compromise and Settlement, § 36, p. 284.
In an action brought to enforce an agreement of compromise and
settlement, made in good faith, the court will not inquire into the merits or
validity of the original claim. Heath v. Potlatch Lumber Co., 18 Idaho 42,
108 P. 343, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 707; Nelson v. Krigbaum, supra.
Id. The Court discounts Hollands' argument that no rule basis or other authority exists

pursuant to which MetLife can seek enforcement of the settlement agreement. See
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance
Under Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 6, citing Young
Elec. Sign Co. v. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 808, 25 P .3d 117 (2001 ). At issue is whether

the agreement reached by the parties' emails constitutes a meeting of the minds
38157-2010
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sufficient to support a contract. An enforceable contract requires "distinct
understanding common to both parties." Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 189,
628 P.2d 218, 220 (1981). Acceptance must be unequivocal and identical to the offer
and the parties' minds must meet as to all terms before a contract is formed. Turner v.
Mendenhall, 95 Idaho 426, 429, 510 P.2d 490, 493 (1973). Proof of a meeting of the
minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of the agreement and
the assent of both parties. Thomas

v. Schmelzer, 118 l~aho 353, 356, 796 P.2d 1026,

1029 (Ct.App. 1990).
A settlement agreement by the parties, purportedly evidenced by the email from
Paukert to Hollands' counsel on f'ebruai:y 2, 201-0,-0fferiRQ-$20O,000-ans-a-full-release,
and from Holland's counsel to Paukert on February 3, 2010, accepting the offer and
stating Hollands "will sign a full release of their claims against MetLife", appears to
constitute a meeting of the minds. See Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, pp. 4-5, ,I ,I 1011. However, "[t]he question of whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to
form an express agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact." Corder v. Idaho
Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353,359,986 P.2d 1019, 1025 (Ct.App. 1999) citing Bischoff

v. Quang-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826,828,748 P.2d 410,412 (Ct.App. 1987).
At issue here is whether the full release contemplated in the emails would include the
claim for attorney's fees because on the one hand MetLife claimed to have had no
knowledge of the suit having been filed or of Holland's counsel incurring any fees as
they believed him to be appearing pro bono, and on the other hand, Hollands' had filed
suit and now claim they fully intended to seek attorney's fees at the time the settlement
was accepted by them. Hollands argue the agreement reached is not an enforceable
contract because material terms were not negotiated; the "material terms" which
38157-2010
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Hollands identify are limited to release at issue in this case. Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 6. "It is also undisputed that subsequent to the
February 3, 2010, emails, the parties' attorneys negotiated the specific terms of the
release in this case." Id., citing Affidavit of Kinzo Mihara. In order to grant Metlife's
motion to compel on this theory, the Court would require additional evidence on the
question of a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a contract or settlement in this
matter, both on the question of what a "full release" constituted in general and on the
question of whether MetLife and Hollands' counsel specifically contemplated the
settlement. to settle all claims iricluding any-fees at-the time-the-settlement agreement
was entered into. Straub certainly indicates there is no presumption that attorney fees
are not included if the agreement is silent on the issue.
Thus, this Court cannot grant Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under
Settlement upon Metlife's argument that fees were not contemplated in the settlement
agreement, under either a contract interpretation analysis or a waiver analysis.
Hollands also make the argument that MetLife should be estopped from taking
the position that the settlement agreement, entered into voluntarily and expressly
excluding the claim for fees from settlement, should now be viewed by the Court as a
basis for denying the claim for fees because it settled all pending claims. Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 3. What is confusing here is Hollands'
use of "settlement document." Is it the "Joint Motion to Dismiss All Claims Except for
the Pending Motion for Attorney's Fees" to which Hollands refer, or is it the email
exchange which MetLife argues amounts to a settlement of all claims?
3s1s1-A1rodiscussed supra, equitable estoppel requires:
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that
the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the
party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to
his or her prejudice.
Willig

v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971

(1995). And, quasi-estoppel, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth
elements and applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right
inconsistent with a prior position. Id. Because the issue of fees remained at the time
the Order granting the joint motion to dismiss all claims was entered, there was no false
representation or concealment of material fact made by MetLife. Indeed, it was
Hollands who arguably had concealed the fact that a lawsuit was filed and attorney's
fees would be sought at the time the settlement for $200,000 and a full release was
entered into by the parties.
As mentioned above (pages 12-15 of this decision), there are questions of fact
as to whether there was an extension of time within which MetLife could respond.
Ultimately, material questions of fact also remain as to whether the agreement reached
through the February 3, 2010, email was an enforceable contract. And, although
Hollands' estoppel argument fails, a material question in dispute remains as to whether
the settlement agreement constituted a meeting of the minds. As such, the Hollands'
having "waived" their counsel's right to fees via the release turns on whether the
settlement agreement giving rise to the release was a valid contract between the
parties. See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under
the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, pp. 7-8.
Here, questions of material fact remain surrounding the formation of the
settlement agreement. Thus, contrary to Metlife's arguments, the existence of the
38157-2010
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purported settlement agreement alone does not provide a basis for granting Metlife's
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement Agreement.
However, there is a basis upon which MetLife's Motion to Compel Performance
Under the Settlement Agreement must be granted. In this area, the above issues of
disputed fact are not relevant
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 (and sanctions under I.C. § 12-123) provides the
exclusive basis for recovery of attorney's fees in actions between insureds and insurers
involving disputes arising under insurance policies. I.C. § 41-1839(4). An insurer who
fails to pay an amount justly due under a policy for thirty days after proof of loss has
been furnished shall-be-liable for reascmableattorney's-feeS-as adjudged-by the-Court
in any action thereafter brought against the insurer for recovery under the terms of the
policy. LC.§ 41-1839(1). The statute requires: (1) the insured to provide proof of loss
as required by the insurance policy and (2) the insurer must fail to pay th~ amount justly
due within thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss. Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw
Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18 (2007). "As defined by this

Court [the Supreme Court of Idaho], a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when an
insured provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. ofldaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006); citing Brinkman v.
AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988).

This Court is simply unable to find that Hollands have met their burden under
Greenough and Brinkman, because Hollands "submitted proof of loss" but not a proof

of loss which was "sufficient... to provide the insurer with enough information to allow
the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." /d., Keep
38157-2010
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in mind that it was MetLife and its directive to its attorney Paukert to be creative in trying
to find additional coverage for Hollands. The only theories for additional coverage
expounded by Hollands' counsel Mihara were determined by MetLife to be without
merit. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. §
41-1839; Affidavit of Paukert,

,r 9.

As discussed above in analyzing Hollands' motion for attorney fees, there are
additional reasons that, in analyzing Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement,
show MetLife was not provided with "a reasonable opportunity to investigate and
determine its liability", given the January 22, 2010, deadline that Mihara agreed to and
-l;>eyond wl"lich-he-was-Unwilling-to-extend•. -As-set- forth-at;,ove,-on January.8,-201-0rthe--adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could not decide whether or not
coverage was applicable under the policy and that a coverage opinion would be sought

from an independent attorney. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine
Attorney's Fees, p. 3. On January 13, 2010, the independent attorney, Kathleen
Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and requested an extension to come to a coverage
decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an extension until January 22, 2010. Id. On
January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara and requested another extension, which
Mihara denied. On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf
of Hollands. A few days later, on February 2, 2010, Paukert advised Mihara that, based
on her research, there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by
Mihara, but there was possible coverage on the motorcycle policy under a theory
Mihara had not advanced. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839; Affidavit of Paukert,

,r 9.

Paukert advised Mihara that

MetLife was offing to pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had
re§@l~1{rom the negligent party), provided Hollands signed a full release. Id. Page461
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION F'OR ~I IMM4RV .II 1nr.Ml=tJT

of709

Obviously, MetLife on January 22, 2010, felt Mihara's theories were not
plausible, but MetLife was still working on coming up with its own theories to provide
additional coverage. Ten days later, those theories, developed only by MetLife and not
by Mihara, resulted in additional coverage which in turn resulted in settlement on
February 2, 2010. Hollands have provided no facts which would counter such findings.
In light of such, Hollands, through Mihara, did not provide MetLife with "a reasonable
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability".
The following was discussed above at pages 13-14, but is now analyzed in more
detail. First, this started out as somewhat of a moving target for Hollands, and thus,
MetLife. l::t:1is-impacted Metlife'.s "reasonable opportunity_ to. investigate_and_determjne
its liability". As mentioned above, there were separate offers made at separate times
on separate policies. MetLife was prepared to pay policy limits in Claim No. FRO
373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was seeking to make
additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Holland's policies and would not consider
the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, there was no tender on or about December
7, 2009. Also, to the extent there was a tender as to Claim No. FRO 373130,
subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims under the two
polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers
FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not contemplated within the
initial $50,000 offer. In her Affidavit, Davis states she informed Holland's counsel
Mihara she would be going on a three-week vacation and would not return until January
6, 2010, at which time the two new claims would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice
Davis, p. 2, ,I 3. Davis states this delay was acceptable to Hollands, but that she did
negt~B§ii&>ut a letter confirming her conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id.
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Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 2010, and she had contact
with Holland's counsel regularly from January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to
discuss theories coverage on the additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO
408440 and 408370. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees
Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17. MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the
30-day clock running on January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement
timely. Id. Second, counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative
argument that these time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on
separate policies should be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue the cumulative time
between November1-0, 2Q09,to-Qesemoer 7-, 2009,-acided to theperiGCJ..fr..omJanuary 7, 2010, to January 26, 2010, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of
loss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court
can find no such case law to support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these
are separate offers made at separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no
factual basis to aggregate these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf
of MetLife, found the theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and
Mihara on behalf of Hollands accepts that higher amounts based on the theory
Metlife's attorney created, how can Hollands' claim at this time that MetLife was
provided "a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability"?
For these reasons alone, this Court finds Hollands have failed to meet their
burden under Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593,
130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006) and Brinkman v. AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766
P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988), because Hollands failed to prove they submitted proof of
loss with sufficient information to allow the MetLife a reasonable opportunity to
38157-2010
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investigate and determine its liability, when it was MetLife that came up with the
creative theory for additional coverage.
Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement must be granted, and
Hollands are not entitled to attorney fees.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be
denied. Additionally, questions of material fact remain ~egarding the motion for
attorney's fees and the motion to compel performance under the settlement.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Hollands' Motion to Shorten Time to hear Hollands'
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Attorney Fees is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under the
Settlement Agreement and to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. The Settlement Agreement is enforced. As a result of the granting of
Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement Agreement and to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Hollands are not entitled to attorney
fees under I.C. § 41-1839.
th

Entered this 20 day of July, 2010.
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424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308
P. 0. Box 969
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Counsel for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
) Case No. CV 10-0677
)
) AFFIDAVIT OF KINZO H.
Plaintiffs,
) MIHARA IN SUPPORT OF
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
) RECONSIDERATION
vs.
)
)
ME1ROPOLITAN PROPERTY and
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and )
)
METLIFE AUTO & HOME,
)
Defendants.
)
)
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND,
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and
KATHLEEN HOLLAND,

State ofldaho
County of Kootenai

)
) ss.
)

COMES NOW, Kinzo H. Mihara, after being duly sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oaths, swears and declares as follows:
1)

My name is Kinzo H. Mihara. I am an attorney.duly authorized to practice law in
the state ofldaho. I an1 competent to testify to matters herein.

2)

I represent Plaintiffs' herein.

A~lvfr18F KJNZO B.
MIHARA IN SUPPORT OF
n,
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3)

On or about January 21, 2010, Daneice Davis sent me a certified copy of the
policy of insurance in effect between MetLife and Benjamin C. Holland, policy
no. MPL 6010-000 (under claim no. FRD 373] 3). Attached hereto as Exhibit .. 1"
is a true, accurate, and correct copy of policy MPL 6010-000.

4)

Attached hereto as Exhibit "2" are true, accurate, and correct copies of the
declaration pages of all three policies at issue between Plaintiffs and Defendants
prior to February 3,2010. The bottom front of all three declarations pages purport
to show form MPL 6010-000 to be the controlling insurance form for the
respective declarations pages.

5)

Attached hereto as Exhibit "3" is a true, accurate, and correct copy of a letter with
attachment that MetLife sent to me on or about December 29, 2009 that
transmitted a check for $1,000 for med-pay coverage and funeral benefit to the
Estate of Benjamin Holland.

6)

Attached hereto as Exhibit "4" is a t;-ue, accurate, and correct copy of documents
bates 00084-00088; 00126-00129; 00361-00362 I received from MetLife during
the discovery process in the above encaptioned lawsuit. I did not have these
documents in my possession at or prior to filing the lawsuit in this matter.
Defendants' agents did not apprise me to the existence of these documents at or
prior to filing the lawsuit in this matter.

7)

On or about November 8, 2009, I placed a telephone call to Joe Foredyce in an
attempt to give proof of loss of Plaintiffs' claims. I spoke to Mr. Foredyce. I was
instructed to call the claim in to MetLife's toll-free telephone number. I called
MetLife's toll-free telephone number. I spoke with an agent of MetLife who I

A~Xv1W
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gave the information required by the insurance contracts between Plaintiffs and
Defendants. I also gave the agent of MetLife all the additional information that he
requested from me at that time. I was told that MetLife would be assigning an
adjustor to the matter. Soon thereafter I was contacted by Daneice Davis.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
Respectfully submitted this

~

l__ day of August, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2,:.
day of August, 2010, I caused a true,
accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via
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THE COMPANY NAMED IN THE DECLARATIONS
Administrative Offices: Warwick. Rhode Island

AUTOINSUAANCEPOL~Y
INSURANCE AGREEMENT AND DECLARATIONS
This insurance policy is a legal contract between you (the po6cyholder) and us (the Company named in
the Declarations). I! insures you and your automobile for the various kinds of insurance you have
selected, as shown in the Declarations. The Declarations are an important part of this policy. By accepting
this policy, you agree that lhe statements contained in the Declarations and in any application are your
true and accurate representations. This policy is issued and renewed in reliance upon the truth of those
representations. This policy contains all agreements between you and us and any of our sales
representatives relating to lhis insurance. You must pay the required premium.
The exact terms and conditions are explained in the following pages.
GENERAL DEFINITIONS

The following words and phrases appear in bold-face type repeatedly throughout this policy. They have a
· special meaning and are to be given that meaning whenever used in connection with this policy and any
endorsement which is part of this policy:
·AUTOMOBILE" means a private passenger automobile, pick-up truck, panel truck or van, designed for
use mainly on public roads.
·aODIL Y INJURY· means any bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by any person.

"LOSS" means direct and accidental loss or damage.

·MOTOR VEHICLE" means a land motor vehicle designed for use mainty on public roads other than:

1. a farm type tractor or other farm equipment designed ror use principally off public roads, while not upon
public roads;
2. a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads;
3. a vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; or
4. a vehicle used as a dwelling or place or business.
"OCCUPYING· and "OCCUPIED· mean being in or

vehicle.

·

upon, entering into, or alighting from a motor
·

·

"PROPERTY DAMAGE" means physical injury to or destruction or tangible property, including the 'loss of
use of such property.

"RELATIVE" means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption (including a ward or foster
child) and who resides in your household.
"TRAILER' means a trailer designed for use with an automoblie which is not used as an office, store,
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display, or passenger trailer. A farm wagon or farm implement is a trailer when used with an automobile.

"WE",

-us·, "OUR" and "COMPANY" mean the company named in the Declarations.

-YOU" and "YOUR" mean the person(s) named in the Declarations of this policy as named insured and the
spouse of such person or persons if a resident of the same household.

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS FOR THIS COVERAGE
The following definitions apply to this coverage only:

"COVERED AUTOMOBILE'" means:
1. an automoblle owned by you or hired under a written contract for one year or more, which is
described in the Declarations, and for which a specific premium is charged.
2. an automobile newly acquired by you, if:
a. it replaces a vehicle described in the Declarations; or
b. it is an additional automoblle, but only if:

i. we insure all other automoblles owned by you on the date of acquisition;
ii. you notify us within 30 days of acquisition or your election to make this and no other policy
issued by us applicable to the automobile; and
iii. you pay any additional premium required by us.

3.

a substitute automobile.

"INSURED" means:
1. with respect to a covered automobile;

a. you;
b. any relative; or
c. any other person using it within the scope of your permission.
2. with respect to a non-owned automobile, you or any relative.
The operation or use or such vehicle must have been with the permission of, or reasonably believed to
have been with the pei-mission of, the owner. The operation or use must also have been within the
scope of the permission given.
3. any other person or organization if liable due to the acts or omissions of any person described in-1. or 2.
above. This provision does not apply if the vehicle is a non-owned automobile owned or hired by the
person or organization.
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"NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE" means:
1. an automoblle which is not owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to you or any
resident in your household.

EXCEPTION: An automoblle owned by, lumished to, or made available for regular use to any resident
in your household, is considered a non-owned automobile when used by you.

2. a commercially rented automobile used by you or a relative on a temporary basis.
·suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE· means a motor vehicle not owned by you or any resident or lhe same
household and which is used with the owner's permission to replace for a shon time a covered
automobile. The covered automobile has to be out of use for senlicing or repair or because of
breakdown, loss or destruction.
COVERAGE PROVIDED
We will pay damages for bodily Injury and property damage to others for which the law holds an
tnsurJtd~respqosible because..of an accident which results from the ownership, maintenance or use of a
covered automobile, a non-owned automobile or a trailer while being used with a covered
automobile or non-owned automobile. We will defend the lnsmed, et our expense wilh attorneys or
our choice, against any suit or claim seeking these damages. We may investigate, negotiate or settle any
such suit or claim.
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS WE WILL PROVIDE
In addition lo the limits of liability, we will pay the following expenses incurred in connection with any claim
or suit to which the policy applies:
1. Premiums on the following bonds:

a. Appeal bonds in any suit we defend.
b. Bonds to release attachments in any suit we defend. The total amount of the- bonds must not
exceed our limit of liability.

c.

Up lo $250 ror any bail bond needed because of an accident or traffic violations arising out or the
ownership, maintenance or use of a covered automobile.

We have no duty to furnish or apply for any bonds.
2. Court costs levied against the Insured.
3. Post-judgment interest on all damages following a judgment until we pay, offer or deposit in court lhe
amount due up to our limit or liabifity.

4. Expenses incurred by the Insured ror first aid to others at the time of a motor vehicle accident.
5. Up to $200 per day for lost wages, but not ror loss or other income, if we ask the Insured to attend a
hearing or trial.

6. Other reasonable expenses incurred at our request.
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COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS
We do not cover:

A. bodily Injury to any employee of an Insured arising out of his or her employment, except domestic
employees who are not co11ered or required to be covered tmder any workers compensation law.
B. bodily Injury to a fellow employee while
trailer in lhe business of his employers.

on the job and arising from the use

of a motor vehicle or

EXCEPTION: You are covered in this situation.
C. bodily Injury or property damage covered under an atomic or nuclear energy liability insurance
poficy, or that would have been covered had that policy not been terminated upon exhaustion of its limit
•
of fiability.
D. any motor vehlcJe rented to others or used to carry persons for a charge.
. EXCEETION: This exclusion.does not apply to.shared expense car pools.

E. bodily lnjw-y or property damage arising out of the business or occupation of selling, leasing,
repairing, servicing, storing, or parking vehicles or trallers.
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to the use of a covered automobile by you, a relative,
or by any other person in any such business in which you have an interest as owner or partner.
F. any non-owned automobile while used by any person in any business or occupation.
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to an automoblle or lr'aller used therewith, if driven or
occupied by you or your chauffeur or domestic servant

G. property damage caused by any insured to:
1. an automoblle that is owned by, rented to, operated by, or in the care of that Insured; or

2. any other property that is owned by, rented to, or in the care of any Insured. This exclusion does
not apply to a rented dwelling or private garage.
H. bodily Injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of an Insured.

I. bodily Injury to you or any person related 10 an Insured by blood, marriage, or adoption who resides
in the same household. This exclusion applies regardless or whether demand is made or suit is brought
against the Insured by the injured person or by a third party seeking contribution or indemnity.

J. bodily Injury or property damage awards designated as punitive, exemplary, or statutory multiple
damages.
K. any motor vehlcle while it is located inside a facility designed for racing, for the purpose of competing
in, practicing for, or preparing for, any prearranged or organized racing or speed contest.
L. a non-owned automol:>lle while used by a relative who owns, leases or has available for their re;,ular

use, a motor vehicle not described in the Declarations.
M. anv motorized vehicle which has less than four wheels.
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LIMIT OF LIABILITY

The limlt of liability shown in the Declarations for ·each person· for Bodily Injury Liability is the most we will
pay for all damages, including damages for care. loss or consortium, emotional distress, loss of services or
death, arising out of bodily Injury sustained by any one person as the result of any one accident. Subject
· · lo this frmit for •each person·, the nmil shown in the Declarations for "each acddenr for Bodily Injury
Liability is the most we will pay for all damages, including damages for care, Joss of consortium, emotional
distress, !oss of services or death, arising out of bodUy Injury sustained by two Oi mOie persons resulting
from any one accident.
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each accidenr for Property Damage Liability is the most
we will pay for all damages to all properly resulting from any one accident.
If a single limit of liability is shown in the Declarations for bodlly injury and property damage, ii is the
maximum we will pay for any one accident for all damages, including damages for care, loss of
consortium, emotional distress, loss or services or death.

1

The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all
damages l'esulring-from any one accident. -This is the-mesl we will1)ay·regardless of the number of:

1. covered persons;

2. claims made;
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarafons; or
4. vehicles involved in the accident.

A motor Yehlcle and attached trailer are considered one vehicle.
If notice or this policy is given in lieu of security or if we certify this policy as proof under any financial
responsib'ifity law, the limil of liability will be appfled lo provide separate limits for bodily Injury liability and
property damage liability to the extent required by such law. Such separate application will not increase
the total limit of our liability.
·.. CONFORMITY WITH FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS

If we certify this policy under any financial responsibility law, this Habifity coverage will comply to the exlenl
of the liability coverage and limits required by the law.
OUT OF STATE INSURANCE
If any Insured becomes subject to a financial responsibility law or the compulsory insurance law or similar
laws or another state or Canada because of !he ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered automobile
in that slate or Canada, we will interpret this policy to provide the coverage required by those laws. The
coverage provided shall be reduced lo the extent that other automobile liability insurance applies. No
person may in any event collect more than once for the same loss.
REDUCTIONS

Any amount payable lo any person under this section will be reduced by any amount that person is paid
under the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists coverage portion of this policy.
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OTHER INSURANCE

If there is other similar insurance, we will pay our fair share.
However, with respect to a non-owned automoblle or a substitute automoblle, this Insurance will be
excess over any other insurance. If there is other excess or contingent insurance, we wiD pay our fair
share.

Our fair share is the proportion that our fimit bears to the total of ali applicable limits.
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION

If applicable, see special state provisions.

AUTOMOBILE MEDICAL EXPENSE
ADDITIONAL-DEFINITIONS-FOR THIS GOVERASE

The following definitions apply to this coverage only:
·coVERED AUTOMOBILE" means:

1. an automoblle owned by you or hired under a written contract for one year or more, which is
described in the Declarations, and for which a specific premium is charged.
2. an automoblle newly acquired by you, if:
a. it replaces a vehicle described in the Declarations; or

b. it is an additional automoblle, but only if:
i.

we insure all other automobiles owned by you on the date of acquisition;

ii. you notify us within 30 days of acquisition of your election to make this and no other policy
issued by us appficable to the automobile; and
iii. you pay any additional premium required by us.

3. a substitute automoblle.
"MEDICAL EXPENSES" means usual, customary and reasonable expenses for necessary medical,
surgical, x-ray, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, funerals and dental services, including prosthetic

devices.
"NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE" mearis:
1. an automobile, while being used by you or a relative with the owner's permission, which is not
owned by, turnished to, or made available for regular use to you or any resident in your household.

EXCEPTION: An automobile owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to any resident
in your household, is considered a non-owned automobile when used by you.
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2. a commercially rented automobile used by you or a relative on a temporary basis.
•suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE9 means a motor vehicle not owned by you or any resident of the same
household and which is used with lhe owner's permission to replace for a short time a covered
automoblle. The covered automobile has to be out of use for servicing or repair or because of
breakdown, loss or deslruction.

COVERAGE PROVIDED
We will pay reasonable medical expenses inrurred by you or any relative for bodily Injury as a result
or an accident involving a motor vehicle or trailer while being used with an auto mob lie.
We will pay reasonable medical expenses incurred by any other person for bodlly Injury as a result of:
1. occupying or using a covered automobile at the lime of'the accident with your consent;
2. being struck by a covered automobile; or
3. ctccupyJng_a non-owned _automobJle If Jhe bodily lnJury results from-the operation or oceupancy of
such non-owned automobile by you or a relative.

COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS
We do not cover:
A. medical expenses incurred for services furnished more than three years after the date of accident.
B. any person injured while in a vehicle located for use as a residence or premises.
C. that portion or any medical expense for which benefits are available under any:

1. premises insurance which affords benefits for medical expenses;
2. law which provides workers compensation or disability benefits; or
3. personal injury prolection coverage of this po6cy.
D. bodJly Injury sustained while occupying:
1. a motorized vehicle having less than rour wheels; or
2. a vehicle located for use as a residence or premises.
E. a covered automobile while hired or rented to others for a charge, or any automobile which you are
driving while available for hire by the public.
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to: ·
1. bodily injury sustained as a pedestrian; or
2. shared expense car pools.
F. bodily Injury arising out of the business or occupation of selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing,
or parking vehicles or traUers.
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EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to:
1. bodily Injury sustained as a pedestrian; or

2. the use or a covered automo~lle by you, a relative, or by any other person In any business or
occupation or selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing, or parking vehicles or trailers, in which
you have an interest as owner or partner.
·

G. any non-owned automobile while used by any person in any business or occupation.
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to:
1. bodily Injury sustained as a pedestrian; or

2. an automobile or its attached trailer used by you, yout chauffeur or domestic servant.

H. medical treatment that is experimental in nature which is not accepted as effective therapy by:
1. the state medical association or board;

2. an approved medical specialty board; or

3. the American Medical Association.
I. a non-owned automobile while used by a relative who owns, leases or has available for their regular
use, a motor vehicle.
LIMIT OF LIABILITY

The limit shown in the Declarations for "each personn is the maximum we will pay for any one person as a
result or any one accident.
The limit or liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum limit or liabrnty for all
damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:

1. covered persons;

2. claims made;
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. vehicles involved in the accident.
The total amount we will pay includes funeral and burial expenses not to exceed $1000 for each person.

OTHER INSURANCE
If there is other similar insurance, we will pay our fair share. However, with res~t to a non-owned

automobile or a substitute automobDe, this insurance will be excess over any other insurance. 1r there
is other excess or contingent insurance, we will pay om fair share. This coverage shall be excess over any
personal injury protection benefits paid or payable, except for a deductible under this or any other motor
vehicle insurance policy, for boc:Slly Injury to an eligible person.
Our fair share is the proportion that our limit bears to the total of all applicable limits.
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MEDICAL EXPENSE REVIEW

Al our option, we may use various cost containment and utilization review measures to identify excessive
or inappropriate treatments and expenses. For example, we may use medical bill audits, case
management, preferred provider discounts or other such tools.
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS
ADDITIONAL D~FINITIONS FOR THESE COVERAGES
The following definitions apply 10 these coverages only:

·coVERED AUTOMOBILE" means:

1. an automobile described in the Declarations to which the Automobile Liability coverage of this policy
applies and for which a specific premium is charged.
2. an automobJle..newly acquired by you, if:
a. ii replaces a vehicle described In the Declarations; or
b. ii is an additional automobile, but only if:
i.

we insure all other automoblles owned by you on the date of acquisition;

ii. you notify us within 30 days of ·acquisition of your election lo make this and no other policy
issued by us applicable lo the automobile; and
iii. you pay any additional premium required by us.
3. a substitute automobile.

4. a motor vehlcle, while being operated by you or a relative with lhe owner's permission, which is not
owned by, furnished 10, or made available for the regular use to you or any relative in your household.
EXCEPTION: A motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to any
relative in your household is covered when operated by you.
•suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE" means a motor vehicle not owned by you or any resident of the same
household and which is used with the owner's permission to replace ior a· shon time a covered
automobile. The covered automobile has lo be out of use for servicing or repair or because of
breakdown, loss or destruction.
·UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE" means:

1. a motor vehicle for which, al lhe time of the accident, there is no insurance poficy or other financial
security appflcable to lhe owner, or operator, or any other liable person or organization.
2. a motor vehicle which hijs a bodily injury Uabifity bond or insurance policy in effect at the time of the
accident, but the amount of bodily Injury coverage under such bond or insurance policy is less than
the minimum financial security requirements of the state in which lhe covered automobfle is
principally garaged.
38157-2010

Page 480 of 709

3. a motor vehicle which has a bodily injury Jiabillity bond or insurance policy in effect at the time of the
accident, but lhe company writing such bond or policy denies coverage, or is or becomes insolvent

4. a hit and run motor vehicle which causes bodlly Injury to a person covered under this seclion as the
result of striking Iha! person or a motor vehicle which that person is occupying at the time of the
accident, if:

a.

the identity of the driver and the owner of the hit and run vehicle is unknown;

b. the accident is reported within 24 hours to a police officer, a peace or judicial officer, or the
Commissioner or Director or Motor Vehicles;
c. the injured person or someone on their behalf files with us within 30 days of the accident a
statement under oath that the injured person or their legal representative has a cause of action due
to the accident for damages against someone whose identity is unknown; and

d. the injured person or their legal representative makes available for inspection by us, when
requested, the motor vehicle occupied by that person at the time of the accident.
· The term uninsured motor vehicle does not include:

1. a covered automobile or motor vehicle regularly furnished or available for the use of you or any
relative;

2. an automobile owned and operated by a self-insurer as defined in the applicable motor vehicle
financial responsibility law, compulsory insurance law, motor carrier law, or any other similar applicable

law; or
3. an automobile owned by the United States of America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any
such government, or an agency of any of the foregoing.

"UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE" means a motor vehlcle which has a bodily injury fiability bond or
insurance policy in effect at the time or the accident, inat least the minimum·amount required by the state
in which the covered automobile is principally garaged, but less than the limits or this coverage provided
by this poUcy as stated in the Declarations.
·

The term underfnsured motor vehicle does not include:

1. a covered automoblle or motor vehicle regularly furnished or available for the use of you or any
relative;

2. an automobile owned and operated by a self.-insurer as defined in applicable motor ve.1-ticle financial
responsibility law, compulsory insurance law, motor carrier law, or any other similar applicable law; or

3. an automoblie owned by the United States of America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any
such government, or an agency of any of the foregoing.
UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
This coverage is provided only if a premium is shown in the Declarations.

We will pay damages for bodily Injury sustained by:
1. you or a rei&tlve, caused by an accidei,t 8iising out of L'··,e a;mership, maintenance, or use of an
38157-2010
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uninsured motor vehlcle, which you or a relatlve are legally entitled to collect from the owner or
driver of an uninsured motor vehicle; or
,

caused by an accident while occupylng a covered automobile, who is legally
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an unlnslD'ed motor vehlcle.

2. any other person,

We will also pay damages to any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodlly
inJury sustained by anyone described in 1. or 2. above.
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE

This coverage is provided only if a premium is shown in the Declarations.
We will pay damages for bodily Injury sustained by:

1. you or a relative, caused by an accident arising out or the ownership, maintenance, or use or an
W1derlnsured motor vehlcle, which you or a relative are legally entitled to collect from the owner or
driver of an underlnsured motor vehicle; or
.
2. any other person, caused by an accident while occupying a covered automobile, who is legally
entitled to coltect from the owner or driver or an underlnsured motor vehicle.
We will also pay damages to any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily
. Injury sustained by anyone described in 1. or 2. above.
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS

We do not cover:
A. any person occupying or struck by a motor vehlc:le owned by you or a relative, other than a
covered automoblle.

B. any person who settles a bodily Injury claim, with any liable party, without our written consent.
C. any claim which would benefit any insurer or selr-lnsurer under any workers compensation, disability
benefits, or similar law.
D. any claim for which benefits are provided under the Personal Injury Protection or Medical Expense

coverage of this policy.
E. any person, other than you, or a relative, while occupying:
1. a covered automobile while it is being used to carry persons or property for a ree.
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to shared expense car pools.
2. a vehicle while being used without the permission or the owner.
F. bodily lnjury or property damage awards designated as punitive, exemplary, or statulory multiple
damages.
G. a relative who owns, leases or has available for their regular use, a motor vehicle not described in the
Declarations.
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SETTLEMENT

Whether any person is legally entitled to collect damages under lhis section, and lhe amount to which such
person is entitled, will be determined by agreement between that person and us. Upon written consent of
bolh parties, any disagreement will be settled by arbitration.

When arbitration applies, it will take place under lhe rules of the American Arbitration Association, unless
other means are required by law or are agreed to by the injured party and us.
If a person seeking coverage files a suit against the owner or driver of the uninsured or 1mderlnswed
motor vehicle, copies or suit papers must be forwarded to us and we have lhe right to defend on the
issues of the legal Uabi6ty of, and the damages owed by, such owner or driver. However, we are nor
bound by any judgment against any person or organization obtained without our written consent
LIMIT OF LIABILITY
The fimit of liability shown in lhe Declarations for "each person" is lhe most we will pay for all damages,
including damages for care, loss or consortium, emotional distress, loss of services or death; arising out of
be>dily Injury sustained by any one person as the result of any one accident. Subject to this limit for neach
person"~ the limit sfiown in tfie Declarations for "each accident" for bodlly Injury llability, is the most we
will pay for all damages, including damages for care, loss of consortium, emotional distress, loss of
services or death, arising out of bodlly Injury sustained by two or more persons resulting from any one
accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:

1. covered persons;

2. claims made;
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. vehicles involved in the accident
REDUCTIONS

The lesser of the limits of this insurance or the amount payable under this coverage will be reduced by any
amount:
1. paid by or on behalf or any liable parties.

2. paid or payable under any workers compensation. disability benefits or similar laws.
3. paid or payable under lhe AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY section or this policy.

OTHER INSURANCE

If there is other similar insurance, we will pay only our fair share. The total amount of recovery under all
policies will be limited to the highest of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
Insurance.
Our fair share is the proportion that our Omit bears to the total of all applicable limits. However, if you do
not own the motor vehicle, our insurance will be excess over other similar uninsured or underinsured
insurance available but only in the amount by which the limit of liability of lhls policy exceeds the limits of
llability of the other available insurance. Ir there is orher excess or con~ngent insurance. we will pay our
fair share.
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No payments will be made until the limits of all other liability insurance and bonds that apply have been
exhausted by payments.
·

PHYSICAL DAMAGE
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS FOR THESE COVERAGES
The following definitions apply to these coverages oniy:
·ACTUAL CASH VALUE" means the amount that it would cost to repair or replace damaged property,
less allowance for physical deterioration and depreciation.
·coLLISION" means the upset or an automobile or the contact or an automobile with another object or
vehicle.
·
·COVERED AUTOMOBILE" means:
1. an automoblle or a trailer designed for use with an automobile, owned by you or hired under a
written contract for one year or more and for which a specific premium·is shown in the Declarations.
2. an automobile newly acquired by you, subject to the following:

a. If Comprehensive or Collision coverage applies to any automobile shown in the Declarations:
i. we will apply the broadest of these coverages to the newly acquired automobUe;
ii. you must notify us within 30 days of acquisition, of your election to make this and no other
poficy issued by us applicable to the newly acquired automobile; and

iii. you must pay any additional premium required by us.

b. It Comprehensive or Coltision coverage does not apply to any automobile shown in the
Declarations:

i. we will provide Comprehensive and Collision coverage subject to a $500 deductible for the
newly acquired automoblle;
ii. you must notify us within 6 days of acquisition, or your election to make this and no other policy
issued by us applicable to the newly acquired automobile; and

iii. you must pay any additional premium required by us.
3. a substitute automobile.
"DEDUCTIBLE" means the amount of loss to be paid by you. We pay for covered loss above the
deductible amount.
9NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE" means:

1. an automobile or traller while being used by you or a relative, with the owner's permission, which is
not owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to you or any resident in your household.
EXCEPTION: An auiornobile or a traiier owned by, furnished 10, or made avaiiable for reguiar use to
38157-2010
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any resident in your household, is considered a non-owned automobile when used by you.

2. a commercially rented automobile or trailer used by you or a relative on a temporary basis.
·suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE" means an automoblle or a traner not owned by you or any resident or
the same household and which is used with the owner's permission to replace for a short time a covered
automobUe. The covered automobile has to be out of use for servicing or repair or because of

breakdown, loss or destruction.
COVERAGES PROVIDED

The following coverages are applicable only if indicated in the Declarations. They apply to the vehicles for
which a premium is shown.
COMPREHENSIVE
We will pay tor loss lo your covered automobile or to a non-owned automoblle, including Its
equipment. not caused by colllslon, minus any appticable deductlble shown in the Declarations.
Cgver~ge is ir_:icl~ded_for_ a loss cal!sed by, but not limited to, the following:

1. FaUing objects or contact with a bird or animal;

2. Fire, explosion or earthquake;
3. Theft or larceny;
4. Windstorm, hail, water or flood;

5. Malicious mischief or vandalism;
6. Riot or civil commotion; or
7. Breakage of glass, even if caused by collislon. If your Comprehensive and Collision coverages have
different deductibles, the smaller deductible will apply to broken glass.
COLLISION
We will pay tor loss to your covered automobile or to a non-owned automobile, caused by
colllslon, including its equipment, minus any applicable decluctlble shown in the Declarations.

Deductlble Waiver: We will waive the deductible if the loss is the result of coll!slon with another
vehicle insured by us.
TOWING AND LABOR

This coverage is provided for vehicles covered under Comprehensive or Collision, as shown in the
Declarations.
·
If the covered automobile is disabled, we will pay up to the maximum limit shown in the Declarations for
the costs of labor done at the place of disablement and costs of towing for each disableme-nt.
The deductible does not apply to !he above payments.
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SUBSTITUTE TRANSPORTATION
We will pay for the cost of substitute transponation ir lhe covered automobile is disabled as a result of a
loss covered under Comprehensive or Collision. For loss caused by theft of the covered automobile,
this coverage is provided in lieu of the substitute transportation costs provided by Item 3. of ADDfflONAL
COSTS WE WILL PAY.

Payment will begin the day the covered automoblle is:
1. out of use due lo the loss, but, in the case of theft of the entire vehicle, 48 hours after the theft is
reported 10 us; or

2. the day you leave it at the repair shop.
Payment will be made for the reasonable and necessary time· required to repair or replace the covered
automobile, but, in the case of theft of the entire vehicle, until we offer settlement for the theft.
We will pay for rental from an auto rental agency, as shown in the Declarations, up to the amount per day,
but nQt mgre than the maximum amount for each disableme11t for al'ly one loss.

However, if you do not rent from an auto rental agency, we will pay you $12 per day, but not more than
the limit shown in the Declarations for each disablement for any one loss.
No deductlble shall apply to payment for substitute transportation.
ADDITIONAL COSTS WE WILL PAY

1. If a disablement occurs as a result of loss to the covered automobJle. we will pay up to $25 for
transportation to reach the intended des1ination.
2. If a loss is caused to the covered automobile by a peril insured against under this section, we will
pay up to $300 for loss to clothes and luggage belonging to you or a relative which are in the
covered automobile.

3. If the covered automoblle is stolen, we will pay up to $25 per day for substitute transportation for the
period that will begin 48 hours after the theft is reported to us and will end when we offer settlement for
the theft. If you do not rent from an auto rental agency, we will pay you $12 per day. However, the
total amount we will pay will not be more than $750.
4. We will pay general average and salvage charges for which you become legally liable for transporting

the covered automobile.

The deductible does not apply to the above payments.
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS

We do not cover:
A. any automobile while used to carry persons for a fee.
EXCEPTION: This does not apply to shared expense car pools.
B. a motor vehicle not owned by you while being used in the business or occupation of selling, leasing,
repairing, servicing, storing, or parking motor vehlcies or traliers.
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C. any loss due and confined to wear and tear, freezing, or mechanical or electrical breakdown, unless the
loss results from a theft.

D. tires unless stolen, damaged by fire or vandalism, or unless another loss happens at the same time for
which there is coverage under this policy.
E. loss to any electronic equipment designed for the reception, recording or reproduction of sound or
video, and any accessories used with such equipment. This includes. but is not limited to:
1. radios and televisions;
2. tape decks;
3. compact disc players; or

4. video cassette recorders.
This exclusion does not apply if the equipment is operated solely from the electrical system of the
vehicle and is:
a. permanently inslalled in a housing unit or location used by the automobile manufacturer for such

equipment; or

b. a component that is removable from a housing unit permanently installed in the location used by the
automobile manufacturer for such equipment.
F.

loss to electronic equipment designed torreceiving or transmitting audio, visual or data signals and any
accessories used with such equipment. This includes, but is not limited to:
1. citizens band radios;
2. two-way mobile radios;
3. telephones; or

4. personal computers.
This exclusion does nol apply to:

a. any electronic equipment

that operates solely from the electrical system of, and is necessary for the
normal operation ot the vehicie.

b. a telephone permanently installed in a location in the dashboard or console of the vehicle used by
the automobile manufacturer for a telephone.

G. loss to rapes, records, discs, other media or other devices designed for use with equipment described
in exclusions E. and F.
H. loss to a camper or living quarters unit designed for mounting on an automobile, unless the unit is
reported to us and the required premium is paid before the loss.
I. loss due to war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, or revolution.

J. loss due to radioactive contamination.
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K loss due 10 destruction or confiscation by governmental or civil authorities.
L. loss 10 an automobile located inside a raciUty designed ror racing, for the purpose of competing in,

practicing for, or preparing for, any prearranged or organized racing or speed contest.

M. a non-owned automobile while used by a relative who owns, leases or has available ror their regular
use, a motor vehicle.
N. radar and laser detectors.

O. loss to your covered automobile or any non-owned automobile due to any actual or perceived
loss in market or resale value.

MAXIMUM AMOUNT WE WILL PAY
Our payments will not exceed the lesser of:
1. the actual cash valu&

or the property at the lime of loss; or

2. the cost to repair or replace the property with other or like kind and quality.
If the loss is only to a part of the property, our responsibility extends to that part only.

The most we will pay tor loss to a traller you do not own is $500.

OTHER INSURANCE
If you have other insurance against a loss covered by this policy, we will pay our fair share. Our fair
share is the proportion that our limit bears lo the total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we
provide with respect 10 non-owned automobiles or substitute automoblles will be excess over any
other collectible insurance.

YOUR DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF LOSS
You must:
1. protect the automobll8 from further loss. We will pay you for reasonable expenses incurred for this
protection. We will not cover any loss which results from yom failure to protect the automobile from
further loss.
2. file with us a proof of ioss within 91 days or within the number or days required by law.
3. show us the damaged property and submit to examination under oath upon request.

NO BENEFIT TO BAILEE
This coverage shall not directly or indirectly benefit any carrier or bailee for hire for loss to the covered
automol>lle.

RIGHT TO APPRAISAL

tr within 60 days after proof of loss is filed, there is a disagreement as to the amount, you or we may
demand an appraisal. Each party will select a competent appraiser. Each appraiser will state separately

the actual cash value and the amount of ioss. Ii they iail to agree, they must seiect and submit their
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differences to a competent and disinterested umpire. Agreement by any two will determine the amount of
loss. Each party will pay his chosen appraiser and will equally share the expenses of lhe appraisal and
umpire.

PAYMENT OF LOSS
We may pay for the loss in money, repair the damaged property, or replace the damaged or stolen

properly. We may, at any time before the loss is paid or the property replaced, return at our own expense
any stolen property. We will return lhe property to you or to the address shown in the Declarations, at our
option. We may take all or part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value, but you cannot
abandon the property to us. We may seHle any claim or loss either with you, the owner, or any other
party who has an interest. title, or fien on the property.

GENERAL POLICY CONDITrONS
1. TERRITORY AND POLICY PERIOD

This J)Olicy applies to accidents and losses which happen while the policy is in effect:
a. in the United States, its territories or possessions;

b. in Canada:
c. while the covered automobile is being shipped between their ports; and
d. during the policy period shown by the effective date and expiration date in the Declarations, or until
the effective date and time of cancellation al your address shown in the Declarations.

2. PREMIUM CHANGES
a. All premiums for this policy will be computed in accordance with our rules. rates, rating plans,
premiums and minimum premiums which apply to the insurance provided by this po6cy. The
premiums we charge are based on the information provided by you on your application and other
information we possess. We are permitted to adjust your premiums when this information changes.
Changes during the poficy period that may result in a premium increase or decrease include, but are
not limited to, changes in:
i. the number, type or use classincation of the covered automobiles.
ii. operators using the covered automobiles, including you. relatives and all licensed drivers in
your household

m.

the principal garaging of the covered automobiles.

iv. coverage, deductible cir limits of the policy.
If a change requires a premium adjustment. we will adjust the premium as of the effective dale of the
change. Premiums are payable on the dates set tonh by us.
b. We will round all premium adjustments made for any reason to the nearest dollar, in accordance
with the manuals in use.
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c. The policy premium may be re-computed upon expiration of the Policy Period as shown in the
Declarations.

3. FRAUD AND MtSREPRESENTATION

All coverages under !his poricy are void if, whether before or after a loss, you or any person seeking
coverage has:
a. concealed or misrepresented any material fact or made any fraudulent statements; or
1-

b. in the case of any ~aud or attempted fraud, affected any matter regarding this policy or any loss for
which coverage is sought.
4. OTHER AUTOMOBlLE INSURANCE WITH US
If two or more automobile insurance policies issued by us apply to any accident or loss, the most we

will pay is the highest dollar limit or benefit in any one such policy.
5. IF AN ACCIDENT Ofl LOSS OCCURS

You or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible of any accident or toss. The
notification should include as many details as possible, including names and addresses of drivers,
injured persons and witnesses, and the time, place, and circumstances of the accident or loss. We
may require it in writing.
In the event of a theft, you must promptly notify the police. tr a claim or suit is made, immediately
forward to us e,rery claim, demand, notice, summons, or other process.
If any legal action is begun before we make payment under any coverage, a copy of the summons and
complaint or other process must be forwarded to us immediately.
6. YOUR DUTY TO COOPERATE

You must cooperate with
defend you.

us in every effort to investigate the accident or loss, settle any claims and

You must attend hearings and trials and assist in securing and giving evidence and obtaining the
attendance of witnesses. Except at your own cost, you will not voluntarily make any payment, assume
any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid to others at the time of the accident.
Under Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists coverage, we may require you to take appropriate action
to preserve your right to recover damages from any other person responsible for the bodily Injury.
Also, in any lawsuit against us, we may require you to join the responsible person as a defendent.
You must submit to examinations under oath as often as we may reasonably require.
These duties also apply to any other person making a claim under this policy.

7. LAWSUITS AGAINST US

You may not sue us unless there is full compliance with all of the terms of the poficy.
You may not sue us under the Automobi'le Liability coverage until the amount of legal Uabflity has been
finally detennined either by judgment after actual trial or by written agreement of you, the claimant and
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us. However, no one has the right to make us a party in a suit to determine legal responsibility. Your
bankruptcy or insolvency will not relieve us of any obligation under this policy.
You may not sue us under Physical Damage coverage until 30 days after proof of loss is filed and the
amount of loss is determined as provided in this policy.
These conditions also apply to any other person insured under this policy.
8. MEDICAL REPORTS; PROOF AND PAYMENT OF CLAIM

Any person making a claim as a result of bodily Injury, which may result in payment from Personal
Injury Protection coverage or Automobile Medical Expense coverage, must notify us In writing. This
notification should be sent to us as soon as reasonably possible after the person's first examination or
treatment resulting from the bodily Injury. Another person may give us the required notice on behalf
·
of the person making a claim.
Any person making a claim must, as soon as possible:
-a. -give us details about the death, injury, treatment, and other information we need to determine the
amount payable. We have the right to make or obtain a review of medical expenses and services
to determine if !hey are reasonable and necessary tor the bodily Injury sustained. Forms tor
providing this information may be provided by us.
b. consent to be examined by physicians chosen and paid by us when, and as often as, we
reasonably may require.
c. execute authorizations to permit us to obtain medical reports and records. If the person is dead or
unable to act, such authorizations must be executed by his or her legal represe.,tative.
d. submit to and provide all details concerning loss information through wriuen or recorded
statements or examinations under oath as often as we reasonably may require.
Under Personal Injury Protection coverage and ·Automobile Medical Expense coverage, we may pay
the injured person or any person or organization rendering the ser,,,ices. Any such payment will reduce
the total amounl we will pay for the injury. Any payment by us will not constitute admission of liability.
Under Personal Injury Protection coverage and Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists coverage, we
may pay any amount due to:
a. the injured person;
b. if the injured person is a minor, his parent or guardian;
c. if the person is deceased, the surviving spouse;
d.

the person authorized by law to receive such payment; or

e. the person entitled by law to recover the damages, which the payment represents.
9. OUR RECOVERY RIGHT

In the event of any payment under this policy, we are entitled to all of the rights of recovery of !he
person to whom, or on V•.'hose behalf, payment was made.
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Thal person must:
a. hold in trust for us all rights of recovery.
b. sign and deliver to us any legal papers relating to lhe recovery.
c. help us exercise those rights and do nothing alter loss to prejudice our rights.
In lhe event or recovery, we must be repaid for all amounts paid out by us plus any related collection
expenses. We will enforce this provision only in the manner and to the extent permitted under all
appficable state laws.
10. POLICY CHANGES

a. This policy conlains all of lhe agreements between you and us. The terms of this policy may not
be changed or waived except by endorsemenl issued by us.
b. We will automalically give you the benefits of any extension or broadening of coverage if a policy
change does not require additional premiums. The change will automatically apply to your poucy
as of the date we implement the change in your state.

c.

we may replace this policy to renect any changes introduced since it was issued.

Paragraph b. of
this section does not apply to changes implemented with a general revision that includes both the
broadening and restriction of coverage, whether thal general revision is implemented through
introduction of:

i. a future edition of your policy; or

ii. an endorsement changing the policy.
However, any replacement policy will not change lhe limits of coverage with respect to any
accident or loss which occurs before it was replaced.
11. ASSIGNMENT

No change of interest in this policy is effective unless we consent in writing by means of endorsement
to this poficy.
If you die, lhis policy will continue for:
a. the surviving spouse if a resident of the same household;
b. any legal representative to the extent he is acting within the scope of his duties as such; or

c. any person having proper temporary custody of the covered automobile.
12. TERMINATION

CANCELLATION
You may cancel lhispoticy by telling us on what future date you wish to stop coverage.
We can cancel lhis poUcy by delivering 10 you or by mailing to you, at your last known address
shown on our records, notice stating when the cancellation will be effective. This notice will be
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mailed to you not less than the minimum statutory time permitted by state law, but
1. not less than 1Odays:
a. (or non-payment of premium; or
b. if this policy has been in effect less lhan 60 days al the time notice or cancellation is mailed; and
2. not less than 20 days prior to the effective date oi cancellation ior underwriting reasons if yow
driver's license or the license of any other driver who either resides in the same household or

customarily operates the covered automoblle has been suspended or revoked during the 12
month period preceding the effective date of cancellation.
NONRENEWAL

If we decide not to renew or continue your poilcy, we will mail notice lo you at the last known
address shown on our records. Notice will be mailed at least 20 days before the end of the policy
period. We will have the right not to renew or continue at the expiration date shown in the
Declarations.
If we offer to renew or continue and you do not accept, this policy will automatically terminate at the
end or the current policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or continuation premium when
due shall mean that you have not accepted our offer.
OTHER TERMINATION PROVISIONS

a. · If you obtain other insurance on your covered automobile, any similar insurance provided by
this policy will terminate as to that automobile on the effective date of the other insurance.
b. If the law in effect in your state al the time this policy is issued, renewed or continued:

i. requires a longer notice period;
ii. requires a special form of or procedure ror giving notice; or
iii. modifies any of the stated termination reasons;
we will comply with those requirements.

c. Proof or mailing of any notice shall be sufficient proof or notice.

you cancel, premium may be computed on a short rate basis: If we cancel, premium shall be
computed on a prD-fata basis. Return premium shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. Any refund
may be returned either at the time cancellation is effected or as soon as possible arter cancellation
becomes effective, but refund or offer or refund is not a condition of cancellation.

d. If

e. The effective date of canceilation or termination stated in the notice shall become the end of the
p:>ficy period.

13. LOSS PAYABLE CLAUSE
If a loss payee is shown in the Declarations, we may pay any comprehensive or collision loss to:

a. you and, if unpaid, the repairer;
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b. you and the loss payee, as its interest may appear, when we find ii is not practical to repair the
covered automobile; or
c. the loss payee, as to its interest, if the covered automoblle has been repossessed.
When we pay the loss payee for loss, we are entitled to the loss payee's right of recovery to the
extent or our payment. OLD' right or recovery shall not impair !he loss payee's right to recover the full
amount of its claim.
The coverage for the loss payee's interest will not be invalidated by any act or neglect of you or the
owner or person legally in possession of the vehicle except:
a. when you or the owner or person legally in possession of the covered automobDe makes
fraudulent statement{s) or engages in fraudulent conduct in connection with any loss for which
coverage is sought.
·
b. when the vehicle is intentionally damaged, destroyed or concealed:

i. by or at the direction of you or the owner or person legally in possession of the vehicle; or
ii. as a result of any other act which constitutes
and the loss payee.

a breach of contract between

you or the

owner

c. if you do not have any insurable interest in the covered automobile.
The loss payee must file a claim in writing and comply with the conditions of the policy.
The loss payee's interest may be terminated as permitted by the terms and conditions of the policy
and the date of termination or the loss payee's interest will be at least 10 days after the date we mail
·the termination notice.
IN wrrNESS WHEREOF, we have caused this policy to be signed by its President and its Secretary at
Warwick, Rhode Island. In the event that the President or Secretary who signed this contract cease to be
our officers either before or after the contract is issued, the contract may be issued with the same effecr as
if they were stiH our officers.

Secretary
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t..JPI ~n1 n..nnn Drinhui in I f

w~ w4e::--c
President

Page 494 of 709
~

.a OMn

INDEX OF POLICY PROVISIONS

Additional Benefits We Will Provide
Additional Costs We Will Pay
Additional Definitions For This Coverage
AcilJal cash Value
Collision
Covered Automobile
Deductible

3
15
2, 6, 9, 13

18

If An Accident Or Loss Occurs

19

Lawsuits Against Us
loss Payable Clause
Limit Of Liability

22
5, 8, 12

13
13

2. 6, 9, 13
13

Jnsured
Medical Expanses
Non-Owned Automobile
SubstIMe AulomobOe
Uninsured Motor Vehicle
Underinsured Motor Vehicle
Automobile Liability Coverage
Assignment

General Policy Conditions

2
6

3, 6, 13
3, 7, 9, 14
9
10
2
21

cancellation
Clothes And Luggage
Collision Coverage
Comprehensive Coverage
CoofonnityWilh Financial Responslbltlty Laws
Coverage Provided

21
15
14
5
3, 7, 14

Deductible
Disablement

13, 14
14

14

Maximum Amout We Will Pay
17
Medical Expense Review
9
Medical Reports; Proof And Payment 01 Claim 20
No Benefit To Bailee
NDIVenewal
Other Automobile Insurance With Us
Other Insurance
Olher Temlination Provisions
Our Recovery Righi
Out Of State Insurance

Payment Of loss
Premium Changes
Polley Changes

Fraud and Misrepresentation

loss
Motor Vehicie
Occupying, Occupied
Property Damage
Relative
Trailer
We, Us, Our, Company
You. Your
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18
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Salvage Charges
Settlement
Substitute Transportation Coverage
Substitute Transportation

15
12
15
15
21

1

Tennination
Terrltory And Polley Period
Towing And Labor Coverage

18
14

1
1
1

Uninsured M otofists Coverage
Underinsured Motorists Coverage

10
11

Your Duties In The Event Of A Loss
Your Duty To Cooperate

17
19

4
7

11
15

19

General Definitions

Automobile
Bodily lnj.Jry

19
6, 8, 12, 17
22

5, 12
17

Reductions

Medical Expense
Uninsured And Underinsured Motorists
Physical Damage

17
22

Right To Appraisal

Exclusions

Liability

19

1
1
1
1
2
2
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utomobile Insurance Declaration

:iolicy Number: 1193308780
:iolicy Effective Date: 08/07/2009
:ioJicy Expiration Date: 02/07/2010
At: 12:01 A.M.

··t""-··J

ST 11.
Page 2

of 2

Renewal Effective Date: 08/07/2009

iiscounts
·hefollowing have been included in the total semi-annual premium:
MetRewards Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA 1996 TOYOT
Airbag Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA 1996 TOYOT
Anti-Jock Brake Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA 1996 TOYOT
Active Anti-theft Discount applies lo 1996 TOYOT
Passive Anti-theft Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA
Good Student Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT
Auto Policy Plus, including
Homeowners

:ating Information
lousehold Drivers:

GREG HOLLAND
KATHY HOLLAND
BENJAMIN C HOLLAND

17/16/1955
)3/30/1957
0/13/1986

=YOU

Insured
Spous e/Co"'.I nsured
Child

HAVE A DRIVER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO ts NOT LISTED ABOVE, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY.

·our policy is rated on the following information:
803 HONDA

Driver Assigned:
· Commute 20 Miles

J02 HONDA

Driver Assigned:
· Pleasure Use

;195 TOYOT

Driver Assigned:
Commute 04 Miles

KATHY HOLLAND
Multi-Car Rate
Annual Mileage 15,000
GREG HOLLAND
Multi-Car Rate
O
Annual Mileage
BENJAMIN C HOLLAND ·
.Multi-Car Rate
O
. Annual Mileage

Licensed 36 Years
Married
Ucensed 38 Years
· Married
Licensed 06 Years
Unmarried

1terested Parties
J03 HONDA

Lien/Loss Payee:

HONDA FINANCE SERVICE

. PO BOX 5025 .
J02 HONDA

Lien/Loss Payee:

396 TOYOTA

Lien/Loss Payee:

HONDA FINANCE SERV
PO BOX5025
HORIZON CREDIT UNION
PO BOX 15128

:ir seNice or claims; see the Customer
2rvice and Claim Directory located on
e back of your cover page.

t!..lfe Auio & Home, is a

~WM'Jil!/;l,man Prop,erty and Casualty Insurance Company and its Affiliates, Warwick. RI

SAN RAMON

CA~94583

SAN RAMON

CA 94583

SPOKANEVLY

WA99215

Your representative is:
FOREDYCE. JOSEPH
. TEL: 208--777 -7402
JOS-153-5
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utomobile Insurance Dedaratior ·
Policy Number: 1193308780
Policy Effective Date: 08/07/2009
::>olicy Expiration Date: 02/07/2010
At: 12:01 A.M.

Page 1

1
2
3

2003
2002
1996

of 2

Renewal Effective Date: 08/07/2009

~amed Insured:
<.ATHY HOLLAND AND
::;REGORY HOLLAND
18439 W HOLLAND
=>OST FALLS ID 83854

feh Year

11

Bill To: Insured

Insured Vehicle(s)
Body Type Vehicle ID Number

Make

Model

HONDA
HONDA
TOYOTA

CIVIC L
CIVIC L
TACOMA

4DR
4DR
PUCLCAB

:overage Description

Sym Territory

2HGES16693H611731
2HGES15612H598892
4TAWM72N4TZ137339

15
14
15

01
01
01

Semi-Annual Premiums
2003
2002
1996

Applicable Limits

HONDA HONDA T0Y0T
.iability
Bodily Injury
Property Damage. .
1edical Expense
lninsured Motorists
Bodily Injury
lnderinsured Motorists
Bodily Injury .
'hysical Damage

.ctual Cash Value (ACV) or Limit
Collision 1.ess deducti_ble .
Comprehensive less "deductible
· · 'Towing and Labor Limit
1ptional Coverages
Substitute Transportation
Glass Deductible Buyback

.....
4>
$

250,000 Per Person/
500,000 Per Accident

$
$
2003
HONDA
ACV
$ 500.
$ 500
50
$

Per Person/.
Per Occurrence
Per Occurrence
Per Person

.·. 250,000 Per Person/
500,000 Per Accident
1996
2002
HONDA TOYOT
ACV·
ACV
· $ 500 $.1000
$ 500 $1000
$ so $ . so

$ 40 Day/$1200 Occurrence

otal Semi-Annual Premium:

eductible Savings Benefit (DSB) $

$

250,000
500,000
250,000
10,000

$
.$
$

$

962.00
...

Vehicle Totals:

57
39
14

62
41
17

126
87
18

7

7

7

7

7

7

85
49
Incl

76
53
Incl

97
63
Incl

18
Incl

18
Incl

Incl

276

281

405

,150

eductible Savings reduces Collision or Comprehensive deductibles, eY.cluding towing and glass claims. effective
3/07/2009 for claims. occurring after this date. Your next anniversary date is 08/07/2010. 'See Important Notice for
:::tails.
::>rms and Endorsements
MPL 6010-0001D700A VSSO V702 V911 V506

.Life Auto&: Horne is a brand of Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company ar,d its Affiliates. Warwick. Rl
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Property and Casualty lnsuranc~f'~~"lnpany
. ,utomobile Insurance Declarations ~?:rJ

---------------.

olicy Number: 1193308781
olicy Effective Date: 09/24/2009
olicy Expiration Date: 09/24/2010
At: 12:01 A. M.

Page

2

of 2

Renewal Effective Date: 09/24/2009

scounts
1e following have been included in the total annual premium:

MetRewards Discount applies to 2005 SUZUK
iting Information

:>usehold Drivers:

7/16/1955
3/30/1957
)/13/1986

Insured
Spouse/Co-Insured
Child

GREG HOLLAND
KATHY HOLLAND
BENJAMIN HOLLAND

YOU HAVE A DRIVER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO IS NOT LISTED ABOVE, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY.

I0SSUZUK

Driver Assigned:
Pleasure Use

BENJAMIN HOLLAND

Licensed 06 Years
Unmarried

Annual Mileage 3,000
Your representative is:
FOREDYCE, JOSEPH
TEL: 208 - 777 - 7402
J05- 1 - 5

,r service or claims, see the Customer
~rvice and Claim Directory located on
e back of your cover page.

38157-2010
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tomobile Insurance Declaration

olicy Number: 1193308781
olicy Effective Date: 09/24/2009
olicy Expiration Date: 09/24/2010

Page 1

At 12:01 A.M.

Renewal Effective Date: 09/24/2009

Bill To: Credit Card

lamed Insured:
i REG HOLLAND AND
ATHY HOLLAND
8439 W HOLLAND
'OST FALLS ID 83854

Insured Vehicle(s)
Body Type Vehicle Id Number

eh Yeai

Make

Model

1

SUZUKI

GSXR-60

2005

of 2

CYCLE

overage Description

CCs Territory

JS 1GN7CA052104636

0599

Applicable Limits

01

Annual Premiums
2005

SUZUK
ability
Bodily In jury
Property Damage
ninsured Motorists

Bodily Injury
nderinsuredMotorists
Bodily Injury

1ysical Damage

$
$
$

250,000 Per Person/
500,000 Per Occurrence
250,000 Per Occurrence

$
$

250,000 Per Person/
500,000 Per Accident

8

$
$

250,000 Per Person/
500,000 Per Accident

8

126
156

2005

SUZUK
:tual Cash Value (ACV) or Limit

ACV

Collision less deductible
Comprehensive less deductible
Towing and Labor Limit

$ 500
$

>tal Annual Premium:

$

~ductible Savings Benefit (DSB) $

42
32
Incl

500
75

.$

372.00

Vehicle Totals:

372

150

=ductible Savings reduces Collision or Comprehensive deductibles. excluding towing and
t/24/2009 for claims occurring after this date. Your next anniversary date is 09/24/2010.
:tails.

claims, effective
Important Notice for

•rms and Endorsements
MPL 6010-000 1D700A V130A V550 \/702 V911

_ire Auto /l, Home is

L 1380-000

a181ngf!io"fo"olitan Property

and Casualty Insurance C!>mpany and its /lffilialeS, Warwick, .RI
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Metro~t~ ::)n Property and Casualty lnsurand
)mpany
,f4'Automobile Insurance Declarations ,,

>olicy Number: 0234338980
>oJicy Effective Date: 10/16/2009
>olicy Expiration Date: 10/16/2010
At: 12:01 A.M.

ST 11
Page

2

of 2

Reinstatement Effective Date: 10/16/2009

iscounts

he following have been included in the total annual premium:
MetRewards Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT
Airbag Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT
Anti-lock Brake Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT
Active Anti-theft Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT
Auto Policy Pius, including
Homeowners
_ating Information
lousehold Drivers:

BENJAMIN C HOLLAND

0/13/1986

Insured

-·

: YOU HAVE A DRIVER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO IS NOT LISTED ABOVE, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY.

·our policy is rated on the following information:
396 TOYOT

Driver Assigned:
Commute 04 Miles

BENJAMIN C HOLLAND

Licensed 07 Years
Unmarried

Annual Mileage 12,000
1terested Parties
396 TOYOTA

Lien/Loss Payee:

HORIZON CREDIT UNION
PO BOX 15128

SPOKAI\JE VALLE

lessages

:ancellation void. Policy reinstated without lapse of coverage.

or service or claims, see the Customer
ervice and Claim Directory located on
te back of your cover page.

38157-2010
:tlife Auto&. Home is a brand of Melropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and Its Affiliates, Warv-.iick. RI

Your representative is:
FOREDYCE, JOSEPH
TEL: 208 - 777 - 7 402
JDS- 153- 5
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Property and Casualty lnsuran,
\~,~,;Automobile Insurance Declaratior_

=>olicy Number: 0234338980
=>olicy Effective Date: 10/16/2009
=>olicy Expiration Date: 10/16/2010
At: 12:01 A.M.

ILi IU/LUU~

mpany

ST 11

Page 1

of 2

Reinstatement Effective Date: 10/16/2009

\lamed Insured:
3ENJANllN C HOLL.AND
1359 W CARDINAL AVE
-JAYDEI\J ID 83835

Bill To: Insured

Insured Vehicle(s)

'eh Year
1

1996

Make

Model

TOYOTA

TACOMA

Vehicle ID Number

Body Type
PUCLCAB

:overage Description

4TAWM72N4TZ137339

Applicable Limits

Sym Territory
15
01

Annual Premiums
1996

TOYOT
.iability
Bodily Injury

$

$
$
$

Property Damage
1edical Expense
lninsured Motorists
Bodily Injury

s;

Jnderinsured Motorists
Bodily Injury
'hysical Damage

100,000
300,000
50,000
10,000

Per
Per
Per
Per

Person/
Occurrence
Occurrence
Person

222
162
27

$

100,000 ?er Person/
300,000 Per Accident

12

$
$

100,000 Per Person/
300,000 Per Accident

12

1996

TOYOT
.ctual Cash Value (ACV) or Limit
Collision:less deductible
Comprehensive less deductible
Towing and Labor Limit
tptional Coverages
Glass Deductible Buyback

ACV

$ 1000
$ 1000
$ 100

Incl

otal Annual Premium:

eductible Savings Benefit (DSB) $

189
158
Ind

$

782.00

Vehicle Totals:

782

150

eductible Savings reduces Collision or Comprehensive deductibles. excluding towing and glass claims. effective
2/10/2009 for claims occurring after this date. Your next anniversary date is 10/16/2010. See Important Notice for
=tails.
------------------------------------------ --------------------------------orms and Endorsements
MPL 6010-000 10700A V550 V702 V911 V506

I Life Aulo & Home is~~11-Q!'~opolitan Prop~rty and CasuaJty Insurance Company and its Affiliates. Warwick. RI

PL 1380-000
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MetUte'Auto & Home®
Freeport Field Claim Office
Mail Processing Center
P.O. Box 410250
Charlotte, NC 2B241
(800) 854-6011

MetLife
December 29, 2009

Funke and Associates
Attn: Kinzo H Mihara.
P.O. Box 969
Coeur D Alene, ID 83816

Our Customer:
Our ClaiJD Number:
Date of Loss:

Benjamin C. Holland

FRD37313 BG
October 25, 2009

...

..1

Enclosed please find a check for $1,000.00 made payable to "Estate of Benjamin C ..Holland".
Please caH with any questions.

=

---

Sincerely,

Margaret Signalness
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company
Claim Adjuster
(800) 854-6011 Ext. 78i2
Fax.: (866) 947-0224
I

•

'

'

';

D:/Ch~'ck}fo;JG1,;()00.00 made payabie to "Estate of Benjamin C Holland".
letter on top to Attorney.
!f.:'' ,

,.

~

T

•

Please mail
,t

w:.ih: the

~

IDAHO LAW REQ:cJ!E.ES US TO NO-;I'IFY YOU OFT.HE FOLJ:.,OWING: Ai;iy person who knowingly, an_d with
intent to defraud any insurance company, files a statement containing any false incomplete, or misleading information
is guilty of felony.
.

a

MetLife AUlo & Home is·a brand or Metropolllan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and ils Affiliates, Warwick, RI

38157-2010
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0003

: ,<' BOX

4~0400
CHAALOTTE

MetLife Auto & Home

NC 28241

MetLife Auto & Home is a brand of
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company
and its Atti li aies, Warwick, RI
0003

FRD37)130
ESTATE OF BENJAMIN C HOLLAND
P O BOX 969

COEUR DALENE , ID 83816

INSURED:

CLAfMANT:

BENJAMIN C HOLLAND
BENJAMIN-C HOLLAND

CHECK NUMBER:

002478683

CHECK AMOUNT:

$1,000.00

One thousand and

oo/rno Dollars

MEDPAY COV, FUNERAL BENEFIT OF $1,000.00 FOR
BENJAMIN C HOLLAND

JS BG BG 0938159

*

EXHIBIT "4"

38157-2010

Page 506 of 709

Clnim Number: FR.0408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:23 pm, Author: Wenger FRIAT, M,
Keyword(s): New Claim

Cross Reference: FRD37313

Claim Number: FRD408370~ Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:23 pm, Author: Wenger FRIAT, M,
Keyword{s): Handler Alert

YX Freeport YX hns been assigned ns U1c.A1U Adjuster handler for Lhis claim.

Claim Number: FRD408370, Dnte/tirne: 12/7/2009 2:32 pm, Author: Knoph, J, Keyword(s):

Handler Alert
LaRae Hill has been assigned as the AIU Adjuster hand] er for this claim.

Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:53 pm. Aulhor: Wolman, I, r<eyword(s):
Handler Alert
Daneice Davis has been assigned as the Casualty - Auto bnndler for this claim.

Claim Nwnber. FRD408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:53 pm, Author: System., Keyword(s): New
aaim.
.
New Casually Claim

Claim Number. FRD408370. Date/time: 12/7/2009 2.:54 pm, Author. Wolm~ I, Keyword(s):
Sup/MgrRev
This is a companion claim to one that DaneiceDirvis is already handling.

392
38157-2010

00126
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Claim Number: FRD408370, DoleJtime: 12/8/2009 9:12 nm, Author: Davis, D, Kcyword(s):
Coverage, Loss lnfo
Orgin Date : 8/7/2001
No concurrent issues
Policy Term: 9/24/2009 - 9/24/20 I0
Loss Date: l 0/25/2009
Listed Drivers:
Greg Holland 7/16/1955
Ko.thy Holland 3/30/1957
B enjemin Holland 10/1311986
2005 Suzuki OSXR-60
Coverage: Metropolitan Properly and Casualty Compnny
Motorcycle Policy
Endorsements: MPL 6010-00
ID700A
V130A
V550
V702
V91 l
Loss Reported: NI was passenger in non owned vehicle fatality.
There are other claims set up:
NJ Auto Policy: FRD37313

Parentts Auto Policy: FRD40844 ·:
Contact has been made with attorney on cross refemece files.
Reserves: ON this file: I am setting a table AUB reserve as
Allstate the car tbe NI was a pBBsenger in has !650/1 00 U1:1t
Metlife Auto Policy for Benjamin Holland has I 00/300 Limit
Parents Policy: FRD40844 - $250/500
On this file 1 am completing an ROR fur ~esidenr.y Issues
Need R/.S from both Named lnsurads for residency issues
I have requested lhe Policy - Need to read as it appears Benjamin Hal.land may be a listed driver
and not a named insured?

393
38157-2010

D0127
Page 508 of 709

i.l,

\.,

Claim Number: FRD4083 70, Date/time: 12/8/2009 10:49 em, Author. Davis, D, Keyword(s):
Coverage, GREG HOLLAND

To Transmittal Desk:
Da~e ofRequest:December 8, 2009

Insured Name:Greg Holland
Insured Address:Greg Holland
18439 W Holland
Post Falls, ID 83854
Claim Number:FRD40837 CB
Date of Loss:October 2.5, 2009
Policy Number:119330878-1
Vehicle Year/Make:2005 Suzuski

Coverage Verification Requested For:

New Policy
Cancellation
Proof of Mailing
Copy of Letter
XCopy ofOriginaJ Application
Manual Policy

DEC
Certified DEC
XCertified Copy of Policy/ Endorsements
Copy of Po]icy /Endorsements
Copy of UM Election Form
Copy of P697

Copy of Undeiwriting File

PELP
Copy Rcq uired

Attach Coverage when Requesting Certified Documents/ Underwriting Information
Other/ Remarks:

394
38157-2010
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Claim Number: FRD408370, Dale/time: 12/8/2009 11 :02 am, Author: Davis, D, Keyward(s):
Attornc:y
Called attomey's office and left message with Julie for LOR.

Claim Number: FRD408370, OaleJtirne: 12/8/2009 11:54 pm, Author: MIP Requirement,.
Keyword(s): Mnnage1· Intervention
The following Casualty key word(s} were found and triggered Ibis alert: fatality, requiring a file
re-view.

Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/Lime: 12/9/2009 3:20 pm, Author: Shick, M, Keyword(s):
Coverage, Sup/Mgr Rev, BENJAMIN HOLLAND
Reviewed file __
rli1c: FRD37313 - ai policy - Benjamin Holland
xfile: FRD40844- parents policy,
this file hns been set up per request from claimant attorney looking for additional coverage for our
NI-Benjamin ..••• this policy is tbe motorcycle policy that is in the ni parent's name but Benjamin
is a listed driver.

xfile of FRD373 l3 ...we are about to tender ins policy limits when attorney has submitted these 2
ndd'l claims ]oolciag for coverage under these policies....Nl was a passenger in an unowned
vehicle. Per agent, there were no other policies...23 yr old ins lived on his own, µurchesed a home
10/9/09, owned his own vehicle, had his awn insurance policy.
Liab D/1 00--appears div fel] asleep, losing control ofiv. strilcing tree.
ale Allstnte has 50/100 abi limits and have tendered their policy limits...:
auu table reserve has been set as a precaution as we detennine coverage.
Daneice is ordering certified copies of this policy and parents policy and ali uw notes and referring
to defense counsel to review to assist in determining coverage.

Claim Number: FRD408370, DateJtime: 12/30/2.009 I 0:11 am, Author: Syslem,., Keyword(s):
Handler Alert ·

Daneice Davis is currently oul of Lhe office thru Jan G2010

Claim Number. FRD408370, Date/time: 12/30/2009 I 0:11 am, Author: Hardy, D, Keyworcl{s):
HOCA
ere we getting the requested materials, etc.? we may have an t:xposure under UIM under this
policy, but a complete review is needed.

395
38157-2010
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Claim Number. FRD408440, Date/time: 1/12/2010 11 :47 am, Author: Dnvis, D, Keyword[s):
Coverage
REquested the coverages ngnin. Never received the oorignal one.

C]aim Number. FRD408440, Date/time: 1/21/2010 9:59 am, Author. Davis, D, Keyword(s):
Coverage
Pending covernga response from Kuthy Pnukdert
509 232 7760

Kpaukerl@pt-Iaw.com.

Claim Number: FRD408~40, Dale/time: I/29/2010 2:00 pm, Author: Davis, D, Keyword(s):
Agent, Coverage
Called the agentJoe Fodeyece, 208 777 7402, he advised that Ben did cal1 to agent to add but he
was under the impression that U1e parents were going to be on the title.
He alao advised that it was in Coure D'Alene press that the attorney has filed suit against Met Life
in this matter.

Claim Number. FRD408440, Date/time: 1/29/2010 2:32 pm, Author: Davis, D, Keywotd(s):
Coverage
Called Kathy Paukert
509 232 7760

401
38157-2010
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Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/lime: l/29/20l0 4:23 pm, Author: Hardy, D, Keyword(s):
HOCA, Authority
reviewed this marter once agnill. I concur with DC Pnukert thnt we hnve n $ I50k ne\v UIM
·exposure under the mtoroc:yde file nnd am willing ro tender it at this lime:. this is in tiddition to the
$50lc new UIM Wlposura under Ben's own Auto policy. 1 do not believe there is any coverage
under the parent's Auto policy, but if there was, the payout would still be capped to the higher limit
and it would not create an additional liability fo·r us. ·- ·
·
·

Claim Number. FRD40844D, Date/lime: 1/29/2010 4:26 pm, Author: Hardy, D, Keyword(s):
FRD40837 File
the preceeding note belongs in the Motorcycle clnim FRD40B37.

Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/10120 IO 4:21 pm, AuU1or: Groezinger, M,
Keyword(s): Summary
QFT: I have a new EC Suit on this file so I need to split this file & open a new claim to hn.nd le lhe
EC file. Please give the new file to me nod transfer all the file notes &info on the Charlie tree
from this file over. Thanks I

Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/11/2010 8:45 am, Author. Myers, C, Keyword(s):
Admin Support

.

·

Rcvd request, forwarded to QFr COY.
QFT

Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/11/2.010 4:23 pm, Author. Eckert. T, ICeyword(s):
Adioin Support
Please set up another claim EXACTLY like this one. (please note, there is NO insd veh involved,
so you will skip right over the "insured vehicle" tab). Thanks! -QFT

Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/12/2.010 11 :32 nm, Author: Eurli, M, Keyword(s):
Loss Info, Admin Support
THIS CLAIM HAS BEEN RESET TO FRD5D561.
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